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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Interest in identifying the determinants of terrorism has gained renewed attention after
the devastating terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.
Shortly after the attacks, a quick consensus among intellectuals (Jai, 2001), politicians
and the public emerged that poverty i.e., socio-economic underdevelopment crucially
contributes to the emergence of terrorism. For instance, Kim Dae-jung, the Nobel Peace
Prize recipient of 2000, argued that at "[...] the bottom of terrorism is poverty. That is the
main cause." (cited in Jai, 2001). Similarly, the then U.S. President George W. Bush (2002)
suggested that in underdeveloped countries "[...] persistent poverty and oppression can lead
to hopelessness and despair", leading to scenarios where these countries can ultimately
become "havens for terror".
Indeed, there is a long tradition among the leaders and followers of terrorist revolu-
tionary movements to attribute their armed struggle (partly) to the prevalence of poor
socio-economic conditions. For instance, Vladimir I. Lenin (1906) argued that the "[...]
old Russian terrorism was an a¤air of the intellectual conspirator; today as a general rule
guerrilla warfare is waged by the worker combatant, or simply by the unemployed worker."
Following his line of reasoning, guerilla warfare (i.e., terrorism) has clear economic under-
pinnings, being rooted in economic disenfranchisement, unemployment and, more broadly
and consistent with the Marxist ideas of historical materialism, the class conict between
the proletariat ("the workers") and the bourgeoisie who owns the means of production.1
1Cohen-Almagor (1991) also discusses the role of violence and terrorism in the writings of Marx, Engels
and Lenin. He also comes to the conclusion that these writers considered terrorist violence to be an
2Throughout the 20th century, left-wing revolutionary groups in the developed e.g., the
West German Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion, RAF ) and the Italian Red Brigade
(Brigate Rosse, BR) and in the developing world e.g., the Argentinian Peoples Revolu-
tionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo, ERP) and the Philippine New Peoples
Army (Nuevo Ejército del Pueblo, NPA) referred to such lines of argumentation, styling
their terrorist campaigns as armed struggle directed against social injustice and economic
oppression on national and global levels (Shughart, 2006). What is more, economic motives
have also been repeatedly argued to fuel terrorist movements with ostensibly territorial or
religious goals.2 For instance, Piazza (2011) suggests that economic discrimination of mi-
nority groups may have crucially fueled violent activities by terrorist groups such as the
Spanish Basque Homeland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA) and Sri Lankas
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Ila Vitutalaip Pulika, LTTE ). Mousseau (2011)
argues that urban poverty has lled the ranks of and fueled popular support for Islamist
terrorist groups such as the Turkish Great Eastern Islamic RaidersFront (Islami Büyük-
dogu Ak¬ncilar Cephesi, IBDA-C ) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Ozbekiston
Islomiy Harakati, IMU ).
Yet, terrorism may not only be (partly) rooted in socio-economic underdevelopment.
It may also negatively a¤ect economic outcomes. Indeed, the potential threat of terrorism
to a countrys economic situation has been frequently recognized by politicians. For in-
stance, U.S. President Barack H. Obama (2012) argued that "disruptions to supply chains
caused by [...] criminal and terrorist networks [...] can adversely impact global economic
growth and prosperity." As a matter of fact, economic destabilization appears to be a prime
goal of terrorist organizations (Schelling, 1991). Repeatedly, such organizations have used
terrorism as a means of economic warfare, e.g., by deliberately attacking a countrys key
acceptable instrument to promote social change, where social conict itself was attributed to class (i.e.,
economic) antagonisms.
2 Indeed, a number of these terrorist groups have simultaneously embraced left-wing ideas geared towards
socio-economic redistribution. For instance, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) fought for the
unication of Northern Ireland with the rest of Ireland as a socialist republic (Shughart, 2006). As another
example, the Iranian Peoples Mujahedin of Iran (MEK) followed an ideology of Islamic Marxism.
3industries e.g., oil pipelines or centres of the tourism industry or targeting managers
and businessmen (e.g., Lutz and Lutz, 2006). Ultimately, a strategy of economic desta-
bilization aims at inicting intolerable economic damage on the terroristsopponents, so
that the enemy would be forced to give in to the terroristsdemands to avoid further neg-
ative economic consequences (e.g., Sanders and Enders, 2008). For instance, Osama bin
Laden (2004) argued that terrorist actions by al-Qaida also serve the purpose of "bleeding
America to the point of bankruptcy", so that it would be easier for al-Qaida to realize its
ultimate goals (e.g., to repel U.S. inuence in the Muslim World).
To sum up, in the popular discourse poor socio-economic conditions have been re-
peatedly named as a root cause of terrorism, while terrorisms adverse e¤ects on economic
growth and development have also not gone unnoticed. Indeed, the self-perception of many
terrorist groups suggests that economic motivations matter strongly to their armed strug-
gle, while these groups have also recognized the potential of terrorism as means of economic
warfare. Figure 1.1 plots the global number of terrorist attacks between 1980 and 2007
against the global growth of per capita income during this period of time. The data on
terrorist activity are drawn from the Global Terrorism Database, the GTD, as introduced
by LaFree and Dugan (2007).3 The growth series is extracted from the latest version of
the World Development Indicators (WDI ), as provided by the World Bank (2012). Figure
1.1 suggests that more terrorist activity negatively correlates with global economic activity
(their correlation coe¢ cient is -0.122) and vice versa. For instance, the increase in world-
wide terrorist incidents during the early 1990s was associated with a noticeable decline in
global economic growth during the same time period. While Figure 1.1. does not allow for
causal argumentations, it serves as a starting point for the discussion advanced throughout
3Throughout this thesis terrorism is dened as the intentional use of violence (or threat thereof) by a
sub-national (i.e., non-state) actor outside the context of legitimate warfare activities (e.g., a civil war),
where this act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal, with the intention
to coerce, intimidate or convey some other message to a larger audience than the immediate victims. This
is the GTD denition of terrorism (cf. Drakos, 2011). Other databases on terrorist activity employ slightly
di¤erent denitions of terrorism, given that the phenomenon of terrorism is in itself di¢ cult to dene
(Anderton and Carter, 2011; Drakos, 2011). This doctoral thesis sticks to the GTD denition of terrorism
because the GTD is used as the main source of information on terrorism throughout this thesis (particularly
in Chapters 2 and 4).
4Figure 11: Global Terrorist Activity and GDP Growth, 1980-2007
this doctoral thesis on the negative and potentially complex interaction between socio-
economic conditions (indicated by global economic growth) and terrorist activity. At a
rst empirical glance, popular perceptions about the socio-economic roots and negative
economic consequences of terrorism do not seem to be unsubstantiated.
This doctoral thesis sheds further light on the relationship between terrorism and the
economy. Below, a brief overview of the literature on the economic causes and macroeco-
nomic consequences of terrorism is provided. This section serves the purpose of identify-
ing important gaps in the academic (empirical) literature associated with the terrorism-
economy nexus. Note that this section does not provide a more comprehensive overview
of this literature for two reasons. First, several studies already provide extensive surveys
regarding the determinants of terrorism (e.g., Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Kis-Katos
et al., 2011; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011) and its potential economic repercussions (e.g.,
Lutz and Lutz, 2006; Frey et al., 2007; Bird et al., 2008; Sandler and Enders, 2008). Sec-
ond, all three empirical studies of this thesis also discuss the literature that is particularly
relevant to their respective topic in more detail.
51.1 A Brief Look at the State of Research
1.1.1 Economic Determinants of Terrorism
As shown above, popular wisdom has it that economic conditions matter to the emer-
gence of terrorism. Intuitively, the poor the likely would-be terrorists ought to resort to
violence to change socio-economic conditions in their favor. Rational-choice theory the
theoretical workhorse of most economic analyses of the determinants of terrorism (e.g.,
Sandler and Enders, 2004; Caplan, 2006) can be used to provide a theoretical reason-
ing that mirrors this popular wisdom. In short, in a rational-choice approach terrorists
are considered rational actors who want to maximize their (political) utility from using
terrorism as a means to facilitate socio-political change, where they are subject to certain
constraints such as nancial resources or manpower (e.g., Sandler and Enders, 2004). Then,
terrorists are expected to choose the optimal (i.e., utility-maximizing) level of violence by
considering the benets from terrorism (e.g., from gaining government concessions) as well
as its costs (e.g., from government punishment) and opportunity costs (e.g., from foregone
earnings). Arguably, a countrys long-run level of socio-economic development (measured
by, e.g., poverty or income inequality) and short-run state of the economy (indicated by,
e.g., economic growth) can be expected to inuence the terroristscalculus. For example,
Blomberg et al. (2004a, b) introduce a model in which the poor state of the economy
(i.e., slow economic growth) fosters terrorist activity. They argue that the benets from
terrorism during economic downturns increase because terrorist success (i.e., a redistribu-
tion of wealth) means more access to an otherwise scarce resource base. Also, slow growth
means that the opportunity costs of terrorism are particularly low because, e.g., non-violent
opportunities of economic participation are limited.
However, the empirical literature on the determinants of terrorism is far from produc-
ing consistent results regarding the role of economic factors in terrorism. For one, there
is robust empirical evidence that economic success immunizes against the occurrence of
civil wars (e.g., Sambanis, 2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Some studies also nd that
6socio-economic progress is detrimental to terrorism as a form of lower-scale conict. For
instance, Blomberg et al. (2004b) and Blomberg and Hess (2008a, b) nd that economic
progress is associated with a decrease in terrorism. What is more, further studies point
at indirect linkages between terrorism and the economy, where any improvement of socio-
economic conditions as intervening variables that is a consequence of some underlying
policy change (the development of a welfare state, economic liberalization etc.) ultimately
reduces terrorist activity. For example, Li and Schaub (2004) nd that economic integra-
tion tends to have a benecial e¤ect on economic growth and development, which in turn
makes terrorism less likely by driving up the price of terrorism. Similarly, Burgoon (2006)
argues that social welfare policies reduce terrorist activity through their benecial e¤ect
on the socio-economic causes of terrorism (e.g., economic insecurity, inequality). Finally,
Piazza (2011) nds that economic discrimination leads to domestic terrorism, whereas poli-
cies that counter this kind of discrimination may discourage terrorism that otherwise would
have emerged due to economic grievances.
For another, most empirical studies on the causes of terrorism stress the primacy of
non-economic over economic variables in terrorism (e.g., Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011;
Kis-Katos et al., 2011; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011).4 For instance, Basuchoudhary and
Shughart (2010) nd that terrorism is more strongly related to ethnic tension than to
economic development. Abadie (2006) nds that terrorism is more likely in countries that
are politically semi-open (meaning that they are neither democracies nor autocracies) with
a geography that is favorable to a sustained terrorist campaign (e.g., jungle, mountains)
by providing terrorists with safe havens. Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006) also point at a
non-linear relationship between political conditions and terrorism, while Piazza (2008) and
4Some empirical studies have also tried to identify the micro determinants of terrorism, i.e., those vari-
ables that matter to the individual decision to participate in terrorism. While such a micro perspective is
not the focus of this thesis, it is nevertheless interesting that these studies also usually do not nd that
poor economic conditions lead to terrorism. For instance, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) nd that terrorists
active in the Arab-Israeli conict are in fact fairly well-o¤ and educated. Still, such a relationship between
individual living conditions and terrorist participation does not necessarily imply that national social con-
ditions do not matter. As noted by Krueger and Maleckova (2003), well-o¤ and educated individuals may
nevertheless become terrorists e.g., as a "revolutionary vanguard" in a left-wing fashion to voice dissent
over a countrys general socio-economic situation.
7Kis-Katos et al. (2011) nd that political instability (e.g., state failure) is conducive to the
emergence of terrorism.
To sum up, while there is a theoretical foundation to the popular wisdom that eco-
nomic variables matter to terrorism, the empirical evidence regarding this relationship is
mixed. It seems to be the case that socio-economic underdevelopment similar to other
social conditions such as political openness or instability is neither a necessary nor su¢ -
cient conditions for the emergence of terrorism. As also shown in Table 1.1, some studies
nd that economic factors determine terrorist activity, while others come to a di¤erent
conclusion. Below, the possible explanations for this discrepancy are discussed in more
detail. Certainly, this discrepancy calls for more research on the economic determinants
of terrorism and for a cautious research design that nds ways to control for other ter-
rorism determinants or the (potential) heterogeneity with respect to the determinants of
terrorism.
1.1.2 Macroeconomic E¤ects of Terrorism
As already noted earlier, terrorism may not only have socio-economic roots but may also
aim at economic destabilization (as an intermediate goal) to succeed in achieving ultimate
socio-political goals (e.g., a redistribution of wealth or territory).5 Economic destabiliza-
tion is expected to improve the terroristsbargaining position by inicting costs upon the
government which has to weigh the cost of making political concessions against the present
and anticipated costs of a prolonged terrorist campaign e.g., in the form of reduced eco-
nomic activity that result from the decision of not negotiating with terrorists (Sandler
and Enders, 2008). In economic theory such mechanisms are typically modelled as out-
5The other intermediate goals of terrorists to foster their agenda are political destabilization and media
attention (Schilling, 1991). The political repercussions of terrorism are analyzed in, e.g., Berrebi and Klor
(2008), Blomberg et al. (2011b) and Dreher et al. (2010). These studies show that terrorism may indeed
a¤ect a domestic political system, possibly contributing to instability and the erosion of civil liberties. The
interplay of terrorism and the media is discussed in, e.g., Frey (1988), Nelson and Scott (1992) and Rohner
and Frey (2007). These studies usually hint at the reciprocal relationship between terrorism and the media,
where terrorism successfully produces media attention (meaning terrorist success insofar as their ideology
is spread), while the media benets from terrorism in terms of increased newspaper sales or television
audience.
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9comes of either rational-choice considerations by the government or a game between the
government and a terrorist opposition (e.g., Lapan and Sandler, 1988; Sandler and Enders,
2004; Arce and Sandler, 2005; Sandler and Siqueira, 2009).
Terrorism may impair economic activity directly by destroying an economys human
and physical capital stock through destruction (loss of lives, property damage etc.) and
indirectly as markets and economic agents react to it. For instance, terrorism is anticipated
to hurt certain sectors of an economy (e.g., tourism) that are particularly exposed to it (Bird
et al., 2008). On an aggregate level, terrorism may distort national levels of consumption,
investment, government spending and savings. For instance, terrorism creates uncertainty,
leading to the postponement of long-term investments or increased government spending
on security at the expense of (more productive) spending on education and infrastructure,
which ultimately reduces growth (Bird et al., 2008). On an international level, terrorism
may lead to the diversion of capital and trade ows because it poses a costly risk and reduces
the returns to investment (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008). The resulting withdrawal of
international capital may hurt economic development, in particular when foreign nance
and investment are important engines of growth.
Empirically, the evidence regarding the economic consequences of terrorism is mixed.
For one, several empirical studies nd that terrorism has negative e¤ects on macroeconomic
variables such as consumption, investment, and public spending (e.g., Crain and Crain,
2006; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2008) and on the international ow of goods and capital
(e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008). Such e¤ects help to explain why several studies nd
that terrorism is detrimental to economic growth on sub-national, national and global levels
(e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Crain and Crain, 2006; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2008,
2011). For instance, Crain and Crain (2006) calculate that in the absence of terrorism in
the year 2002 world GDP would have been $3.6 trillion U.S. dollars higher than it was that
year.
For another, however, some studies are more skeptical with respect to the macroeco-
nomic consequences of terrorism (e.g., Tavares, 2004; Enders et al., 2006; Gaibulloev and
10
Sandler, 2009). These studies nd that the economic e¤ects of terrorism are rather modest
and short-lived, where country-specic conditions (a countrys level of politico-institutional
development, political stability, its culture etc.) matter to a countrys economic vulnerabil-
ity to terrorism. For instance, Tavares (2004) nds that terrorism produces rather marginal
negative e¤ects on a countrys economic performance vis-a-vis the negative macroeconomic
repercussions of natural disasters and currency crises. He also nds that democratic coun-
tries su¤er less damage from terrorism than non-democratic economies, potentially because
economic and political power is more strongly decentralized (so that terrorism is less likely
to produce distorting e¤ects) and responses to terrorism by democratic governments (e.g.,
interventionist policies) are less likely to produce extreme outcomes that impair economic
performance.
In summary, while there is a theoretical reasoning as to why terrorists ought to aim at
economic destabilization (to increase their bargaining position) and as to how terrorism may
hurt the economy (by negatively a¤ecting the allocation and accumulation of resources),
the empirical evidence on the macroeconomic e¤ects of terrorism similar to the literature
on the economic causes of terrorism is rather inconclusive. This is also shown in Table
1.2 which summarizes the ndings of some empirical studies on the economic repercussions
of terrorism. The next section provides several explanations for these inconsistencies.
1.2 Gaps in the Literature
The brief overview of the academic literature on the economic causes and consequences
has shown that there is no consensus on either issue. This section serves the purpose of
identifying several gaps in this literature. Filling these gaps ought to contribute to a better
understanding of the terrorism-economy nexus and may help explaining the inconclusive
evidence on this nexus.
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1.2.1 Causality
One important gap in the existing literature on the terrorism-economy nexus is that the
question of causation is largely disregarded. Plausibly, and consistent with the empirical
ndings reviewed above, economic conditions may determine terrorist activity. Alterna-
tively, terrorism may have a negative causal e¤ect on these very conditions. Or feedback
between terrorism and economic development may exists, where economic conditions im-
pact the opportunity costs of terrorism, while terrorism simultaneously a¤ects the allocation
and accumulation of resources.
Indeed, some contributions on the terrorism-economy nexus acknowledge the poten-
tially complex links between terrorism and economic variables. For instance, Piazza (2009:
406-407) argues that "[...] scholars and analysts who link terrorism with poor levels of
economic development fail to carefully distinguish cause from e¤ect. In countries that have
su¤ered long bouts of terrorist activity, it is possible that poverty is the result of terrorism
rather than the cause." Sandler and Enders (2008: 25) note that "[...] economic conditions
may be both a root cause of terrorism and a consequence of terrorism" so that "[...] a
researcher must be prudent to test and/or correct for a potential endogeneity bias." In-
deed, econometrically endogeneity meaning a situation where the independent variables
are not independent of the error term, thereby violating one assumption of the classical
linear regression model where the covariance of the explanatory variable and the error term
ought to be equal to zero (e.g., Maddala, 2001: 343) may produce biased and inconsis-
tent parameter estimates and a¤ect hypotheses tests in settings where such feedback exists
(e.g., Greene, 2012: 259-263).
Nevertheless, most studies on the causes and economic e¤ects of terrorism e.g., see
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 largely ignore the potentially complex interaction of terrorism and
economic variables and instead assume a relationship between them that clearly di¤erenti-
ates between cause and e¤ect. One exception to this rule is Abadie (2006) who shows that
once the dependence of economic development on terrorism is properly accounted for there
is no longer a statistically signicant e¤ect of economic development on the emergence of
13
terrorism.6 The potential existence of reverse or bidirectional causality may bias empirical
ndings on the terrorism-economy nexus, calling for more cautious econometric modelling,
e.g., by means of (panel) vector autoregression (VAR) models in which all employed vari-
ables serve as independent and dependent variables and are jointly determined in a system
of simultaneous equations (e.g., Stock and Watson, 2001). At the same time, such econo-
metric approaches allow to directly test for causation.7 This may shed further light on the
potentially complex causal linkages between terrorism and socio-economic conditions. For
instance, one may nd evidence of bidirectional causation between terrorist conict and
economic decline, implying a vicious circle of violence and reduced economic activity. Such
a relationship might be missed in (conventional) empirical studies that rely on econometric
methods that only work with "xed" causal expectations.
1.2.2 Heterogeneity in the Causes and Consequences of Terrorism
As shown in the short review above, some studies nd that economic factors matter to
terrorism, while others come to a di¤erent conclusion. Similarly, there is evidence that ter-
rorism produces economic damage, while some studies come to more skeptical conclusions.
Possibly, the inconclusive evidence on the terrorism-economy nexus results from the exis-
tence of heterogeneity in the causes and consequences of terrorism. Heterogeneity in the
causes of terrorism means that socio-economic conditions may determine terrorist activity
6Abadie (2006) uses an instrumental variable approach. He treats the economic variables in his model
(e.g., GDP p.c.) as endogenous and instruments them with landlock, arguing that variation in geographic
landlock a¤ects terrorism only through its e¤ect on income levels (where landlocked countries are poorer
due to higher transportation costs and lower levels of economic integration). While this approach seems to
properly account for reverse causation, it is only feasible in a cross-national study such as Abadies (2006).
For panel (cross-national time-series) or time-series analyses as employed in this doctoral thesis other
analytical tools to uncover causal relationships in the terrorism-economy nexus are needed.
7Testing for causation in a statistical sense, as it is done in this thesis, does not necessarily imply
causation in a philosophical sense. Throughout this contribution particularly in Chapters 3 and 4
causality refers to the concept of Granger causality, which tries to establish whether an event A (e.g.,
terrorism) occurs before an event B (e.g., economic decline), whether the opposite is true or whether
both events are contemporaneous (Granger, 1969; Maddala, 2001: 379-381). One may speculate about
causation between A and B in a philosophical sense ("A leads to B"), particularly when there is a theoretical
foundation to this argument. However, such an argumentation should only be understood as a (cautious)
interpretation of related ndings, given that it usually goes beyond the (statistical) scope of the concept of
Granger causality (e.g., Maddala, 2001: 379).
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in some, but not all countries. Heterogeneity in the consequences of terrorism means that
terrorism may produce detrimental economic repercussions in some, but not all countries.
With respect to heterogeneity in the causes of terrorism, terrorist organizations in-
deed usually di¤er with respect to their ideological motivations and ultimate goals, where
some terrorist groups may be more responsive to socio-economic change than others. For
instance, it seems plausible to assume that the Guatemalan Guerilla Army of the Poor
(Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, EGP) which emerged in response to poverty and socio-
economic discrimination and fought for a removal of socio-economic grievances (e.g., Lopez,
1988) has been more responsive to an amelioration of socio-economic grievances than the
Islamist Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (i.e., Hamas) who continues to ght for the estab-
lishment of an Islamic Palestinian state and whose active members seem to be on average
rather well-o¤ and highly educated (e.g., Krueger and Maleckova, 2003). Still, most large-
N studies on the causes of terrorism usually pool terrorism data irrespective of di¤erent
ideological motivations and goals of terrorist groups to test the relationship between ter-
rorism and specic social conditions. Implicitly, these studies work with the assumption
that there is a unique terrorist calculus which specic social variables (e.g., measuring
socio-economic conditions) enter the same way across all countries. Yet, it seems more
plausible to assume that economic grievances matter to some (e.g., the Ejército Guer-
rillero de los Pobres), but not to all terrorist insurgencies. Intuitively, there ought to be
a stronger connection between economic variables and left-wing (which is usually geared
towards socio-economic change) or separatist terrorism aiming at territorial goals (which
is often also tied to economic discrimination; see Piazza, 2011) than between the econ-
omy and religious terrorism (which commonly strives for religious motives). Economically
speaking, the calculus of terrorists may be intrinsically tied to their ideology and goals,
where socio-economic progress can be expected to have a stronger (terrorism-reducing)
e¤ect on the opportunity costs of left-wing and ethnic terrorists than on the calculus of
religious terrorists (e.g., Freytag et al., 2011). Bernholz (2004, 2006) even goes so far as
to argue that Islamist terrorists are completely irresponsive to socio-economic incentives
15
due to their adherences to supreme values, on which they build to justify terrorism and
which are preferred to all else. Indeed, rst evidence for the idea that di¤erent types of
terrorism emerge in response to distinct social conditions is provided by Robison et al.
(2006) who nd that left-wing and Islamist terrorism are driven by di¤erent determinants,
with left-wing terrorism being more responsive to economic variables.
Similarly, heterogeneity in the macroeconomic e¤ects of terrorism may mean that ter-
rorism produces detrimental economic repercussions in some, but not all countries. For
one, the level of terrorist activity ought to matter. As noted by Sandler and Enders (2008),
a more intense and persistent terrorist campaign is more likely to inict economic costs
than isolated attacks. Also, terrorism is anticipated to be particularly e¤ective in terms
of economic damage when it is used as a form of economic warfare (e.g., Lutz and Lutz,
2006). For instance, Powers and Choi (2012) nd that terrorism directed against business
interests is more likely to scare o¤ FDI than non-business terrorism.
For another, the vulnerability of a country to terrorism ought to play a role. As argued
by Sandler and Enders (2008), a countrys robustness to terrorism crucially depends on
its level of socio-economic and politico-institutional development, where terrorism ought
to have a stronger impact on less economically and politically developed countries. For
instance, a small economic size (i.e., low GDP p.c.) makes it more likely that the nega-
tive e¤ects of terrorism feed through to reduced economic activity. Similarly, low levels of
diversication and institutional capacity as other variables indicating politico-economic
underdevelopment make it less likely that substitution of economic activity away from
vulnerable to robust sectors of the economy takes place (accompanied by quick adjust-
ments in prices and resource allocation), resulting in stronger negative repercussions from
terrorism (Bird et al., 2008). Economies may also be particularly prone to the negative
repercussions of terrorism when economic and political power is strongly centralized (e.g.,
Frey and Luechinger, 2004) or when the government e¤ectiveness in responding to terrorist
activity is poor due to, e.g., autocratic structures which are likely to respond to the threat
of terrorism with excessive, counter-productive measures (Tavares, 2004). Di¤erences in
16
country-specic robustness to terrorism may explain why economic activity in some coun-
tries quickly rebounds (e.g., as it was the case in the U.S. after the 9/11 attacks) , while
other (developing) countries su¤er sustained economic losses from terrorism (Sandler and
Enders, 2008).8 Yet, the role of country-specic conditions in governing the socio-economic
consequences of terrorism is usually not recognized in large-N studies. Rather, these stud-
ies estimate an "average" e¤ect of terrorism on macroeconomic aggregates such as GDP
p.c., investment or consumption. Heterogeneity in the economic consequences of terrorism
is not accounted for, a problem also recognized by Sandler and Enders (2008: 43) who argue
that "[the] estimations average picture may not be descriptive of many sample countries,
especially when the panel includes vastly diverse countries."
To sum up, heterogeneity in the causes of terrorism means that socio-economic de-
velopment may determine terrorist activity in some, but not all countries (depending on
the terroristsresponsiveness to economic incentives). Similarly, heterogeneity in the conse-
quences of terrorism means that terrorism may result in economic damage in some, but not
all economies (depending on the level of terrorist activity and an economys robustness).
The assumption of homogeneity in the causes and consequence of terrorism common in re-
lated large-N studies is probably incorrect. Econometrically, the incorrect assumption of
parameter homogeneity may have serious consequences for statistical inferences, as shown
by, e.g., Plümper et al. (2005). For instance, the heterogeneous e¤ects of socio-economic
underdevelopment on terrorism may be masked when large-N studies incorrectly assume
that parameter homogeneity prevails. For any causal analysis of the terrorism-economy
nexus one may consequently not only expect a homogenous causal e¤ect of terrorism on
the economy (and vice versa), but also more complex causal links (heterogenous causation)
that are governed by terrorism- and country-specic factors.
8Sandler and Enders (2008: 18) nd that terrorist activity against foreign ships (the U.S. destroyer
USS Cole and the French oil tanker Limburg) resulted in a loss of $3.8 million per month to the shipping
industry of Yemen, which translated into a substantial loss of income and a rise in unemployment. They
argue that Yemens small economic size and low level of diversication were to blame for the signicant
negative e¤ects on its economy that resulted from a rather small number of attacks.
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1.2.3 Domestic and Transnational Terrorism
Another gap in the existing research on the terrorism-economy nexus is a consequence
of the lopsided focus on the phenomenon of transnational terrorism by previous research
e¤orts.9 By denition (e.g., Sandler and Enders, 2004: 302), terrorism is transnational
when more than one country is involved, while domestic terrorism only a¤ects one country.
For example, an attack of the German RAF on a German politician in Germany (e.g.,
the assassination of the German Attorney General Siegfried Buback and his companions
in Karlsruhe in 1977) is a domestic terrorist attack only involving German perpetrators
and victims inside Germany. By contrast, an attack by the RAF on a U.S. target in Ger-
many (e.g., the bombing of an U.S. Army building in Frankfurt in 1972) is a transnational
incidents as it involves the targeting of non-Germans. As other examples of transnational
terrorism, a terrorist group may "export" terrorism to another country (e.g., attacks by
the Groupe Islamique Armé, GIA, in France), where its activity may also be sponsored by
a third country (e.g., Iran-backed Hezbollah attacks against Israel). While domestic ter-
rorism is far more common than transnational terrorism10, previous empirical studies have
overwhelmingly analyzed the (economic) roots and (economic) consequences of transna-
tional terrorism. This is due to data constraints. The oldest and most widely used dataset
on terrorism, the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE )
dataset, only provides information on transnational terrorist activity (Drakos, 2011). Only
recently i.e., after 2008 the GTD has made data available on domestic and transnational
terrorism (LaFree and Dugan, 2007; Drakos, 2011). While it is consequently understand-
9Empirical research on transnational terrorism may analyze two aspects of it. For one, it may analyze
why certain countries are targeted by transnational terrorism (target denition). For another, it may assess
why certain countries breed transnational terrorism (origin denition). Economic variables may interact
di¤erently with terrorism, depending on which denition of transnational terrorism is used. For instance,
Blomberg and Hess (2008a, b) show that while economic progress makes it less likely that a countries
produces transnational terrorism (origin denition), it also makes it a likelier victim of transnational attacks
at the same time (target denition). With respect to the terrorism-economy nexus (particularly considering
the economic determinants of terrorism), the origin denition of transnational terrorism seems to be more
important, so that this doctoral thesis focuses on the evidence that relates (economic) variables to the
production of transnational terrorism.
10Commonly, the relation between domestic and transnational terrorist attacks is assumed to be between
ca. 3:1 to 4:1 (Sanchez-Cuenca and De La Calle, 2009; Enders et al., 2011).
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able that the empirical research as shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 has focused on the issue
of transnational terrorism, this very focus may be problematic. For one, domestic and
transnational terrorism may have di¤erent roots. For another, domestic and transnational
terrorism may have di¤erent e¤ects on economic activity. This calls for research analyzing
the roots and e¤ects of domestic terrorism and contrasting these ndings with the empirical
research on the causes and consequences of transnational terrorism.
Considering the economic determinants of terrorism, the empirical mainstream so far
suggests that economic variables do not matter strongly to terrorism (e.g., Gassebner and
Luechinger, 2011; Kis-Katos et al., 2011; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011). Indeed, this may
be due to the fact that these studies overwhelmingly analyze the roots of transnational ter-
rorism.11 In fact, a substantial body of literature suggests that the internationalization of
terrorism is motivated by international cultural-economic (globalization) and political fac-
tors (e.g., foreign policy behavior, foreign occupation). For instance, Zimmermann (2011)
argues that various aspects associated with the phenomenon of globalization (immigration,
the global spread of ideologies and information, network e¤ects, social polarization etc.)
are conducive to the emergence of transnational terrorist activity. Similarly, Bergesen and
Lizardo (2004) and Lizardo (2006) suggest that transnational terrorism emerges in response
to the forces of cultural and political globalization, particularly as a (cost-e¢ cient) weapon
of the disenfranchised against the economic, political and economic power of the West. Sim-
ilarly, the empirical ndings of a number of empirical studies (e.g., OBrien, 1996; Pape,
2003; Bapat, 2007; Dreher and Gassebner, 2008; Savun and Phillips, 2009; Plümper and
Neumayer, 2010; Conrad, 2011) suggest that a countrys foreign policy behavior is a crucial
determinant of transnational terrorist activity directed against its interests. For instance,
Dreher and Gassebner (2008) nd that political proximity to the U.S. makes a country
a likelier target of transnational attacks. Likewise, Conrad (2011) argues that there is a
11As a matter of fact, when work on this doctoral thesis started in 2009, there were almost no empirical
studies on the origins of domestic terrorism, as summed up by Sanchez-Cuenca and De La Calle (2009).
While some recent contributions (Bandyopadhyay and Younas, 2011; Dreher and Fischer, 2011; Kis-Katos
et al., 2011; Piazza, 2011) focus on the determinants of domestic terrorism, obviously this topic remains
underanalyzed, particularly compared to the vast literature on the roots of transnational terrorism.
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strong (positive) interaction between interstate rivalry, the sponsorship of terrorism and
the prevalence of transnational terrorism.
To sum up, there is considerable evidence that terrorism internationalizes in response to
specic developments in the global economic (economic integration), cultural (e.g., spread
of culture and "clash of civilizations"), military (e.g., interventions) and political (e.g., ag-
gressive foreign policy) order. The fact that transnational terrorism is strongly driven by
the global order may explain why (domestic) socio-economic factors do not matter strongly
to this kind of terrorism. However, it is unclear to what extent the global order matters
to domestic terrorism. For example, Savun and Phillips (2009) nd that democracies are
vulnerable to transnational terrorism (due to specic foreign policies undertaken by democ-
racies), while they are not particularly prone to domestic terrorism. This may indicate that
domestic and transnational terrorism are at least, partly determined by di¤erent fac-
tors.12 In particular, one may speculate that domestic terrorism has stronger economic
roots, while material conditions do not matter substantially to transnational terrorism
which in turn may be more strongly fueled by foreign policy considerations and rather ab-
stract trends in globalization. This line of reasoning calls for an analysis of the (economic)
determinants of domestic terrorism, where related ndings should then be contrasted with
the evidence regarding the (economic) roots of transnational terrorism.
Considering the economic consequences of terrorism, the (empirical) academic research
has predominantly analyzed the negative repercussions of transnational terrorism on the
economy (cf. Table 1.2). Yet, the e¤ect of domestic and transnational terrorism on eco-
nomic activity may also be as with their economic roots non-symmetric. For one, do-
mestic terrorism is a far more common phenomenon than transnational terrorism (Sanchez-
Cuenca and De La Calle, 2009; Enders et al., 2011). As previously argued, the economic
12A counter-argument to this reasoning is provided by Sanchez-Cuenca and De La Calle (2009). They
argue that the actors of domestic and transnational terrorism (i.e., terrorist organizations) are usually
identical. Most terrorist groups attack inside their "natural territory" or "homeland", where they may
target inhabitants of their own country (domestic terrorism) or citizens of other countries (transnational
terrorism). They also argue that few terrorist groups systematically attack outside their "natural territory"
for only international reasons. The idea that domestic and transnational terrorism have similar determinants
is also supported by Kis-Katos et al. (2011).
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e¤ects of terrorism also depend on the level and persistence of terrorist activity (e.g., San-
dler and Enders, 2008). Then, a sole focus on transnational terrorist activity may lead
to an underestimation of terrorisms negative repercussions, whereas considering domestic
and transnational terrorism ought to give a more precise picture of terrorisms potential
to detrimentally a¤ect the economy. For another, however, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011)
argue that the domestic component of terrorism may be less harmful to economic devel-
opment because this kind of terrorism can be better controlled (e.g., it does not require
cross-border actions), is a more predictable risk (because it is more common) and is less
threatening to outward-oriented economic sectors (e.g., trade, FDI, tourism) that are vital
sources of economic success especially in developing economies. As a matter of fact, the
evidence on the di¤erent e¤ects of domestic and transnational terrorism on the economy
is inconclusive and sparse. For instance, while Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008) nd that
both domestic and transnational terrorism substantially reduce economic growth in West-
ern Europe, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011) for a sample of African economies nd that
only transnational terrorism inhibits economic growth in this part of the world. Clearly,
this inconclusiveness means that an empirical analysis of the e¤ects of domestic terrorism
possibly, in combination with transnational terrorism on the economy is needed and ought
to contribute to a better understanding of the terrorism-economy nexus.
1.2.4 Measuring Socio-Economic Conditions
A nal gap in the literature that may contribute to the inconclusive evidence regarding the
economic roots and e¤ects of terrorism is related to the measurement of socio-economic
development. In many empirical studies it is measured by (real) GDP per capita (e.g., Li,
2005; Abadie, 2006; Kurrild-Klitgaard et al., 2006; Krueger and Laitin, 2008; Basuchoud-
hary and Shughart, 2010). It is usually interpreted as an indicator of foregone earnings that
determines the opportunity costs of terrorism associated with the level of socio-economic
underdevelopment (e.g., Abadie, 2006: 51). However, per capita income may also be in-
terpreted as a measure of state capacity. A prominent example of such an interpretation
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is provided by Fearon and Laitin (2003: 80) in their analysis of the determinants of civil
war. They argue that higher per capita income corresponds to a higher level of state ca-
pacity (in terms of infrastructure, bureaucracy etc.), where higher levels of state capacity
make a civil war less likely. Holtermann (2012) also provides empirical support for this
hypothesis. However, while state capacity deters large-scale conicts (civil wars), it may
actually be positively related to lower-scale violence (terrorism). When insurgents face a
su¢ ciently strong enemy (in terms of state capacity) they do not challenge him openly
(civil war) but resort to highly asymmetric warfare (terrorism) which is the cost-e¢ cient
means to violently voice dissent under such circumstances. Indeed, Sanchez-Cuenca and
De La Calle (2012) show that open insurgencies (which involve territorial control by in-
surgents) are more likely in poor countries, while clandestine terrorist activity (which does
not involve territorial control but uses a distinct modus operandi associated with its un-
derground existence) is more likely in richer countries.13 Again, Sanchez-Cuenca and De
La Calle (2012) interpret per capita income as a measure of state capacity rather than
socio-economic development.
Admittedly, the openness of the usual indicator of socio-economic conditions (per capita
income) to interpretation is particularly important to the study of the roots of terrorism.
However, it may also matter when the e¤ects of terrorism are assessed. For one, if a higher
per capita GDP is seen as an indicator of a higher level of (individual) material wealth,
it is expected to make terrorism less likely by raising its opportunity costs. Following this
interpretation, one would also expect terrorism to a¤ect it negatively by distorting the
allocation and accumulation of resources within an economy. For another, however, if a
higher per capita GDP is intended to indicate a higher level of state capacity, it ought to
be positively related to terrorism by driving up the price of an open insurgency and making
a terrorist insurgency the cost-e¢ cient mode of resistance. By the same token, terrorism
13 Interestingly, a number of empirical studies that control for the e¤ect of state capacity on terrorist
activity nd they are positively correlated (e.g., Li and Schaub, 2004; Li, 2005; Burgoon, 2006; Gassebner
and Luechinger, 2011). However, these studies do not interpret this positive association as evidence for a
substitution of open for clandestine violence in the face of a su¢ ciently strong enemy.
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may also correspond to higher levels of state capacity, given that, e.g., terrorism usually
triggers public investment in defence and security (e.g., Gupta et al., 2004). To sum
up, disregarding the potentially detrimental e¤ects of socio-economic underdevelopment
and state capacity which are usually measured by the same indicator may have serious
consequences for statistical analyses, making it rather di¢ cult to identify the isolated e¤ect
of socio-economic development on terrorism (and vice versa).
This issue calls for alternative measures of socio-economic conditions in empirical analy-
ses. First, one can use less ambiguous socio-economic variables (rates of economic growth,
unemployment, ination, income inequality indices etc.). Second, one can use variables
that only indirectly reect the e¤ect of socio-economic conditions on terrorism. For in-
stance, Li and Schaub (2004) argue that economic integration reduces terrorism by stimu-
lating economic growth and reducing poverty. Burgoon (2006) suggests that social welfare
policies tend to make terrorism less likely by reducing poverty and economic inequality
and by limiting the inuence of extremist groups in society. Piazza (2011) argues that
certain economic policies may reduce minority economic discrimination, in turn making
terrorism rooted in this very discrimination less likely. Generally speaking, these stud-
ies argue that certain variables (measuring, e.g., welfare policies) reduce terrorism only
through their e¤ect on a set of intervening socio-economic variables, meaning that through
such an empirical approach the aggregate e¤ect of socio-economic conditions rather than
the isolated e¤ect of specic economic variables is identied, consequently providing a pre-
sumably clearer picture of to what extent terrorism is actually rooted in socio-economic
underdevelopment.14
14 It may be an interesting avenue of future research to study the relationship between terrorism and
specic social conditions through structural equation (latent variable) models, given that many social
conditions that may incite terrorism (e.g., economic insecurity, frustration, discrimination, humiliation) are
di¢ cult to measure, i.e., potentially unobservable (latent). However, structural equation models are highly
sensitive to misspecications (e.g., Sanchez et al., 2005). Thus, more traditional statistical tools are used
throughout this doctoral thesis.
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1.3 Structure of Thesis and Outlook
In the following chapters of this doctoral thesis, three empirical studies are presented that
help to ll the research gaps outlined above, therefore adding to a better understanding of
the terrorism-economy nexus.
Chapter 2, Terrorism in the World of Welfare Capitalism, builds on a joint work with
Tim Krieger. It is a slightly revised version of a paper that was published in the Journal
of Conict Resolution 54(6), 902-939. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the
Annual Congress of the Verein für Socialpolitik (Magdeburg, 2009) and the 4th Network
for the Economic Analysis of Terrorism Workshop (Brussels, 2009). This contribution
analyzes the relationship between welfare policy measures (indicated by social spending and
welfare regime variables) and the emergence of domestic terrorism for 15 Western European
countries during the 1980-2003 period. Building on and expanding an earlier study by
Burgoon (2006), this chapter argues that social policies ameliorate poor short-run and long-
run socio-economic conditions (e.g., unemployment, poverty, inequality, dissatisfaction)
which would otherwise lead to violence, thereby indirectly reducing terrorist activity.
This contribution adds to the empirical literature on the terrorism-economy nexus by,
rst, using an alternative measure of socio-economic conditions that assesses the overall
e¤ect of socio-economic improvements induced by social spending and welfare programs
on terrorism, instead of using proxies that may be prone to measurement error or may be
di¢ cult to interpret.
Second, it focuses on the economic determinants of domestic rather than transnational
terrorism. It also examines whether there are di¤erences between the driving forces of
domestic terrorism in Western Europe and transnational terrorism that is "imported" into
this part of the world (as non-European terrorist groups attack within Europe). To preview
the papers results, it nds that higher levels of social spending in certain elds (health,
unemployment benets and active labor market programs) are associated with less domestic
terrorism. Moderate evidence indicates that the di¤erent worlds of welfare capitalism
24
di¤erently impact homeland terrorism. Social-democratic welfare regimes that create low
levels of market dependence are on average less prone to domestic terrorist activity. These
social spending and welfare regime variables usually do not matter to terrorist activity
"imported" from non-European countries and conicts. This provides support for the idea
that domestic terrorism is more strongly determined by socio-economic conditions than
transnational terrorism.
Third, this paper accounts for the issue of heterogeneity in the causes of terrorism by
focusing on a panel of homogeneous countries, namely industrialized Western European
countries with mature social welfare systems. For one, terrorism in this part of the world
is overwhelmingly committed by left-wing and separatist terrorist groups which are more
likely as it is evident from their objectives (social justice, overcoming of class struggle, end
to economic discrimination; cf. Shughart, 2006; Piazza, 2011) shaped by their respective
ideologies swayed by socio-economic improvements than their religious counterparts. For
another, during the observation period of this paper all countries in the sample were stable
democracies. This makes it plausible that terrorism in this part of the world is more
strongly rooted in di¤erences in economic rather than political conditions. The ndings of
this paper suggest that home-grown terrorism in Western Europe is (partly) rooted in poor
socio-economic conditions and may consequently be fought by higher spending in certain
social policy elds and by more generous welfare regimes.
Chapter 3, Causal Linkages between Domestic Terrorism and Economic Growth, is a
joint work with Thomas Gries and Tim Krieger. A nearly identical version of it was
published in Defence and Peace Economics 22(5), 493-508. An earlier version of this paper
was presented at the 9th Annual Meeting of the European Public Choice Society (Athens,
2009). This contribution studies the relationship between domestic terrorism and economic
growth for seven Western European countries for the post-World War II period (ca. 1950-
2004). It uses statistical tools of time-series analysis to study these causal interactions.
First, and most importantly, this contribution adds to the existing research by provid-
ing an explicit assessment of the causal relationship between terrorism and socio-economic
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conditions, where the latter is measured in terms of economic growth (a socio-economic
variable that is easy to interpret). This makes it possible to fully consider the (poten-
tially complex) causal interaction between these two variables without assuming a "xed"
direction of causation.
Second, this contribution uses data on domestic terrorism, making it possible to as-
sess to what extent it is rooted in economic conditions and produces economic damage,
also in comparison to the empirical mainstream that focuses on the causes and e¤ects of
transnational terrorism.
Third, it takes due account of heterogeneity in the determinants and consequences of
domestic terrorism. Methodologically, through a time-series approach (using the Hsiao-
Granger method to test for causality) the causal dynamics of the terrorism-growth nexus
are analyzed separately for each country in the sample. This makes it possible to more
closely identify those country-specic variables which may inuence the causal e¤ect of
growth on terrorism (e.g., the responsiveness of terrorist groups in di¤erent countries to
socio-economic change) and the causal impact of terrorism on economic growth (e.g., the
macroeconomic resiliency of the attacked economies). To preview the empirical results of
this paper, it nds that in bivariate settings the impact of economic performance on do-
mestic terrorism is very strong, while in trivariate settings the impact of economic growth
on terrorism diminishes. Considering the other direction of causation, terrorism is almost
never found to causally inuence growth in bivariate and trivariate specications. This
indicates consistent with the ndings of Chapter 2 that economic conditions matter to
domestic terrorism in several Western European countries, whereas all attacked economies
have been successful in adjusting to the threat of terrorism. The latter nding also sug-
gests that the results presented in Chapter 2 are not driven by reverse causation, further
strengthening condence in the ndings of the second chapter.
Chapter 4, Economic Performance and Terrorist Activity in Latin America, is a joint
work with Thomas Gries. A virtually identical version of this paper is due to be published
in Defence and Peace Economics (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2012.656945). This
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study examines the links between economic performance and terrorism for 18 Latin Amer-
ican countries from 1970 to 2007. In contrast to Chapter 3, it uses statistical tools for
panel data (panel unit root tests, panel Granger causality tests) to analyze these linkages.
First, and similar to Chapter 3, this contribution directly tests for the causal relation-
ship between economic growth and terrorism, albeit for a di¤erent part of the world and
through the use of di¤erent econometric techniques (panel unit root tests, panel Granger
causality tests, negative binomial regressions). This again makes it possible to consider the
(potentially complex) causal interaction between terrorist and economic activity.
Second, it uses data on total (i.e., domestic and transnational) terrorism for this analy-
sis ought to provide a more consistent picture of the causal dynamics between short-run
economic performance and terrorist activity. This is di¤erent to the empirical mainstream
which has mainly focused on the causes and e¤ects of transnational terrorism.
Third, by focusing the analysis on Latin America, it is possible to contrast the ndings
of this study with the large-N (i.e., global) evidence on the causes and consequences of
terrorism. On the one hand, terrorist activity in Latin America has been predominantly
carried out by left-wing groups which have clearly emerged in response to economic in-
justice and exploitation and are geared towards socio-economic change (e.g., Lopez, 1988;
Shughart, 2006). This may make terrorism in Latin America more responsive to eco-
nomic progress than terrorism in other parts of the world. On the other hand, the relative
economic-institutional backwardness may make Latin American economies more vulnerable
to economic damage from terrorism, e.g., in comparison to Western European economies
which Chapter 3 examined.
Fourth, the empirical approach of Chapter 4 does not only make it possible to contrast
its ndings with the global evidence, but also to study whether di¤erences within Latin
America are a source of causal heterogeneity. Specically, in this study it is argued that
the overall level of economic development may be a driver of such heterogeneity. To pre-
view the empirical ndings of this analysis, it is indeed found that during the period of
observation growth reduced terrorism in the less developed (poorer) but not in the higher
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developed (richer) Latin American economies. A series of negative binomial regressions
delivers additional support for this nding, while also identifying further determinants of
terrorism (political instability, population size, the dynamics of the Cold War etc.) which
also seem to matter to terrorism in Latin America. Considering the other direction of
causation, no evidence is found that terrorism had a causal e¤ect on economic growth,
implying homogeneous non-causality, no evidence of reverse causation or endogeneity and
a su¢ ciently high level of economic resiliency to the adverse e¤ects of terrorism.
Chapter 5, Concluding Remarks, provides a summary of the ndings of this doctoral
thesis. It also discusses the implications of this thesis for future research on the socio-
economic causes and consequences of terrorism. A special emphasis is put on the political
implications that follow from the results of this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Terrorism in the Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
This chapter is a joint work with Tim Krieger. It is slightly revised version of a paper that
was published in 2010 in the Journal of Conict Resolution 54(6), 902-939.
2.1 Introduction
Many Western European countries have su¤ered from major episodes of terrorist activity
on their own soil since the 1950s (Engene, 2007). While such terrorism has resulted in
thousands of victims, it has also entailed notable negative economic and political e¤ects.1
As these direct and indirect costs are considerable, this contribution seeks to investigate the
determinants of home-grown (homeland) terrorism in Western Europe. In particular, we
want to extend the academic discourse on a potential terrorism-welfare policy nexus which
was introduced by Burgoon (2006). He argues that social policies may indirectly reduce
terrorist activity by removing several socio-economic causes of terrorism (e.g., poverty,
inequality, social dissatisfaction). He o¤ers an empirical analysis of this hypothesis, nding
that welfare e¤orts are indeed linked to a reduction in the production of and vulnerability to
transnational terrorism. His analysis has attracted some criticism, especially by Crenshaw
et al. (2007) who point at potential aws in Burgoons argumentation and econometric
procedure. We take Burgoons analysis as a starting point of our investigation, keeping
1Several studies analyze the impact of terrorism on economic and political factors in Western Europe.
See Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008) for a study of the negative e¤ects of terrorism on economic growth in
Western Europe. See Enders and Sandler (1996), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Greenbaum et al.
(2007) for studies that investigate the negative inuence of terrorism on tourism, production, investment
and employment in Spain, Greece and Italy. See Indridason (2008) for the disruptive e¤ects of terrorist
activity on political systems in Western Europe.
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in mind already raised objections by Crenshaw et al. (2007) to improve our empirical
approach. We add to and complement Burgoons analysis by, inter alia, concentrating
on domestic (home-grown) instead of transnational terrorism (as we expect a particularly
strong relationship between social systems and domestic terrorism), by employing a variety
of spending variables to improve the analysis of the mechanics of the terrorism-welfare
policy nexus, and by analyzing (for the rst time) institutional aspects of welfare regimes
and their inuence on terrorism.
We scrutinize the e¤ect of welfare policies (indicated by social spending and welfare
regime variables) on home-grown terrorism in Western Europe during the 1980-2003 period,
using time-series cross-sectional data for 15 countries. A focus on the mature welfare states
of Western Europe is especially interesting because for this part of the world detailed data
and previous empirical work is available which allows us to investigate the terrorism-welfare
policy nexus in much more detail, e.g., by looking at specic forms of social spending
and welfare state design and their e¤ects on terrorism. At the same time, home-grown
terrorism in Western Europe has been carried out in large parts by ethnic-nationalist and
left-wing groups which are (in contrast to religious groups) much likelier to respond to
social policies (Crenshaw et al., 2007). Our rst hypothesis is that higher social spending
reduces terrorist activity by improving a variety of short-run and long-run socio-economic
conditions, net of other factors contributing to the genesis of terrorism and potential terror-
enhancing e¤ects of social spending. In an economic sense higher social spending translates
into higher opportunity costs of terrorism, e.g., as poverty and inequality diminish or
additional economic alternatives open up. Our second hypothesis is that certain worlds of
welfare capitalism are (independent of the actual level of social spending) less vulnerable to
terrorism because they are more successful in ameliorating poor short-term and long-term
socio-economic conditions which may otherwise provide breeding grounds for terrorism.
The latter hypothesis is linked to the inuential work of Esping-Andersen (1990). Similar
to our rst hypothesis, we argue that policy success di¤ers across welfare regimes, thereby
a¤ecting the opportunity costs of terrorism in di¤erent ways.
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As our main results we nd that higher social spending in certain elds on health,
unemployment benets and active labor market programs is associated with a signicant
reduction in homeland terrorist activity. However, there are some policy elds where
more spending does not universally translate into less terrorism (e.g., public housing).
Spending in elds close to the "typical" terrorist (who may be young and lack economic
opportunities, or who is sympathetic towards this group of people) generally discourages
terrorist activity more e¤ectively. Moderate evidence indicates that the various worlds of
welfare capitalism are prepared to deal with homeland terrorism in di¤erent ways. Welfare
regimes that provide low levels of market dependence (i.e., the social-democratic worlds of
welfare capitalism) are on average less prone to terrorist activity than more liberal systems
(which o¤er higher levels of market dependence). Our ndings are robust to a variety of
specications. In an extension to our empirical work we show that imported transnational
terrorism (which originates, e.g., in the Middle East) is not discouraged by higher social
spending or a more social-democratic welfare regime.
The remainder of this contribution is organized as follows. After this introduction
we provide an in-depth discussion of potential links between social policies and terrorism.
Afterwards, we present the data and the empirical framework used for our investigation,
before providing our empirical ndings. In the last section we discuss and sum up our
ndings.
2.2 Welfare Systems and Terrorism
As noted in the introduction to this doctoral thesis, economic theory identies terrorists
as rational actors who use violence as a means to achieve political goals. The terrorists
calculus (and the calculus of their supporters) includes the costs, benets and opportunity
costs arising from terrorist activity, depending on which the actual level of terrorism is
chosen (e.g., Frey and Luechinger, 2003). Country-specic factors may inuence these
calculi. Existing empirical research has analyzed the role of, inter alia, democracy (Li,
2005), economic integration (Li and Schaub, 2004), geographical proximity to terrorism
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hot spots (Braithwaite and Li, 2007) and identity conict (Basuchoudhary and Shughart,
2010) in swaying the patterns of terrorism.2 We control for several of these factors in our
empirical analysis. However, at the same time we acknowledge that there is no academic
consensus on the importance of certain country-specic factors in impacting the production
of terrorism. For our country sample some explanatory approaches do not appear to t.
For instance, this is the case with the role of some political factors (repression or state
failure) as terrorism catalysts.
In this contribution we focus on social spending as a potential (country-specic) deter-
minant of terrorism. We argue that social spending inuences intervening socio-economic
variables in ways that diminish terrorist activity because these very variables are among the
determinants of terrorism. In short, social spending is anticipated to improve short-run eco-
nomic conditions (e.g., growth and employment), ameliorate poor structural socio-economic
conditions (e.g., poverty and inequality), reduce economic insecurity and increase overall
social satisfaction. An improvement in these socio-economic conditions makes terrorism
less attractive as it generally increases the opportunity costs of violence. We connect social
spending to terrorism in more detail below and summarize our line of argumentation in
Figure 2.1.3
Furthermore, we argue that certain welfare regimes (certain worlds of welfare capi-
talism, as Esping-Andersen (1990) calls them) a¤ect terrorist activity, independent of the
actual volume of social spending. Welfare regimes may assign di¤erent roles to the state,
the market and the family, leading to di¤erent degrees of market dependence and forms of
social structuring. Depending on the level of market dependence and the conguration of
social structuring, short-run and long-run socio-economic conditions, insecurity and social
2Bird et al. (2008), Gassebner and Luechinger (2011), Kis-Katos et al. (2011) and Krieger and
Meierrieks (2011) o¤er overviews of potential terrorism causes and related empirical evidence.
3The discussion of the relationship between social spending and terrorism draws in parts on Burgoon
(2006). We complement and readjust his argumentation with respect to the scope of our empirical analysis.
For instance, Burgoon (2006) argues that social policies may reduce religious and political extremism by
"crowding out" welfare activities by terrorist groups (where the social policies of Hamas in the Gaza Strip
may serve as an example). We do not consider the link between social policies and terrorism for Western
Europe because their mature welfare systems do not allow for a "welfare take-over" of this kind.
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satisfaction are inuenced in di¤erent ways, in turn swaying the terroristscalculus and
the calculus of their supporters in di¤erent ways. Our main hypothesis is that low levels
of market dependence and egalitarian forms of social structuring (which are typically asso-
ciated with the social-democratic world of welfare capitalism) ought to lower terrorism by
impacting its opportunity costs through the aforementioned intervening variables. We give
a more in-depth discussion of this point below and illustrate our argumentation in Figure
2.2.
2.2.1 Social Spending and Terrorism
Social spending may positively a¤ect short-run economic conditions (e.g., economic growth,
employment and investment). Midgley and Tang (2001) o¤er a variety of channels through
which such e¤ects may emerge. For instance, spending on health or active labor market
programs may be considered as an investment in human capital which in turn stimulates
growth and employment.4 Social spending on family programs may also remove obstacles
for female economic participation, again promoting economic performance. Harris (2002)
argues that certain forms of social spending (e.g., on health or labor market programs) may
accelerate aggregate productivity and stimulate labor market participation, innovation and
investment. De Grauwe and Polan (2005) furthermore nd that countries with developed
welfare systems exhibit high international competitiveness, so there is no evidence to in-
dicate that social spending decreases a countrys international economic position. The
positive e¤ect of social spending on short-run economic conditions may feed through to a
reduction in terrorism. Blomberg and Hess (2008a) nd that economic success reduces the
likelihood of terrorist activity in a country. Blomberg et al. (2004a) show that slow growth
is one important factor leading to transnational terrorist attacks. A number of further
studies (e.g., Muller and Weede, 1990; Braithwaite and Li, 2007) also nd that economic
4Alternatively, the welfare state can be seen as an institution o¤ering insurance against life-long career
risks, allowing for any type of risky investment, e.g., in individual human capital (Sinn, 1995). Thus, a
welfare state can again be seen as an institution promoting long-run economic performance.
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success is a disincentive to terrorist activity.5 This evidence suggests that social spending
may potentially decrease terrorist activity through its positive e¤ect on short-run economic
factors which shape the opportunity costs of terrorism.
There may also be a terror-reducing e¤ect of social spending via an amelioration of
long-run socio-economic conditions. The evidence indicates that social spending has been
a fundamental determinant of poverty reduction, particularly in developed welfare states
(e.g., Kenworthy, 1999; Förster and Pearson, 2002; Brady, 2005). Similarly, welfare spend-
ing has been associated with a reduction in income inequality (Caminada and Goudswaard,
2001; Förster and Pearson, 2002). Increased welfare spending may reduce poverty and in-
equality, e.g., by providing health and unemployment benets or nancial support for
families and the elderly. The empirical evidence also indicates that low income and high
inequality are conducive to violence in societies (e.g., Muller and Seligson, 1987; Blomberg
et al., 2004a; Blomberg and Hess, 2008a). For instance, terrorist organizations may use
poor socio-economic conditions as a convenient platform to muster support. By its pos-
itive e¤ect on structural socio-economic conditions, social spending may undermine the
recruitment e¤orts or support of terrorist organizations, thus indirectly contributing to a
reduction in terrorism.
Social spending may also a¤ect terrorist activity through variables such as economic
security or satisfaction with life (happiness). These factors are to some extent associated
with the short- and long-run socio-economic conditions discussed above, but also transcend
them as they take a more "holistic" perspective on individual well-being, which indepen-
dently a¤ects terrorist activity. For instance, a recession may trigger terrorism by making
terrorism more attractive for those hit by the economic crisis (e.g., the unemployed). At
the same time, a recession also changes the perceptions of risk, fear and satisfaction of
5As already stressed in the introduction to this doctoral thesis, there is, however, a body of research
that argues otherwise. For instance, Abadie (2006) and Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006) nd that political
development is more important to the genesis of terrorism. While a number of political factors (e.g.,
repression or state failure) obviously do not matter to the production of terrorism in our country sample,
we carefully control for the inuence of other political factors in our empirical analysis. Our analysis
consistently nds that social policies exert a negative inuence on terrorism, net of a variety of political
indicators.
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those individuals that are actually una¤ected by the crisis. This rather "di¤use" dissatis-
faction may also produce terrorism (Frey and Stutzer 2005). Social spending may counter
the latter e¤ect. As shown by Di Tella et al. (2003) and Pacek and Radcli¤ (2008a),
higher levels of social spending are associated with higher levels of satisfaction. Di Tella et
al. (2003) specically refer to the positive e¤ect of unemployment benets as one form of
spending that reduces insecurity and increases satisfaction. Generally, social spending that
secures against perceived risks (e.g., spending on health or old-age benets) may increase
life satisfaction. Through its positive e¤ects on individual perceptions of insecurity and
dissatisfaction, social spending may eventually reduce terrorism that is rooted in these very
"holistic" conditions.
Besides the positive e¤ects of social spending on terrorism via the channels discussed
above, it is also possible that social spending spurs terrorism. On the one hand, social
spending (e.g., unemployment benets) may enable individuals to commit terrorism by
providing them with free time and nancial resources (Burgoon, 2006). That is, terrorism
may positively a¤ect the capacities of those organizing and perpetrating terrorism. On the
other hand, social spending may create grievances. The net contributors to a redistributive
system (the taxpayers) may feel betrayed because they have to give away too much of their
resources.6 The net receivers may feel betrayed because society does not seem to support
them enough. Possibly, both forms of resistance against welfare spending may translate
into increased terrorist violence. However, we side with Burgoon (2006) and argue that the
terror-enhancing e¤ects of social spending via increased terror capacities or the creation of
spending-related grievances are rather marginal.
In Figure 2.1 we sum up how social spending may inuence terrorist activity. Based
on the discussion before, we verbalize our rst hypothesis (H1):
Hypothesis (H1): Social spending augments short-run economic conditions, improves
6The form of taxation may also matter to the genesis of grievances. For instance, nancing social
spending by a value added tax may amplify grievances among those most strongly taxed (e.g., the lower-
middle class). A more detailed analysis of the linkages between taxation and terrorism may be an interesting
avenue of future research.
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Figure 21: Welfare Spending and Terrorist Activity
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poor structural socio-economic conditions, reduces economic insecurity and leads to
generally higher satisfaction with life. Because of the e¤ect of social spending on these
intervening variables, terrorism production (ceteris paribus) should be lower the higher
the level of social spending in a given country due to higher opportunity costs of terror-
ism.
2.2.2 The Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and Terrorism
Previously, we argued that social spending reduces terrorist activity through a number of
channels. An empirical assessment of this hypothesis requires us to study the e¤ect of
spending variables on terrorist activity. Spending, however, does not necessarily tell the
complete story about a welfare regime. For instance, welfare spending on unemployment
benets may increase (as unemployment increases) but the state may at the same time cut
unemployment benet programs (meaning that the welfare states generosity towards an
individual on welfare decreases). This example illustrates that spending variables may not
be good indicators of welfare state commitment (cf. Scruggs and Allan, 2006). Welfare
regimes may, inter alia, di¤er in terms of the rules of access to the welfare system, the
conditions under which one receives social support and the role of the state, the market
and the family. These di¤erences may be independent of the respective levels of social
spending.
Although not exempted from criticism, Esping-Andersen (1990) o¤ers a popular char-
acterization of welfare regimes that is independent of the actual level of social spending,
namely the Worlds of Welfare Capitalism view.7 This view focuses on two fundamental
welfare state dimensions: decommodication and social stratication. Decommodication
refers to the degree to which citizens are dependent on the labor market to keep up a
certain standard of living. In social systems that o¤er generous welfare services, the degree
of market dependence is smaller (decommodication is higher) than in systems that o¤er
7We refer to the excellent survey of Arts and Gelissen (2002) for a broader discussion of the related
literature.
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only minimum compensations. Stratication refers to the societal structuring fostered by
welfare policies. Social policies may aim at conserving a societys status quo, at unleashing
potential for individual success or at overcoming class di¤erences. Social systems may rely
on narrow or broad solidarities, depending on which concept ts in better with underlying
ideas of social structuring. Esping-Andersen (1990) identies three "ideal" worlds of welfare
capitalism for Western Europe along the decommodication and stratication dimension.
The liberal type of welfare capitalism emphasizes the importance of the individual and of
the market (meaning a low level of decommodication), where the primacy of the market
usually leads to a social stratication where a minority is dependent on low levels of state
benets (implying social inequality). In corporatist welfare regimes benet recipients may
maintain their former level of income for some time, where benets usually increase with
previous contributions to the system (implying a moderate level of decommodication).
Such regimes tend to preserve a "natural" social order (e.g., with respect to the role of
the family and women in society). Social-democratic welfare regimes aim at low levels of
market dependence (meaning a high level of decommodication) and promote the ideas of
universality and broad solidarity (implying social equality). According to Esping-Andersen
(1990), e.g., the United Kingdom is a prototype of the liberal world of welfare capitalism.
Germany and Italy are "ideal" conservative worlds of welfare capitalism. The Scandinavian
countries are prototypes of the social-democratic system.
Our main hypothesis is that welfare regimes that promote low levels of market depen-
dence and high levels of social equality are better prepared for swaying socio-economic
conditions in ways that reduce terrorism by a¤ecting the opportunity costs of terrorism.
More plainly, we argue that in particular social-democratic welfare regimes are less prone
to terrorist activity. Figure 2.2 illustrates our reasoning. Below, we discuss in more de-
tail how di¤erent welfare regimes may inuence terrorism. We then formulate our second
hypothesis accordingly.
At times, more liberal welfare regimes have been argued to spur economic growth,
employment and international competitiveness, outperforming the conservative and social-
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Figure 22: Welfare Regimes and Terrorist Activity
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democratic worlds of welfare capitalism. For instance, advantages for liberal regimes are
argued to come, e.g., from scal discipline, exible labor markets or a better attraction
of capital (Bernard and Boucher, 2007). However, Bernard and Boucher (2007) nd that
the di¤erent worlds of welfare capitalism use di¤erent strategies to achieve employment
and that no regime is particularly well-suited to improving short-run economic conditions.
Similarly, Headey et al. (2000) do not nd that liberal regimes achieve higher growth or
employment rates. That is, there is little evidence that liberal regimes improve short-run
economic conditions more e¤ectively than their conservative or social-democratic counter-
parts. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a trade-o¤ between economic e¢ ciency and
welfare state generosity (Headey et al., 2000). Consequently, we cannot assess which wel-
fare regime is less prone to terrorism rooted in poor economic performance, unemployment
or low economic competitiveness. However, welfare regime characteristics may still impact
long-run socio-economic conditions or social satisfaction, which explains why some welfare
regimes are more vulnerable to terrorism than others.
That said, di¤erent types of welfare regimes may have distinct e¤ects on poverty and
income inequality reduction. A substantial body of empirical literature argues that more
generous welfare regimes perform better (Green et al., 1994; Headey et al., 1997; Ken-
worthy, 1999; Rueda and Pontusson, 2000; Fouarge and Layte, 2005; Scruggs and Allan,
2006). Further studies also nd that more generous regimes are better prepared for coun-
tering social exclusion and resource deprivation, thereby reducing more than just the purely
material forms of socio-economic inequality (Tsakloglou and Papadopoulos, 2002; Mu¤els
and Fouarge, 2005). In general, these results convincingly suggest that social-democratic
welfare regimes (the most generous regimes) outperform the corporatist and liberal ones,
thereby being less prone to terrorism rooted in poor structural socio-economic conditions.8
8Whether corporatist or liberal welfare states are better at reducing poverty and inequality is to some
extent open to debate. While liberal welfare states tend to directly target benets at the poor and provide
equal public transfers to the needy, Korpi and Palme (1998) provide evidence that this strategy is in fact less
likely to reduce poverty and inequality compared to providing earnings-related benets, as most corporatist
(continental) European countries do. See also Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007) and Lefèbvre (2007) for
further evidence regarding this issue.
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Di¤erent welfare regimes may also produce di¤erent levels of social satisfaction and
economic security, thereby indirectly a¤ecting terrorism that is rooted in general dissat-
isfaction and insecurity. Again, the evidence indicates that welfare regimes o¤ering low
levels of market dependence and universal access to their social systems are able to gen-
erate higher levels of satisfaction and security (Radcli¤, 2001; Di Tella et al., 2003; Pacek
and Radcli¤, 2008b). This suggests that social-democratic welfare regimes are less likely to
breed terrorism due to social dissatisfaction. For instance, in the social-democratic world
of welfare capitalism the possibility of unemployment is less threatening. High levels of
decommodication make it possible to sustain a comparatively high standard of living,
making it also less likely to lose social status quickly. If we accept that fear, insecurity and
other "di¤use" feelings may drive violence (Frey and Stutzer, 2005), then such violence is
less likely to be produced in more generous welfare regimes.
Nevertheless, it may also be possible that the existence of a specic welfare state regime
(including the social-democratic one) itself produces grievances that translate into violence.
In particular, distributional and "insider-versus-outsider" conicts may arise, where it is
a priori unclear which welfare regime is more prone to these kinds of conicts. First, one
may argue that any kind of tax-nanced welfare program produces distributional conicts,
dividing societies into net contributors and net beneciaries of a welfare state. By trend,
one may hypothesize that more generous regimes produce higher grievances among the
former group, whereas more liberal (i.e., less generous) regimes create grievances among
the latter. Second, welfare regimes may generate intergenerational conict. For instance,
some evidence indicates that large pay-as-you-go pension systems (which are typical of
corporatist countries) systematically reduce fertility (Cigno and Rosati, 1996), thereby
shifting political inuence in favor of the elderly. This may lead to grievances among
the younger generation. Third, corporatist welfare states in particular often su¤er from
particularly high labor market rigidity. Strong protection for the employed combined with
huge barriers to labor market entry divides the labor force into privileged "insiders" and
precarious "outsiders", including, e.g., young and immigrant workers (Esping-Andersen,
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2003). In fact, Rueda (2005, 2006) shows that even in social-democratic welfare regimes
governments may be tempted to introduce active labor market policies that benet insiders
while ignoring the interests of outsiders as this serves their electoral goals best. This may
produce grievances among the "outsiders", in consequence possibly fostering violence.
We provided evidence to indicate that welfare regimes that promote low levels of market
dependence and high levels of social equality are generally more able to sway certain socio-
economic conditions i.e., the intervening variables in ways that reduce terrorism by
increasing its opportunity costs. Although some terror-enhancing e¤ects of welfare regimes
were identied, we believe that they are in general outweighed by the terror-dampening
e¤ects of these very regimes. Our second main hypothesis (H2) is thus:
Hypothesis (H 2): Di¤erent welfare regimes di¤erently a¤ect short-run economic con-
ditions, structural socio-economic conditions, economic security and satisfaction with
life, independent of the actual level of social spending. Terrorism production (ceteris
paribus) ought to be lower in countries whose welfare regimes are characterized by high
levels of market independence and social equality because the e¤ect of such regimes on
some of the aforementioned intervening variables is most benecial.
2.3 Econometric Methodology
2.3.1 Variables and Data
Dependent Variables
We obtain raw data on terrorist activity from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of
LaFree and Dugan (2007). For our main analysis we consider actions by known domestic
terrorist organizations. Given that media attention is a major goal of terrorist organiza-
tions, we do not consider actions perpetrated by unknown groups or individuals (e.g., we
do not count killing sprees by individuals as acts of terrorism).9 We only consider do-
9At the same time, we avoid counting ordinary criminal acts as acts of terrorism. When we process the
raw GTD data, we also lter out any event data that can be considered as criminal rather than terrorist
activity (e.g., Maa activity in Italy). While it is true that criminal and terrorist activities may overlap and
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mestic groups because they should react most strongly by far to changes in socio-economic
conditions initiated by social policies. Also, domestic terrorism is a more common phenom-
enon than transnational terrorism (Sanchez-Cuenca and De La Calle, 2009). According to
Engene (2007), most domestic terrorist activity in Western Europe is conducted by ethnic-
nationalist (e.g., ETA) or left-wing groups (e.g., Action Directe). Note that religiously
motivated terrorism does not play a role in Western Europe because we only consider
home-grown terrorism during the 1980-2003 period.
We use two denitions of domestic terrorism. We consider purely domestic terrorism
(terrorism by domestic groups aimed only at domestic targets). Here, our analysis is
linked to the common di¤erentiation between domestic and transnational terrorism. This
di¤erentiation has, however, been criticized. We therefore also investigate all terrorism
taking place in one country as well as originating in this country (terrorism by domestic
groups against domestic and international targets). Here, we side with Sanchez-Cuenca
and De La Calle (2009) who argue that the nationality of a terrorist target may not matter,
but that it is more important that a terrorist act is conducted by a terrorist organization
in its natural territory.10
Based on our two denitions of homeland terrorism, we construct a total of four de-
pendent variables. First, we use the number of terrorist attacks to indicate the frequency
of purely domestic and total domestic terrorism. Second, we also investigate the ferocity
of purely domestic and total domestic terrorism, indicated by the sum of people injured or
killed in terrorist attacks.
All of these four terrorism incident and victim variables are event counts. For our
analysis we choose 15 Western European countries that experienced homeland terrorist
even converge (e.g., Dishman, 2001; Makarenko, 2004), they di¤er with respect to their main motivation,
where the former serves mainly commercial purposes, while the latter has a clear political dimension.
10 In order to construct terror variables for total homeland terrorism, we, e.g., count all attacks by ETA
in Spain (its homeland), regardless of the nationality of the target of these attacks. By contrast, we do not
investigate imported transnational terrorism conducted by groups operating outside their natural territory.
(e.g., Palestinian groups) in our main analysis. Instead, we focus on this imported transnational terrorism
in an extension of our empirical work. Note that for imported terrorism religious ideology (e.g., Islamist
terrorism) may very well matter.
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Figure 23: Terrorist Activity in Western Europe, 1980-2003
activity between 1980 and 2003. The countries most hit were the United Kingdom, France,
Greece, Italy, Spain and Germany.11 Figure 2.3 gives an overview of the frequency and
ferocity of purely domestic terrorism between 1980 and 2003.12 In total, there were almost
5000 terrorist attacks which claimed approximately 8400 victims.
Independent Variables
To test our hypotheses of inuences of welfare policies on terrorism, we employ a variety
of measures in two categories. First, we use social expenditure variables. Second, we use
indicators that characterize the design of welfare systems and their a¢ liation with the
broad worlds of welfare capitalism clusters. Additional information on all our independent
variables is given in the appendix to this chapter.
11The other countries in our sample are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland.
12Note that the patterns of total homeland terrorism are very similar. The correlation between the
number of purely domestic and total terrorist attacks is 0.99. The correlation between the number of
victims from purely doemstic terrorism and total homeland terrorism (including international victims) is
0.97.
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Our overall measure for social spending is total social public expenditure (SOCEXP).13
We also consider spending on public health (HEALTH ), unemployment (UNEMP) and
active labor market programs (LABOR). In line with our rst hypothesis we expect higher
spending to generally coincide with a decrease in terrorism, e.g., by means of increased eco-
nomic security or participation, or augmented social stability and satisfaction. As "typical"
terrorists (and their supporters) are usually young and without much economic perspec-
tive (Ehrlich and Liu, 2002), we expect the e¤ects of HEALTH, UNEMP and LABOR to
be particularly strong because they are strongly linked to the socio-economic conditions
of potential terrorists and their supporters. We also check for the impact of further ex-
penditure variables. Here, we incorporate public expenditure on old age (OLDAGE ), the
family (FAMILY ) and on public housing (HOUSE ). These spending variables may be less
strongly linked to the "typical" potential terrorists socio-economic conditions and thus
less likely to be linked to violence propensity.
As argued before, the analysis of social spending patterns does not necessarily provide
a complete picture of the terrorism-welfare nexus. Esping-Andersen (1990) notes that it is
not the amount of public spending per se but its e¤ect (policy outcome) that matters. This
e¤ect becomes apparent in the two dimensions (decommodication and social stratication)
we discussed earlier. Decommodication may be measured by an index computed using
information on pension, unemployment and sickness welfare programs (Sruggs and Allan,
2006). Specically, these programs are evaluated, inter alia, with respect to their coverage,
duration of benets and qualifying rules. Higher index values coincide with higher decom-
modication and thus less market dependence. Scruggs (2004) provides a decommodica-
tion score using new data based on the methodology proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990).
We use this decommodication score (DEMSCORE ) as a measure of market independence.
Decommodication is expected to be particularly high in the social-democratic world of
welfare capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990). We also use data on unemployment replace-
13Note that there is no common trend of spending patterns observable for our country sample between
1980 and 2003, based on the SOCEXP variable. This should reduce the possibility of detecting only a
spurious relationship between social spending and terrorism when running corresponding empirical analyses.
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ment rates (UNEM RPL) from Scruggs (2004) as another indicator of market dependence
and welfare generosity. When replacement rates are high, unemployment benets come
closer to the net income of a working individual. Welfare state generosity is again antici-
pated to be high in the social-democratic world of welfare capitalism. Finally, we also use
a measure of social stratication. Following Scruggs and Allan (2008), a possible indicator
to assess social stratication is the degree of universalism (UNIV ) which indicates how
many individuals (in the labor force or above retirement age) are covered by unemploy-
ment or sickness insurance, or receive pensions. According to Esping-Andersen (1990),
a high degree of universalism is associated with a social-democratic welfare regime.14 In
line with our second hypothesis we expect a negative relationship between high levels of
decommodication and universalism on the one hand and terrorism on the other. More
generous regimes should be more successful in discouraging home-grown terrorism, e.g., by
means of countering economic or social disenfranchisement. This relationship should be
independent of the actual level of social spending.15
Controls
We follow Burgoon (2006) and consider a variety of control factors that may not only
inuence terrorism but also social spending and the welfare regime. Thus, we avoid de-
tecting spurious correlations. We choose controls that account for economic, political,
demographic and systemic factors. Information on data measurement and sources is given
in the appendix to this chapter.
Trade openness may inuence terrorist activity by its e¤ects on economic growth, in-
equality and income levels (Li and Schaub, 2004). Blomberg and Hess (2008a) nd that
higher levels of trade openness reduce the likelihood of transnational and domestic ter-
14Due to missing panel data it is not possible to construct and employ the other stratication measures
proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990). See Scruggs and Allan (2008) for a discussion of this issue.
15The correlation between total social spending (SOCEXP) and DEMSCORE is 0.29. The correlation
between SOCEXP and UNEM RPL is 0.49, and the correlation between SOCEXP and UNIV is 0.02. This
indicates the relationship between social spending and welfare regime variables is not very strong, so an
independent analysis of the e¤ect of both types of variables on terrorism is justied.
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rorism. Economic integration may reduce grievances associated with poor economic con-
ditions, consequently reducing terrorism building on such grievances. At the same time,
open economies face external risks from world market uctuations. This increases demand
for more universal social protection provided by the government (Rodrik, 1998).
Voter turnout may be another variable inuencing terrorism and social spending. On
the one hand, democratic participation may, inter alia, make it more costly for terrorist
groups to nd new members and popular support, given that dissent may be voiced non-
violently and cost-e¢ ciently by democratic means (Li 2005). On the other hand, higher
voter turnouts may also coincide with increased political participation of underprivileged
voters demanding an increase in social spending and a more universal form of social pro-
tection (Hicks and Swank, 1992).
Left-wing governments may also inuence the patterns of terrorism. Burgoon (2006)
argues that the presence of left-wing governments should make terrorism less likely, as
left-wing parties represent disenfranchised social groups more strongly. When such groups
are able to enforce their goals politically, they are expected to resort less to violence. This
representation of the underprivileged is likewise expected to increase social spending and
to produce more egalitarian social policy outcomes (Allan and Scruggs, 2004).
Electoral fractionalization (political competition) may mean that social tensions that
manifest themselves in a fractionalized electorate abound in a country. Such cleavages may
translate into terrorist violence (Piazza, 2006). However, in stable democracies political
plurality needs not necessarily lead to more violence but may, in contrast, crowd out support
for violent fringe groups. Political competition may also inuence welfare spending and the
goals of welfare policies. Political platforms change when competition is high. Spending is
expected to increase with competition as policy outcomes are anticipated to become more
egalitarian (Hicks and Swank, 1992).
Population size is almost always positively associated with terrorism in empirical analy-
ses (e.g., Li and Schaub, 2004; Burgoon, 2006). Larger populations should make monitoring
for governments more expensive, while making recruitment for terrorist groups less costly.
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More plainly, terrorism as a random event is more likely in a larger country. Also, pop-
ulation size is named as a factor strongly explaining social spending and policy patterns
(Rodrik, 1998)
The variable population over 65 is considered because older populations are expected to
generate less terrorism just as younger populations are anticipated to breed more violence
(Ehrlich and Liu, 2002). At the same time, an older population may demand more social
spending related to pensions, health or other welfare programs (Lindert, 1996).
Ethnic polarization may also matter. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) show that
ethnic polarization increases the risk of conict. Similarly, Basuchoudhary and Shughart
(2010) argue that identity conict leads to terrorism. For instance, higher ethnic polar-
ization may coincide with an increased likelihood of struggles over rents, thus increasing
the risk of terrorism. Likewise, ethnic polarization may inuence the patterns of social
spending and policies. For instance, Alesina et al. (2001) argue that racial fragmentation
in the U.S. and the underrepresentation of minorities in the political system has led to
lower levels of redistribution.
Lastly, we also control for a major systemic change that occurred during our observation
period, namely the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War is perceived as having
signicantly changed the dynamics of terrorism (e.g., Enders and Sandler, 1999; Robison et
al., 2006). For instance, left-wing groups may nd it harder to get ideological and nancial
support given the collapse of Communism, driving down related risks of terrorist activity.
At the same time, the end of the Cold War cleared the way for economic internationalization
and increased international competition, possibly inuencing welfare spending and policies
(Levy, 1999). For instance, in the 1990s governments may have altered social systems to
enhance international competitiveness.
2.3.2 Empirical Methodology
We run a panel analysis, departing from previous studies which often relied on cross-
sectional approaches. We are able to capitalize on cross-sectional information reecting
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di¤erences between countries and on time-series information reecting dynamics within
countries over time. Panel analyses, amongst others, allow for a better control of het-
erogeneity e¤ects, reduce problems of collinearity and deliver more e¢ cient econometric
estimations.
The dependent variables of our model are count variables which assume only discrete,
non-negative values. Standard regression models require that the dependent variable be
continuous and random. Our dependent variables violate this requirement, making it im-
practical to use the OLS estimator (Winkelmann and Zimmermann, 1995). For instance,
heteroskedasticity, which is inherent in count data, is ignored, which distorts the estimated
variances of the regression coe¢ cients relative to their true variances (Gardner et al., 1995;
Winkelmann, 2008). Also, using the OLS estimation model means to allow for negative
outcomes even though such an outcome is impossible with event-count data (Winkelmann,
2008). Consequently, using such a model may lead to biased and ine¢ cient parameter
estimates. Instead, it is advised to use an estimation technique that explicitly takes into
account the count properties of our dependent variable, i.e., count-data models. Such
models are estimated using the maximum-likelihood estimator which nds the value of
the parameter of interest that makes the observed data most probable to have happened
(Lawless, 1987; Winkelmann, 2008). The Poisson distribution the standard distribution
used to model count data assumes that the mean of the distribution of the dependent
variable equals its variance (equidispersion) and that the events that make up the distribu-
tion are independent. The presence of overdispersion when the variance of the dependent
variable is larger than its mean leads to consistent, but ine¢ cient estimates (e.g., down-
ward biased standard errors that possibly lead to incorrect statistical inferences) when the
event-count is (incorrectly) modelled to be drawn from a Poisson distribution. In the case
of overdispersion, it is advised to t a count-data regression based on negative binomial
distribution as an alternative probability model (Gardner et al., 1995). The negative bi-
nomial regression model "[...] can be viewed as a form of Poisson regression that includes
a random component reecting the uncertainty about the true rates at which events occur
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for individual cases" (Gardner et al., 1995: 399). The negative binomial model also makes
use of the maximum-likelihood estimator (Lawless, 1987). It has also been shown to have
good properties with respect to, e.g., e¢ ciency and robustness (Lawless, 1987).
As shown in Table 2.1, the variances of our dependent variables are indeed larger than
their respective means. Because of this overdispersion, we employ a negative binomial
(maximum-likelihood) count model which does not su¤er from the ine¢ ciency problems
that may result from the use of a Poisson regression model in the presence of overdisper-
sion.16
The estimation equation is as follows:
Terrorjit = i + 1Terrorji;t 1 + 2SOCji;t 1 + 
0
3Xi;t 1 + t + it; (2.1)
where Terrorjit is the j th terrorism indicator for country i in period t. Terrorji;t 1 is
the respective lagged dependent variable. SOCji;t 1 is our j th welfare spending or policy
measure for country i in period t-1. Xi;t 1 is the vector of control variables for i in the (t-1)
lagged form. 1, 2 and 3 are coe¢ cients. t are the xed time e¤ects (time dummies).
it is the error term.
We let the independent variable and control variables enter the model with (t-1) lagged
values, as we assume that any changes in these parameters should a¤ect terrorist behav-
ior only after some time. Furthermore, we avoid potential reverse causation problems by
lagging all the explanatory variables as this eliminates the correlation between the ex-
planatory variables and the error term.17 We include a lagged dependent variable in all
16We may need to take into account the possibility of excess zeros which may be the actual cause of
overdispersion. Zero ination can cause e¢ ciency problems if not accounted for. Burgoon (2006) argues
that zero ination in the context of terrorism analysis may occur because of systematic di¤erences in the
likelihood and causes of terrorist activity. Additionally, zero ination may be a consequence of under-
reporting biases of terrorist activity in countries with low levels of press freedom. Given our data sample
for Western Europe during 1980-2003, we see no reason for assuming the existence of systematic di¤erences
in terrorist activity across countries or of any substantial under-reporting bias. On these grounds, we
abstain from correcting for zero ination.
17Also, it is shown in Chapter 3 of this thesis that economic conditions are usually not causally inuenced
by terrorist activity. This nding reinforces the argument that the ndings regarding the terrorism-welfare
policy nexus cannot be driven by reverse causation.
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Variable N*T Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Purely Domestic Terrorist Attacks 360 13.87 35.35 0 244
Purely Domestic Terrorism Victims 360 23.34 66.19 0 527
Total Domestic Terrorist Attacks 360 15.16 36.37 0 247
Total Domestic Terrorist Victims 360 24.97 68.02 0 528
Transnational Attacks 360 1.86 4.00 0 33
Transnational Terrorism Victims 360 8.09 31.91 0 270
Total Social Public Expenditure 346 22.06 4.83 10.77 36.17
Public Health Expenditure 346 5.56 1.09 2.89 8.48
Unemployment Benets 343 1.58 1.19 0 5.27
Active Labor Market Spending 310 0.87 0.53 0 2.86
Old Age Spending 346 7.49 2.39 2.24 12.79
Spending on Family 346 2.00 1.10 0.15 4.89
Spending on Housing 322 0.41 0.40 0 1.82
Decommodifcation Score 276 7.92 2.06 2.89 11.63
Unemployment Replacement Rate 269 0.58 0.21 0.02 0.92
Degree of Universalism 276 0.87 0.09 0.63 1.05
Trade Openess 360 66.39 32.79 21.46 187.36
Voter Turnout 360 77.60 11.77 42.20 94.80
Left Party in Power 360 0.39 0.49 0 1
Electoral Fractionalization 360 4.51 1.76 2.28 10.29
Population Size 360 9.60 1.02 8.13 11.32
Population over 65 360 14.73 1.83 10.45 19.33
Ethnic Polarization 360 0.324 0.25 0.020 0.87
Post-Cold War Era Dummy 360 0.500 0.50 0 1
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
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estimations to account for serial correlation and the possibility of omitted variables. At
the same time, this variable captures the reinforcement e¤ect of past terrorism on present
one (e.g., Enders and Sandler, 1999). We take into account time and trending e¤ects by
including time dummies. Note that we only use time dummies when this is suggested by
joint signicance tests. The inclusion of a dummy variable for the end of the Cold War era
also controls for the time dependence and trending e¤ects specically associated with the
structural changes in the international system and their e¤ect on terrorism and social sys-
tems. We also report some multicollinearity diagnostics. Note that count-data models due
to their inherent non-linearity and heteroskedasticity do not produce easily interpretable
goodness-of-t measures such as the R2 (Verbeek, 2008; Greene, 2012). There is no consen-
sus regarding the usefulness of alternative goodness-of-t measures for count-data models,
as they all seem to su¤er from specic drawbacks and are not easy to interpret (Winkel-
mann and Zimmermann, 1995). Note that because of this we do not report goodness-of-t
measures in this chapter. However, a series of Wald test for all model specications of
this chapter (not reported), which test whether all regression coe¢ cients in the model are
simultaneous equal to zero, suggests that our models exhibit some explanatory power, as
these tests always turn out to be highly signicant.
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Main Findings
Social Spending and Terrorism
First, we investigate how the frequency of terrorism is a¤ected by total social spending and
by spending on health, unemployment and active labor market programs. The results are
reported in Table 2.2. Net of the impact of the control variables on the number of terrorist
attacks in a given year and country, we nd that higher social spending is consistently
associated with a lower level of terrorist activity. This results holds for purely domestic
terrorism as well as for the more comprehensive measure of total home-grown terrorism.
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In particular spending on health and active labor markets may inuence terrorism
through several of the aforementioned channels. For instance, spending on health may
promote economic growth by positively a¤ecting human capital, may reduce poverty by
means of redistribution (Brady, 2005) and a¤ect overall satisfaction with life. Similarly,
active labor market programs may not only promote economic growth but may also inu-
ence satisfaction with life. Furthermore, if we think of the "typical" terrorist as young and
with only poor economic perspectives (Ehrlich and Liu, 2002), it is intuitive to nd that
spending which opens up new perspectives (spending on health and active labor market
programs) is particularly e¤ective.
Next, we consider the e¤ects of OLDAGE, FAMILY and HOUSE on the number of
terrorist attacks. As shown in Table 2.3, there is considerably less evidence to link public
spending on the elderly, the family and housing to the frequency of terrorist attacks. While
the spending variables always enter with the expected sign, only FAMILY comes out sig-
nicant in the specication where the total number of attacks is the dependent variable.
These results imply that not all kinds of spending lead to a reduction in terrorist activity.
If we again think of the "typical" terrorist as a young, unmarried male with little eco-
nomic perspective, our ndings are highly intuitive. While, e.g., spending on labor market
programs is likely to a¤ect a "typical" would-be terrorist in ways that make terrorism less
attractive (by o¤ering non-violent opportunities), the same cannot be anticipated for pub-
lic spending on the elderly or on public housing. As argued by Brady (2005), public health
expenditure is probably the most encompassing measure of welfare-induced redistribution
because it is not restricted to specic interest groups (e.g., the elderly or families). Again,
it is intuitive to assume that when health expenditures increase (meaning that overall re-
source redistribution increases) terrorism that is rooted in inequality grievances becomes
less likely. Note also that the insignicant e¤ects OLDAGE, FAMILY and HOUSE on
the number of terrorist attacks also explain why the coe¢ cient of SOCEXP (total social
spending) is substantially smaller than that of the other social spending variables reported
in Table 2.2.
53
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
SO
C
E
X
P
-0
.0
82
-0
.0
97
(2
.7
5)
**
*
(3
.5
1)
**
*
H
E
A
LT
H
-0
.7
19
-0
.6
72
(6
.0
7)
**
*
(6
.0
5)
**
*
U
N
E
M
P
-0
.2
15
-0
.2
34
(2
.3
9)
**
(2
.8
5)
**
*
L
A
B
O
R
-0
.6
55
-0
.7
42
(2
.6
4)
**
*
(3
.1
9)
**
*
D
ep
en
de
nt
0.
00
4
0.
00
4
0.
00
4
0.
00
4
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0.
00
6
V
ar
ia
bl
e
(3
.2
1)
**
*
(3
.1
4)
**
*
(2
.8
1)
**
*
(2
.9
9)
**
*
(4
.1
1)
**
*
(4
.0
7)
**
*
(3
.7
3)
**
*
(4
.1
9)
**
*
T
ra
de
-0
.0
24
-0
.0
18
-0
.0
26
-0
.0
20
-0
.0
21
-0
.0
16
-0
.0
23
-0
.0
15
O
p
en
ne
ss
(3
.1
5)
**
*
(3
.3
8)
**
*
(3
.3
6)
**
*
(2
.1
7)
**
(2
.9
9)
**
*
(3
.3
2)
**
*
(3
.1
5)
**
*
(1
.7
3)
*
V
ot
er
T
ur
no
ut
0.
00
2
0.
00
3
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
27
0.
00
4
0.
00
4
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
30
(0
.1
7)
(0
.2
8)
(0
.6
1)
(1
.9
3)
*
(0
.3
7)
(0
.4
6)
(0
.6
4)
(2
.2
6)
**
L
ef
t
P
ar
ty
-0
.0
51
0.
00
4
-0
.0
72
-0
.0
71
0.
01
4
0.
05
9
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
36
P
ow
er
(0
.4
1)
(0
.0
4)
(0
.5
7)
(0
.5
1)
(0
.1
3)
(0
.5
6)
(0
.1
1)
(0
.2
7)
E
le
ct
or
al
-0
.0
78
-0
.1
33
-0
.0
81
-0
.0
64
-0
.0
85
-0
.1
46
-0
.0
86
-0
.0
65
Fr
ac
ti
on
al
iz
at
io
n
(1
.0
6)
(1
.9
6)
**
(1
.0
7)
(0
.6
8)
(1
.2
3)
(2
.2
8)
**
(1
.2
0)
(0
.7
3)
P
op
ul
at
io
n
Si
ze
0.
63
1
1.
07
0
0.
45
2
0.
29
1
0.
73
7
1.
13
3
0.
55
6
0.
38
5
(3
.2
7)
**
*
(4
.8
6)
**
*
(2
.2
2)
**
(1
.1
9)
(4
.0
6)
**
*
(5
.7
1)
**
*
(2
.8
2)
**
*
(1
.6
9)
*
P
op
ul
at
io
n
-0
.0
36
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
81
0.
09
4
-0
.0
22
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
78
0.
06
7
O
ve
r
65
(0
.5
4)
(0
.0
7)
(1
.1
8)
(1
.2
6)
(0
.3
9)
(0
.2
7)
(1
.2
5)
(0
.9
3)
E
th
ni
c
2.
12
4
2.
02
7
2.
52
8
1.
54
3
1.
94
2
1.
92
0
2.
27
6
1.
18
2
P
ol
ar
iz
at
io
n
(3
.4
9)
**
*
(3
.4
6)
**
*
(3
.7
3)
**
*
(1
.9
3)
*
(3
.4
1)
**
*
(3
.4
1)
**
*
(3
.5
5)
**
*
(1
.5
1)
P
os
t-
C
ol
d
W
ar
-0
.8
13
-0
.5
39
-0
.4
14
-0
.6
22
-0
.8
28
-0
.5
89
-0
.4
59
-0
.5
89
(2
.5
4)
**
(1
.8
6)
*
(1
.2
1)
(1
.8
3)
*
(2
.7
8)
**
*
(2
.1
3)
**
(1
.4
4)
(1
.7
9)
*
T
im
e
D
um
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
M
ea
n
V
IF
2.
00
2.
00
1.
88
1.
84
2.
02
2.
02
1.
90
1.
86
N
*T
33
1
33
1
32
8
29
5
33
1
33
1
32
8
29
5
N
ot
es
:
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
pu
re
ly
do
m
es
ti
c
te
rr
or
is
t
at
ta
ck
s
in
m
od
el
s
1-
4
an
d
th
e
to
ta
l
nu
m
be
r
of
do
m
es
ti
c
te
rr
or
is
t
at
ta
ck
s
in
m
od
el
s
5-
8.
N
um
b
er
s
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
ar
e
ab
so
lu
te
z-
va
lu
es
.
*,
**
an
d
**
*
de
no
te
si
gn
i
ca
nc
e
at
10
p
er
ce
nt
,
5
p
er
ce
nt
an
d
1
p
er
ce
nt
le
ve
ls
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
A
ll
ex
pl
an
at
or
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
la
gg
ed
by
on
e
ye
ar
(i
.e
,
t
 
1
).
M
ea
n
V
IF
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
va
ri
an
ce
in
a
ti
on
fa
ct
or
,
de
no
ti
ng
m
ul
ti
co
lli
ne
ar
it
y
w
he
n
th
e
m
ea
n
V
IF
is
la
rg
er
th
an
5.
T
ab
le
2.
2:
W
el
fa
re
S
p
en
d
in
g
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
an
d
T
er
ro
ri
st
A
tt
ac
k
s
54
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLDAGE -0.051 -0.056
(0.71) (0.81)
FAMILY -0.144 -0.255
(1.06) (1.96)**
HOUSE 0.053 0.099
(0.25) (0.49)
Dependent 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
Variable (3.18)*** (3.38)*** (3.24)*** (4.05)*** (4.42)*** (4.15)***
Trade -0.029 -0.027 -0.030 -0.027 -0.024 -0.023
Openness (3.90)*** (3.56)*** (3.17)*** (3.82)*** (3.35)*** (2.58)**
Voter Turnout 0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.25) (0.15) (0.11) (0.18) (0.19) (0.07)
Left Party -0.090 -0.078 -0.099 -0.031 -0.009 -0.036
Power (0.70) (0.61) (0.77) (0.26) (0.08) (0.30)
Electoral -0.099 -0.107 -0.132 -0.101 -0.116 -0.091
Fractionalization (1.31) (1.44) (1.43) (1.41) (1.67)* (1.07)
Population Size 0.539 0.504 0.498 0.597 0.569 0.503
(2.61)*** (2.65)*** (2.41)** (3.01)*** (3.22)*** (2.46)**
Population -0.074 -0.085 -0.093 -0.061 -0.063 -0.072
Over 65 (1.01) (1.35) (1.40) (0.92) (1.11) (1.17)
Ethnic 2.105 2.254 2.091 1.948 2.116 2.343
Polarization (3.33)*** (3.65)*** (2.53)** (3.26)*** (3.61)*** (2.88)***
Post-Cold War -0.827 -0.909 -0.374 -0.878 -0.977 -0.575
(2.43)** (2.68)*** (0.69) (2.76)*** (3.12)*** (1.16)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean VIF 2.14 1.94 1.79 2.16 1.96 1.81
N*T 331 331 308 331 331 308
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of purely domestic terrorist attacks in models
1-3 and the total number of domestic terrorist attacks in models 4-6. Numbers in
parentheses are absolute z-values. *, ** and *** denote signicance at 10 percent,
5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. All explanatory variables lagged by one
year (i.e, t  1). Mean VIF refers to the variance ination factor, denoting multicollinearity
when the mean VIF is than 5.
Table 2.3: Additional Welfare Spending Variables and Terrorist
Attacks
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We also estimate how social spending is related to the ferocity of purely domestic and
total homeland terrorism. We report our ndings on the e¤ect of SOCEXP, HEALTH,
UNEMP and LABOR on terrorist violence in Table 2.4. Our results are broadly consistent
with previous ones. There are negative and signicant e¤ects of SOCEXP, HEALTH and
LABOR on the dependent variable. However, the impact of UNEMP on terrorist violence
is negative but not signicant. We can interpret the major terror-dampening e¤ects of
HEALTH and LABOR on terrorist violence as before, arguing that higher spending in these
elds (intuitively) a¤ects the terroristscalculi more strongly. In general, these ndings
suggest moderate e¤ects of social spending on a reduction of homeland terrorism.
We also investigate how spending on old age, the family and public housing relates to
terrorist violence. The results are given in Table 2.5. For terrorist violence, OLDAGE and
FAMILY are found to reduce terrorist violence signicantly. The e¤ect of public housing
spending on terrorist violence remains insignicant. For instance, these results imply that
higher spending on the family may lead to less social dissatisfaction and may be seen as
a credible e¤ort to reduce poverty and inequality, thereby draining terrorist violence that
is rooted in these very factors. No evidence is found for a substantial link from public
housing spending to homeland terrorism.
Finally, we examine the results for the control variables. Considering the frequency
of terrorism, we nd that past terrorist activity is positively associated with present ter-
rorism, hinting at the self-energizing nature of terrorism detected in many other studies.
Terrorism is also positively linked to larger populations, but this may simply indicate
that terrorism (measured in absolute numbers) is more likely in more populous countries.
Higher ethnic polarization is also associated with higher terrorist activity, indicating that
ethnic conicts translate into an increased likelihood of terrorism. By contrast, higher
trade openness is found to be negatively linked to terrorist attacks in statistically signif-
icant ways. This is in line with Blomberg and Hess (2008a). Economic integration may
spur economic development, which in turn reduces incentives for terrorism. There is also a
negative e¤ect of the post-Cold War dummy, indicating that terrorism became less likely
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLDAGE -0.188 -0.176
(3.00)*** (3.01)***
FAMILY -0.406 -0.357
(3.16)*** (2.95)***
HOUSE -0.301 0.156
(0.95) (0.88)
Dependent 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003
Variable (3.51)*** (4.67)*** (4.43)*** (3.23)*** (4.14)*** (4.06)***
Trade -0.040 -0.029 -0.078 -0.058 -0.035 -0.053
Openness (4.41)*** (3.18)*** (4.89)*** (4.94)*** (3.84)*** (4.67)***
Voter Turnout 0.016 0.009 0.010 0.018 0.005 -0.012
(1.42) (0.80) (0.69) (1.44) (0.43) (0.94)
Left Party -0.022 -0.013 -0.393 -0.287 0.007 -0.133
Power (0.14) (0.08) (2.20)** (1.63) (0.04) (0.86)
Electoral -0.246 -0.303 -0.422 -0.0303 -0.305 -0.453
Fractionalization (2.56)** (3.20)*** (3.78)*** (3.22)*** (3.24)*** (4.49)***
Population Size 0.737 0.646 0.334 0.590 0.586 0.566
(5.62)*** (4.33)*** (1.92)* (4.34)*** (4.24)*** (4.78)***
Population 0.075 0.046 -0.079 0.059 0.069 0.067
Over 65 (1.25) (0.65) (0.88) (0.89) (0.67) (0.93)
Ethnic 2.728 2.924 3.053 2.525 2.802 2.529
Polarization (5.48)*** (5.27)*** (4.41)*** (5.20)*** (5.25)*** (5.11)***
Post-Cold War -0.011 -0.283 -1.510 -0.274 -0.209 -0.059
(0.05) (1.26) (2.13)** (0.65) (0.95) (0.28)
Time Dummies No No Yes Yes No No
Mean VIF 2.13 1.91 1.77 2.11 1.92 1.77
N*T 331 331 308 331 331 308
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of purely domestic terrorist attacks in models
1-3 and the total number of domestic terrorist attacks in models 4-6. Numbers in
parentheses are absolute z-values. *, ** and *** denote signicance at 10 percent,
5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. All explanatory variables lagged by one
year (i.e, t  1). Mean VIF refers to the variance ination factor, denoting multicollinearity
when the mean VIF is larger than 5.
Table 2.5: Additional Welfare Spending Variables and Terrorism
Victims
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after the end of the Cold War, e.g., as left-wing terrorist groups lost part of their ideological
and nancial base with the fall of Communism. In contrast to the former ndings, there is
little evidence of the importance of political variables (left-wing government, voter turnout,
fractionalization of the electorate) in explaining the frequency of terrorism. The results of
the controls for terrorism ferocity are in many ways similar to the previous ones. There
is a positive association between past and present terrorist violence and a positive e¤ect
of population size and ethnic polarization on terrorism. Higher levels of trade openness
are linked to lower levels of terrorist violence. However, there is no strong relationship
between the end of the Cold War and terrorist violence. In addition, political competition
(electoral fractionalization) is now found to be negatively related to terrorist violence. In
some specications, an older population is also found to be positively linked to terrorism.
The Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and Terrorism
We have already stressed that social spending variables d not necessarily provide a com-
plete picture of a potential nexus between social policies and terrorist activity. Therefore,
we assess the impact of welfare regime variables on terrorist activity in Western Europe.
First, we analyze whether higher levels of decommodication and more egalitarian forms
of social stratication inuence the number of terrorist attacks, as suggested in our second
hypothesis. The results are reported in Table 2.6. The ndings indicate that only UNEM
RPL (unemployment replacement rate) signicantly reduces the number of terrorist at-
tacks. The broader decommodication measure (DEMSCORE) is found to signicantly
lower only the likelihood of the total number of homeland terrorist attacks. UNIV, which
indicates the degree of universalism (i.e., of social stratication) in a society, is never found
to signicantly sway the number of attacks, even though the sign of the coe¢ cient is as
anticipated. Overall, these ndings provide some support for the idea that higher levels of
decommodication reduce the number of home-grown terrorist attacks. This relationship
seems to be particularly important with respect to unemployment benet generosity but
not so important for welfare state generosity in general (DEMSCORE). While the former
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should matter to the "typical" terrorist and their supporters, the latter is also related to
generosity towards the elderly and the sick, so less connected to an environment poten-
tially bearing terrorism. This nding also matches our previous insights into the relative
importance of social spending on unemployment and labor market programs.
Next, we want to assess to which extent welfare regime variables interact with terror-
ist violence. The ndings are given in Table 2.7. These results show that UNEM RPL
and DEMSCORE signicantly reduce terrorist violence from purely domestic and total
terrorist activity. Thus, our ndings again stress the role of higher welfare state generosity
(i.e., of higher decommodication) in reducing terroristsincentives to act violently. Lower
levels of market dependence may cause lower levels of income inequality and social dissat-
isfaction, thereby making terrorism rooted in these very conditions less likely. Contrary to
the ndings in Table 2.6, we now even nd a weakly signicant negative e¤ect of higher
universalism on terrorist violence, at least for purely domestic terrorism. While this result
indicates that welfare regimes fostering social equality are less prone to terrorist violence
(as social inequality may otherwise contribute to terrorism), the results from Tables 2.6
and 2.7 generally seem to show that higher levels of decommodication matter more to
terrorism than the promotion of social equality. The social-democratic world of welfare
capitalism, which o¤ers the highest degree of market independence, may be regarded as
least vulnerable to homeland terrorism. Welfare regimes o¤ering lower levels of market in-
dependence (i.e., the liberal regime) may be seen as more prone to such forms of terrorism.
The results for the controls are generally as expected. While past terrorism and big-
ger populations make terrorist attacks and related violence more likely, a higher level of
trade openness makes terrorism less probable. Terrorist attacks are also less likely in the
post-Cold War era, which is consistent with previous results. Interestingly, while political
factors continue not to matter to terrorist violence, higher voter turnout and a left-wing
government are found to reduce the number of home-grown terrorist attacks against do-
mestic and international targets alike. These ndings provide at least some support for the
idea that democratic participation and government ideology are important determinants of
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DEMSCORE -0.155 -0.191
(1.39) (1.77)*
UNEM RPL -3.758 -3.280
(4.69)*** (3.23)***
UNIV -0.621 -2.263
(0.30) (1.21)
Dependent 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.005
Variable (2.16)** (1.99)** (1.76)* (3.02)*** (2.37)** (2.64)***
Trade 0.004 -0.008 -0.003 0.009 0.002 0.003
Openness (0.34) (0.69) (0.24) (0.84) (0.20) (0.35)
Voter Turnout -0.038 -0.079 -0.033 -0.042 -0.064 -0.041
(2.34)** (4.20)*** (2.01)** (2.90)*** (3.26)*** (2.74)***
Left Party -0.493 -0.639 -0.503 -0.403 -0.496 -0.396
Power (2.55)** (3.34)*** (2.56)** (2.28)** (2.76)*** (2.23)**
Electoral -0.094 -0.123 -0.056 -0.066 -0.068 -0.033
Fractionalization (0.85) (1.20) (0.53) (0.57) (0.65) (0.32)
Population Size 1.209 0.731 1.284 1.296 1.095 1.373
(4.76)*** (2.49)** (5.51)*** (5.78)*** (3.84)*** (6.65)***
Population -0.024 0.223 -0.086 -0.024 0.157 -0.076
Over 65 (0.20) (1.85)* (0.76) (0.21) (1.21) (0.72)
Ethnic 1.162 2.620 0.926 0.672 0.890 0.447
Polarization (1.16) (1.96)** (0.93) (0.65) (0.76) (0.45)
Post-Cold War -1.309 -3.990 -1.247 -1.370 -3.037 -1.278
(3.80)*** (4.65)*** (3.36)*** (4.53)*** (4.53)*** (3.66)***
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean VIF 2.33 2.18 2.27 2.34 2.19 2.28
N*T 276 269 276 276 269 276
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of purely domestic terrorist attacks in models
1-3 and the total number of domestic terrorist attacks in models 4-6. Numbers in
parentheses are absolute z-values. *, ** and *** denote signicance at 10 percent,
5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. All explanatory variables lagged by one
year (i.e, t  1). Mean VIF refers to the variance ination factor, denoting multicollinearity
when the mean VIF is larger than 5.
Table 2.6: Welfare Regime Variables and Terrorist Attacks
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DEMSCORE -0.234 -0.192
(2.66)*** (2.19)**
UNEM RPL -1.429 -1.157
(2.85)*** (2.35)**
UNIV -4.851 -3.393
(1.93)* (1.41)
Dependent 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
Variable (3.44)*** (2.56)** (3.20)*** (2.92)*** (2.20)** (2.76)***
Trade -0.016 -0.037 -0.024 -0.020 -0.038 -0.028
Openness (1.10) (2.44)** (1.67)* (1.39) (2.60)*** (2.03)**
Voter Turnout 0.006 0.015 0.007 0.004 0.012 0.006
(0.34) (0.86) (0.41) (0.23) (0.71) (0.41)
Left Party -0.331 -0.278 -0.242 -0.302 -0.258 -0.235
Power (1.28) (1.06) (0.95) (1.18) (0.99) (0.94)
Electoral -0.148 0.015 -0.160 -0.127 0.007 -0.128
Fractionalization (1.26) (0.12) (1.29) (1.14) (0.06) (1.08)
Population Size 1.418 1.445 1.466 1.387 1.413 1.422
(4.57)*** (4.45)*** (4.72)*** (4.85)*** (4.76)*** (5.03)***
Population -0.036 -0.024 -0.059 -0.024 -0.016 -0.042
Over 65 (0.29) (0.19) (0.47) (0.20) (0.13) (0.35)
Ethnic 5.457 5.726 6.093 5.222 5.479 5.720
Polarization (4.97)*** (4.71)*** (5.19)*** (5.00)*** (4.70)*** (5.25)***
Post-Cold War -0.569 -0.398 -0.385 -0.522 0.385 -0.359
(1.79)* (1.32) (1.26) (1.63) (1.26) (1.17)
Time Dummies No No No No No No
Mean VIF 2.32 2.19 2.27 2.33 2.19 2.28
N*T 276 269 276 276 269 276
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of victims from purely domestic terrorism in models
1-3 and the total number of victims from domestic terrorism in models 4-6. Numbers in
parentheses are absolute z-values. *, ** and *** denote signicance at 10 percent,
5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. All explanatory variables lagged by one
year (i.e, t  1). Mean VIF refers to the variance ination factor, denoting multicollinearity
when the mean VIF is larger than 5.
Table 2.7: Welfare Regime Variables and Terrorism Victims
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terrorist activity, as previously found by Li (2005), Burgoon (2006) and Koch and Cranmer
(2007).
2.4.2 Robustness
We also perform some additional robustness checks to see whether our results are stable
to methodological changes. First, we run our standard model without the inclusion of
a lagged dependent variable and time dummies. Second, we run the standard empirical
specication with a reduced dataset. That is, we exclude several Scandinavian countries
from the dataset that exhibit very little terrorist activity but have very developed (social-
democratic) welfare systems (e.g., Norway or Denmark). In general, our robustness ndings
conrm that social spending and welfare regime variables are negatively and signicantly
associated with terrorist activity. This relationship is stronger for the spending variables,
giving further support to our hypothesis H1. We also nd moderate support for our
second hypothesis H2. Our previously reported results are thus stable to a number of
methodological changes and do not seem to be randomly generated.
2.4.3 Extension
As an extension to our empirical work we consider the case of transnational terrorism. This
extension may also be seen as another form of robustness check. Crenshaw et al. (2007)
note that any e¤ect of social policies on terrorism should be stronger in the countries
generating terrorism (i.e., in the terroristshomeland) compared to the target or location
country of transnational terrorism. We similarly argue that transnational terrorism that
has its origins outside Western Europe should be far less responsive to benevolent social
policies due to the lack of connection to the welfare systems it targets. For instance, it is
not intuitive to assume that the terrorist attacks by the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA, an
Algerian organization) in France in the 1990s were somehow inuenced by French social
policies. Rather, we assume that GIA actions were driven by factors associated with
socio-economic and political developments in Algeria. We thus assume that transnational
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terrorism imported into Western Europe is not a¤ected by social policies in the country
where the attacks take place. Such attacks in one country may be better understood as
spillover of domestic conict in another country (Addison and Murshed, 2005) or as a
violent response to the foreign policy of the country targeted by transnational terrorism
(Savun and Phillips, 2009). More generally, and as noted in the introduction to this thesis,
transnational terrorism is more likely to be linked to the global politico-economic and
military order than to domestic socio-economic conditions.
In order to assess whether terrorist attacks imported into Western Europe follow a
di¤erent pattern than attacks by groups operating in their homeland, we modify our em-
pirical model accordingly. As dependent variables, we use the number of terrorist attacks
by known terrorist groups which have a homeland outside of Western Europe.18 We also
use the number of victims from those attacks as another dependent variable. We employ
the usual indicators for social spending and welfare regimes as independent variables. As
control variables, we use the previously discussed variables because they have also been
employed as factors explaining transnational attacks before (e.g., Li and Schaub, 2004;
Piazza, 2006; Burgoon, 2006).19
Our empirical results are given in Table 2.8. While we only present assorted results
here, the ndings for other specications are very similar.20 They suggest that there is
no signicant e¤ect of spending or welfare regime variables on the number of imported
transnational terrorist attacks and on the number of victims from these attacks. This
suggests that terrorism imported into Western Europe is not swayed by social policies of the
country where the attack eventually takes place. This is in line with Crenshaw et al. (2007).
Interestingly, these kinds of attacks are more likely when countries are more open, which
18Such terrorist organizations (with their respective homeland) include the Kurdistan Workers Party
PKK (Turkey), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PFLP (Israel/Palestine), the Japanese
Red Army JRA (Japan) and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia ASALA
(USSR/Turkey/Armenia).
19We only exclude population over 65 from the set of controls because there is no theoretical or empirical
contribution linking this factor to transnational attack patterns.
20 In fact, we only nd a negative e¤ect of OLDAGE on terrorism victims that is signicant at the 10%
level. For all other social spending or welfare regime variables there is no signicant e¤ect on transnational
terrorist attacks or victims.
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is exactly the opposite compared to the case of homeland terrorism. Blomberg and Hess
(2008a) nd similar results. Furthermore, ethnic factors do not matter to transnational
terrorism, while population size and the post-Cold War era still do. Political factors emerge
as insignicant. As we can see from Table 2.8, transnational terrorist attacks are obviously
inuenced by factors omitted by our standard model (e.g., by foreign policy). Overall,
our empirical extension matches our central hypotheses and previously presented results.
Social spending and the welfare regime matter to homeland terrorism where their inuence
on the terroristsand supporterscalculi is comprehensive, but not to imported terrorism.
2.5 Conclusion
In this contribution we investigated whether social spending and welfare regime variables
have an impact on terrorist activity originating in 15 Western European countries during
1980-2003. We argued that welfare spending alters socio-economic conditions in ways that
reduce home-grown terrorist activity (i.e., by increasing the opportunity costs of terrorism
through socio-economic improvements). We also argued that certain worlds of welfare
capitalism di¤er with respect to the degree of market dependence and social stratication
they o¤er and propagate, thereby inuencing the terroristscalculi in di¤erent ways. Our
central hypotheses were that higher social spending reduces homeland terrorism and that
more social-democratic worlds of welfare capitalism are less prone to terrorism.
We nd that social spending in certain elds (health, unemployment benets, active la-
bor market programs) indeed signicantly reduces homeland terrorist activity. While total
social spending also negatively correlates with terrorist activity, higher social spending in
other elds (e.g., public housing) does not universally translate into less terrorism. Further
evidence also suggests that more generous welfare systems o¤ering high degrees of decom-
modication are less prone to terrorism. Independent of the actual level of social spend-
ing, our ndings provide moderate support for the hypothesis that more social-democratic
worlds of welfare capitalism are less prone to terrorist activity originating from within their
borders. In general, we nd ample evidence linking welfare policies to terrorism. There
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are moderate e¤ects of welfare policies indicated by social spending and welfare regime
variables on terrorist activity, presumably as welfare policies inuence a variety of socio-
economic factors (e.g., economic growth, employment, poverty, economic security) in which
terrorism may be rooted. Our ndings are robust to di¤erent specications.
Welfare policies may thus be seen as helpful instruments for ghting terrorism. This
applies in particular to social policies (e.g., unemployment compensation or labor market
mobilization) that are connected to the socio-economic environment of "typical" terrorists
and their supporters. It applies somewhat less to social policies (e.g., on public housing)
that target conditions outside this very environment, and applies neither to transnational
terrorist activity that is imported into Western Europe. Overall, our ndings imply that
social policies in elds that improve the socio-economic conditions of terrorists and their
support are e¤ective in reducing terrorist activity, which is consistent with rational-choice
theory. This result holds even when we acknowledge that terrorism is also driven by other
factors, be they ethnic conict, political developments or past histories of repression and
dictatorship (cf. Sanchez-Cuenca, 2009). In an economic sense social spending and wel-
fare regime variables a¤ect terrorist activity by inuencing certain intervening variables,
thereby impacting the opportunity costs of violence (i.e., making terrorism comparatively
more costly). Our analysis thus sides with other contributions that emphasize the impor-
tance of raising the opportunity costs to terrorists instead of relying on hard-line counter-
terrorism strategies (e.g., Frey and Luechinger, 2003). In the light of our results welfare
state retrenchments (e.g., to reduce scal decits) should be considered with caution be-
cause they may make home-grown terrorism more likely. Potentially, there is a trade-o¤
between the positive and negative e¤ects of welfare state reform, where the latter may
become manifest in less internal security.
With this contribution we add to the discussion on a potential terrorism-welfare policy
nexus started by Burgoon (2006) and Crenshaw et al. (2007). We extend the approach
by Burgoon (2006), e.g., by looking at specic kinds of social spending, at welfare regime
variables and at homeland terrorist activity. While our evidence suggests that there is a
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strong and negative interdependency between welfare policies and terrorism in Western
Europe, some questions remain open. As previously discussed, Western Europe su¤ered
from waves of mainly home-grown left-wing and ethnic-nationalist terrorism in the past.
Welfare policies do not necessarily discourage the new waves of internationalized or religious
terrorism which Western Europe could face in future. Religiously motivated terrorists are
driven by the belief in the superiority of their world view. The possibility of changing
their minds by means of welfare policies seems limited, which suggests that the e¤ect
of social welfare policies on terrorism is heterogeneous and governed by terrorism-specic
factors.21 Future research may thus focus on the e¤ectiveness of social policies on terrorism
a¢ liated with certain ideologies. At the same time, the interaction between social policies
and terrorism should be investigated for other parts of the world. It is currently unclear
whether they may similarly benet from a potential terrorism-welfare policy nexus. On the
one hand, other parts of the world may not exhibit such mature welfare regimes as Western
Europe. On the other hand, other causes of terrorist activity (e.g., political instability and
repression) may matter more strongly, so the e¤ect of social policies on terrorism may
not be that prominent. Finally, it may also be interesting to examine whether social
policies also diminish other forms of undesired behavior in societies (e.g., violent crime).
While we provide evidence that social policies contribute to a reduction of terrorist activity
by improving the socio-economic conditions in which terrorism is (partly) rooted, similar
e¤ects on other social phenomena through similar channels may also be possible and should
be assessed.
21 In fact, Crenshaw et al. (2007) provide rst evidence that international terrorism driven by religious
world views is unlikely to be a¤ected by welfare means.
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Appendix A to Chapter 2. Independent Variables
Total Social Public Expenditure  Description: Broad expenditure measure on publicly
nanced health and social protection, e.g., on unemployment, sickness etc. Notes: For
missing values, see OECD (2007). Source: OECD (2007). Unit : Expenditure to GDP.
Public Health Expenditure  Description: Measures public spending on in- and out-
patient care, medical goods etc. Notes: For missing values, see OECD (2007). Source:
OECD (2007). Unit : Expenditure to GDP.
Unemployment Benets  Description: Indicates cash expenditure on unemployment
compensation etc. Notes: For missing values, see OECD (2007). Source: OECD (2007).
Unit : Expenditure to GDP.
Active Labor Market Programs  Description: Measures public spending on employ-
ment services, youth training etc. Notes: For missing values, see OECD (2007). Source:
OECD (2007). Unit : Expenditure to GDP.
Old Age Spending  Description: Indicates spending on pensions, housing services etc.
Notes: For missing values, see OECD (2007). Source: OECD (2007). Unit : Expenditure
to GDP.
Family Expenditure  Description: Proxy for spending on childcare support, single
parent support etc. Notes: For missing values, see OECD (2007). Source: OECD (2007).
Unit : Expenditure to GDP.
Public Housing  Description: Measures public expenditure on housing allowances etc.
Notes: For missing values, see OECD (2007). Source: OECD (2007). Unit : Expenditure
to GDP.
Decommodication Score  Description: Assesses the overall generosity of a welfare
state regime with respect to features of public programs for unemployment, sickness and
old age insurance, using the methodology by Esping-Andersen (1990). Notes: For missing
values, see Scruggs (2004). Source: Scruggs (2004). Unit : Calculated index.
Unemployment Replacement Rate  Description: Ratio of net unemployment benets
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to net income of an unmarried single person. Notes: For missing values, see Scruggs (2004).
Source: Scruggs (2004). Unit : Rate.
Degree of Universalism  Description: Indicates the degree to which the labor force
and old population are covered by unemployment and sickness insurance, and by pensions.
Notes: For missing values, see Scruggs (2004). Source: Raw data from Scruggs (2004).
Unit : Percentage, own calculations following Scruggs and Allan (2008).
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Appendix B to Chapter 2. Control Variables
Trade Openness  Description: Sum of exports and imports to real GDP. Indicates the
degree of economic integration of a country. Source: PENN World Table (Heston et al.,
2006). Unit : Ratio.
Voter Turnout  Description: Voter turnout in national election. Indicates degree
of democratic participation. Source: Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al.,
2008). Unit : Percentage.
Left Party  Description: Indicates whether a left-wing government is in power.
Source: Beck et al. (2001). Unit : Dummy variable (1 when the left is in power, 0
otherwise).
Electoral Fractionalization  Description: Index of electoral fractionalization of the
party-system. Proxy for political competition and social cleavages. Source: Comparative
Political Data Set (Armingeon et al., 2008). Unit : Calculated index.
Population Size  Description: Total population size. Source: World Bank (2006).
Unit : Logged, in thousands.
Population over 65  Description: Indicator of the number of people aged 65 or older
in one country. Source: World Bank (2006). Unit : Percentage.
Polarization  Description: Indicator of the degree of ethnic polarization of a country.
Source: Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). Unit : Constant calculated index.
Post Cold War  Description: Indicates the post-Cold War period (1992-2003). Unit :
Dummy variable.
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Chapter 3
Causal Linkages Between Domestic Terrorism and
Economic Growth
This chapter is a joint work with Thomas Gries and Tim Krieger. A nearly identical
version of it was published in 2011 in Defence and Peace Economics 22(5), 493-508.
3.1 Introduction
As already noted in the introduction to this thesis, the question of causality between ter-
rorism and economic performance has not been settled. Does terrorism lead to noticeable
damages to aggregate performance, does poor economic performance contribute to the gen-
eration of terror, or do both e¤ects exist side by side? On the one hand, the allocation and
accumulation of resources may be negatively inuenced by terrorism, e.g., as investment
or savings are discouraged, consequently also a¤ecting economic growth. On the other
hand, economic factors may play an important role in explaining terrorism, e.g., as low
opportunity costs of violence (manifested in poor economic growth) may foster conict.
This contribution aims to identify the links between the intensity of domestic terror-
ism and the rate of real GDP per capita growth.1 We investigate this relationship for
seven Western European countries (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and
the United Kingdom). All investigated countries experienced substantial economic suc-
1As dened in the introduction of this thesis, domestic terrorism is terrorism involving only citizens,
groups or the territory of one country. By contrast, transnational terrorism means terrorism involving
citizens, groups or the territory of more than one country, where either the sources or targets of transnational
terrorism can be analyzed.
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cess in the past. Most countries grew between 2 and 4% p.a. between 1950 and 2004.
Nevertheless, these countries also su¤ered episodes of major political violence, especially in
comparison to other countries in this part of the world. In fact, the seven selected countries
accounted for 97% of all reported terrorist attacks and 96% of all reported terror-related
fatalities from 1950 to 2004, according to the Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data
(TWEED) dataset compiled by Engene (2007).2 Most domestic terrorist organizations in
the investigated countries were driven by leftist, ethnic-nationalist or separatist ideologies
(Engene, 2007). Thus, they were potentially motivated by political factors. However, ter-
rorism cannot be sensibly explained by one root cause only. With our analysis, we want
to nd out whether economic performance (economic growth) also swayed the terrorists
calculus. At the same time, we want to analyze whether terrorism negatively a¤ected
growth.
We test for terrorism-growth Granger causality in a time-series framework. We try
to detect causality only in a statistical but not purely philosophical ("cause and e¤ect")
sense. Our analysis is helpful in approximating philosophical causality without implying it,
so corresponding interpretations should be made carefully. Causality between terrorism and
growth can take four possible forms: terrorism may cause economic growth, growth may
cause terrorist activity, both causal e¤ects may exist side by side, or no causal relationship
may be detected. In order to investigate for Granger causality in our empirical frame-
work, we rst examine the stationarity properties of the underlying time series through
a unit root test. At this point we are also able to identify structural breaks, i.e., major
changes in the countrys economic or political history during the period of observation.
We then process our data in accordance with the unit root test results. When we test for
Granger causality, we rely on the Hsiao-Granger procedure to circumvent common prob-
lems associated with detecting Granger causality in time-series frameworks. In comparison
to standard Granger causality tests our procedure allows for high variations in lag length
2 In total, the TWEED dataset provides information on domestic terrorism for 18 Western European
countries. As noted by Drakos (2011), the denition of terrorism used by the TWEED dataset is quite
similar to the denition of terrorism by the GTD.
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selection. In order to avoid omitted variable biases and to check for robustness, we test
for causality in a bivariate and trivariate system. In the trivariate setting we use trade
openness as a control variable. By testing for Granger causality in a time-series setting, we
add to existing evidence which has mainly blanked out the question of causality between
economic performance and terrorist violence.
As our main results, we nd that (1) all the investigated growth and terror series exhibit
structural breaks that coincide with important turning points in the countrieseconomic
and political history. (2) In bivariate systems economic growth leads terrorist violence in
all cases, whereas terrorism causally inuences growth only in the case of Portugal. It
appears as if economic performance inuences the terrorists calculus, yet the resiliency
of attacked economies is generally high, so terror-induced shocks do not feed through to
growth. (3) Knowing that bivariate causality tests are prone to inconsistencies, we also
perform causality tests in trivariate systems. The ndings conrm that economies un-
der attack are successful in adjusting to the threats of terror, so growth is not impaired.
With respect to Granger causality running from growth to terrorism, the results weaken
previous ones from the bivariate analysis. Economic performance robustly sways the ter-
roristscalculus only for Germany, Portugal and Spain, but not for the rest of the sample.
That is, in some countries solid growth may raise the opportunity costs of terror, thus
discouraging violent behavior, e.g. as individuals nd more economic opportunities. The
opposite relationship should hold in periods of economic downturn. Policymakers should
not underestimate the role of economic factors and of the opportunity costs of violence
in impacting domestic terrorism. For some countries in Western Europe economic success
apparently contributed to a crowding out of domestic terrorism. However, factors other
than economic performance (e.g. political transformation or ethnic tensions) should also
be considered when explaining terrorism dynamics, in particular when terrorism-growth
links are not found to be strong.
The remainder of this contribution is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss
the academic literature on possible interactions between terrorism and growth. Afterwards,
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we introduce the data and our methodology, and also present our empirical results. Then,
we discuss our ndings, before summing up our results in the nal section.
3.2 Causal Links Between Terrorism and Growth
3.2.1 Potential Impact of Terrorism on Economic Growth
A central short-run goal of terrorists is economic destabilization. Terrorist actions (e.g.,
assassinations or bombings) are means to achieve this short-run goal. Long-run political
objectives (such as a redistribution of wealth and power) are to be enforced through such
actions. Collier (1999) identies several channels through which civil war a¤ects the econ-
omy; Colliers ideas may be transferred to terrorism as another form of violent conict.
The channels of transaction from conict to the economy are: destruction, disruption,
diversion, dissaving and portfolio substitution.3 Destruction refers to the direct costs of
terrorism, as human and physical capital are destroyed through terrorist strikes. The dis-
ruption e¤ect may, e.g., become manifest in higher transaction costs, as the e¤ectiveness
of public institutions is challenged and manipulated by terror, or as insecurity in general
increases. Diversion occurs when public resources are shifted from output-enhancing to
non-productive defence and security expenditures. Dissaving refers to a decline in savings
that a¤ects the economys capital stock. Portfolio substitution means the ight of human,
physical and nancial capital from a country in the face of conict. Through all these e¤ects
economic performance su¤ers, in particular as they may reinforce each other. Inter alia,
Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004), Naor (2006) and Mirza and Verdier (2008) provide related
theoretical considerations that also discuss how terror may act negatively on economic ac-
tivity. In general, terrorism may distort the allocation of resources, basically through the
disruption, diversion and portfolio substitution channel. It may also negatively inuence
resource accumulation, mainly via the destruction and dissaving channel.
3Frey et al. (2007) and Enders and Sandler (2008) bring forward similar theoretical channels of inu-
ence of terrorism on the economy. These studies also provide additional evidence on the macroeconomic
consequences of terrorism that is not reported here.
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Empirical evidence indicates that terrorism adversely inuences international trade
(Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004; Blomberg and Hess, 2006; Mirza and Verdier, 2008).
Its unfavorable impact on tourism is well-documented, in particular for several Mediter-
ranean countries (Enders and Sandler, 1991; Enders et al., 1992; Drakos and Kutan, 2003).
Transnational terrorism also appears to distort domestic and foreign direct investment (En-
ders and Sandler, 1996; Fielding, 2003; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008). Blomberg et al.
(2004) furthermore nd that resources are relocated from investment to government spend-
ing in times of terrorist violence. A number of studies consequently detect a substantial
negative inuence of terrorism on overall economic growth (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003;
Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004; Crain and Crain, 2006; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2008). In gen-
eral, existing evidence suggests that terrorists are able to destabilize targeted economies.
Here, economic activity is a¤ected through various channels, e.g., through the destruction
of national capital stocks, the disruption of trade or tourism ows, or the diversion of
resources away from private investment, ultimately resulting in negative growth e¤ects.
3.2.2 Potential E¤ects of Economic Performance on Terrorism
To reiterate an earlier line of reasoning, economic theory argues that terrorists are ratio-
nal individuals choosing their levels of violent activity according to the costs and benets
arising from their actions (Sandler and Enders, 2004). Because of terroristspresumed ra-
tionality the opportunity costs of terror also matter. Intuitively, low opportunity costs of
violence (i.e., few prospects of economic activity) lead to elevated terrorist activity, whereas
high opportunity costs result in the opposite (Freytag et al., 2011). Times of economic suc-
cess mean, inter alia, more individual economic opportunities and participation. Higher
levels of overall growth should coincide with higher opportunity costs of terror and thus
less violence. Conversely, periods of economic downturn should be accompanied by fewer
economic opportunities and participation and thus by more economic dissatisfaction. In
times of economic crisis dissidents are more likely to resort to violence as the opportunity
costs of terror are low, while the potential long-run payo¤s from violence (i.e., a redistrib-
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ution of scarce economic resources which is to be enforced by terrorism) are comparatively
high (Blomberg et al., 2004b).
To some extent empirical evidence suggests that economic performance and terrorism
are linked along the lines discussed before. The ndings of Collier and Hoe­ er (1998)
indicate that higher levels of economic development coincide with lower likelihoods of civil
war, providing initial evidence that economic success and conict are diametrically opposed.
Considering economic development and terrorism, several studies nd that higher levels of
development are obstacles to the production of transnational terrorism (e.g., Santos Bravo
and Mendes Dias, 2006; Lai, 2007; Freytag et al., 2011). Blomberg and Hess (2008b)
also nd that higher incomes are a strong deterrence to the genesis of domestic terrorism.
Furthermore, there is evidence connecting solid short-run economic conditions with less
political violence (Muller and Weede, 1990; Freytag et al., 2011).4 In general, the evidence
indicates that terrorism and economic conditions are linked. Here, economic success seems
to impede the genesis of terrorism, presumably due to higher opportunity costs of conict.
In other words, in times of stronger economic performance individuals simply have more
to lose.
3.2.3 Research Contribution and Focus
Feasible theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence have been brought forward consid-
ering the e¤ects of terrorism on growth and of growth on terrorism. Still, to the best
of our knowledge no study has analyzed the causal nature of the terrorism-growth nexus.
Also, due to data constraints past evidence has focused almost exclusively on transnational
terrorism, although domestic terrorism is a far more common phenomenon (Enders and
Sandler, 2008). With this contribution we want to add to existing empirical evidence by
4Evidence on the targets of transnational terrorism either nds that short-run and long-run economic
conditions do not matter strongly for terroristsattack decisions (Piazza, 2006; Drakos and Gofas, 2006;
Kurrild-Klitgaard et al., 2006), or indicate that economically successful countries are more prone to terrorism
(Tavares, 2004; Blomberg et al., 2004a). Attackers from abroad may not be deterred by increased economic
opportunities in the country they attack. Instead, economic success may increase the payo¤s from terrorist
strikes. That is, the cost-benet considerations of transnational attackers may di¤er from those of domestic
terrorists.
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providing a time-series analysis of Granger causality between domestic terrorism and eco-
nomic growth. Multiple directions of causality are plausible. (1) Economic performance
may Granger-cause terrorism, or (2) terrorism may Granger-cause performance. On the
one hand, terrorism a¤ects the allocation and accumulation of resources. On the other
hand, economic performance may also impact the opportunity costs of terror. (3) If the
two processes exist side by side, then feedback between them is detected. Such a rela-
tionship may hint at the existence of a vicious circle of conict and economic decline, as
previously discussed by Blomberg et al. (2006). Lastly, (4) a causal relationship between
performance and terror in the statistical sense may also be non-existent when there is no
evidence of substantial links.
In the next section we test for Granger causality between domestic terrorism and eco-
nomic performance. We are well aware that economic growth and domestic terrorism may
also be determined by other factors. For instance, economic growth may also be driven
by geography, trade or institutions. Terrorism may, e.g., be determined by other economic
or political factors. Thus, we also test for causality in trivariate time-series settings which
include a related control variable. As a control, we choose changes in trade openness, as
this variable may interact with growth as well as with terrorism.5 On the one hand, trade
may impact growth by, e.g., inducing specialization and technology di¤usion, so changes
in trade openness may translate into higher economic growth (Harrison, 1996; Edwards,
1998). On the other hand, trade may, e.g., be regarded as a threat by "globalization losers"
when jobs are lost, or as an opportunity by "globalization winners" when trade increases
wealth. Depending on which mechanism dominates, terrorism may increase or decrease
with changes in trade openness as the opportunity costs of violence are a¤ected.6
5One can argue that other factors potentially driving growth as well as terrorism should also be controlled
for, such as the quality of economic institutions or political instability. We opt for trade openness because it
matches our analysis on thereotical grounds and because data is available for all countries and time periods.
6Mirza and Verdier (2008) provide an overview of the terrorism-trade literature, focusing on transnational
terrorism. It is reasonable to believe that at least some related ndings can be transferred to the relationship
between domestic terrorism and trade. Note that in the broader sense trade openness may also reect the
general quality of institutions (Rodrik, 2002). Better institutional quality should coincide with less terrorist
activity.
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3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Data
We extract data on growth and terrorism for seven Western European countries. The
countries of the analysis with their time horizons are: France (1951-2004), Germany (1971-
2004), Greece (1952-2004), Italy (1951-2004), Portugal (1951-2004), Spain (1951-2004) and
the United Kingdom (1951-2004), where data on Germany prior to 1990 relates only to
West Germany. Economic growth is measured by the rate of real GDP per capita growth
in 2000 constant prices. Data for growth comes from the PENN World Table of Heston et
al. (2006). Domestic terrorism is indicated by the total number of individuals killed and
wounded by acts of domestic terrorism in a given year and country. That is, we use raw
data on terrorist victims (i.e., on the intensity of terror) rather than on terrorist attacks.7
We transform the series by taking the natural logarithm and adding unity to allow for zero
observations.8 Data on domestic terrorism comes from the TWEED dataset compiled by
Engene (2007).
We also test for terrorism-growth causality in a trivariate setting, using changes in trade
openness as a control variable to reduce potential problems due to omitted variables. This
variable is measured as the logarithm of the sum of exports and imports divided by real
GDP in 2000 constant prices. Data for openness also comes from the PENN World Table.
3.3.2 Econometric Procedure
Below, we want to investigate the causal linkages between domestic terrorism and economic
growth. We proceed as follows. (1) We conduct unit root tests to identify the order of
7When we use data on terrorist attacks, we cannot possibly evaluate the ferocity of such attacks. For
instance, both a minor, politically motivated damage to property and a severe bombing with multiple
casualties count as one attack. Intuitively, however, there ought to be a much stronger interaction between
the bombing and economic factors.
8We use the natural logarithm to better account for outliers. We add unity to the observations in order
to compute the natural logarithm also in those years when there were no victims from terrorist attacks.
Note that by adequate data processing (as described later) we circumvent potential problems associated
with "excess zeros" (i.e., when there are many observations without victims from terrorism). By using
estimated rather than observed values for the terrorism series, "excess zero" problems do not arise.
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integration of the investigated time series, and to check for potential breaks in the series.
(2) As we need de-trended I(0) time series to carry out the Granger causality analyses
properly, we then process the data accordingly, building on the unit root test results. (3)
We employ this processed data when we execute a number of causality tests using the
Hsiao-Granger method (1969, 1979, 1982). First, we test for causality in bivariate settings,
where we only consider the growth and terrorism series. Then, we also test for Granger
causality in a trivariate scenario to broaden the evidence and to evaluate the robustness of
our bivariate causality test results.
3.3.3 Unit Root Test
We rst have to identify the order of integration of the investigated series. To ensure a
correct application of the causality test, all series need to be I(0), i.e., stationary and not
exhibiting a unit root. As noted above, the series cover long time spans. Therefore, they
may exhibit unexpected shifts (structural breaks) that are a consequence of, e.g., major
structural changes in a countrys economic or political realm. Conventional unit root tests
do not account for structural breaks and therefore may produce biased results.
In order to account for possible breaks in the data, we use the unit root test (ZA test)
of Zivot and Andrews (1992) which allows for a structural break. Through the ZA test
the investigated series are identied as I(1) (di¤erence-stationary) or I(0) with a break
(trend-stationary). We use model C of the ZA test which allows for a break to occur in
both intercept and trend. The test also gives the dates of the endogenously determined
structural breaks, thus further unveiling underlying dynamics.9
Table 3.1 gives the results of the ZA test for all investigated series. For growth and
terrorism the unit root test always indicates that the series are I(0) with a trend. For
trade openness the series are identied to be I(1) in six out of seven cases. Table 3.1
9Note that when two or more series used simultaneously in the following causality analysis are found
to be I(1), further tests for cointegration would be required in order to account for long-run equilibrium
relationships between the series. As two of the three series analyzed here are always I(0), there is no need
to discuss the issue of cointegration any further.
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Country Series ZA Statistics Break Date Inference
France Growth (G) -6.722 1974 I(0) + Trend
Terrorism (T) -5.636 1989 I(0) + Trend
Openness -3.787 1982 I(1)
Germany Growth (G) -5.113 1988 I(0) + Trend
Terrorism (T) -6.614 1995 I(0) + Trend
Openness -3.904 1993 I(1)
Greece Growth (G) -10.006 1974 I(0) + Trend
Terrorism (T) -5.934 1985 I(0) + Trend
Openness -5.025 1973 I(1)
Italy Growth (G) -7.233 1963 I(0) + Trend
Terrorism (T) -5.400 1971 I(0) + Trend
Openness -2.917 1973 I(1)
Portugal Growth (G) -6.792 1974 I(0) + Trend
Terrorism (T) -6.513 1975 I(0) + Trend
Openness -5.125 1974 I(0) + Trend
Spain Growth (G) -7.754 1975 I(0) + Trend
Terrorism (T) -6.385 1971 I(0) + Trend
Openness -4.606 1959 I(1)
UK Growth (G) -6.147 1983 I(0) + Trend
Terrorism (T) -5.130 1969 I(0) + Trend
Openness -3.593 1981 I(1)
Notes: (**), (***) indicates signicance of the Zivot-Andrews Unit Root
Test at 5% and 1% levels, that is, rejection of the hypothesis of unit root
presence. Critical values are taken from Zivot and Andrews (1992).
Table 3.1: Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test
also gives the calculated break dates. These break dates do not coincide across series for
the same country. As expected, they t in well with economic and political history. For
instance, for Portugal, Spain and Greece most break dates coincide with their transition
to democracy. For the United Kingdom, the structural break for the terror series matches
the beginning of the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland. For France, the break date for the
economic growth series coincides with the end of the "Thirty Glorious Years" of steady
economic development. For the other countries, similar observations can be made.
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3.3.4 Processing of Time-Series Data
Based on the results of the ZA test, we now process the time-series data in order to obtain
I(0) series. For six out of seven series on trade openness the ZA test indicates the existence
of a unit root. Here, we achieve stationarity by simply taking rst di¤erences.
When the ZA test does not indicate a unit root, the series is I(0) with a trend. This is
the case for one openness series and all growth and terror series. If so, utilizing a di¤erence
lter to obtain stationarity is neither necessary nor useful. Instead, we de-trend the data
following the method proposed by, inter alia, Fernandez (1997). We run an OLS regression
of the following form:
yt = + t+ DUt + Dt + DTt + y^t: (3.1)
yt is the dependent variable representing the respective series for growth, terror or openness.
 is a constant, t is a time trend, and DUt, Dt and DTt take values depending on the
calculated break date TB: DUt = 1 for t < TB, 0 otherwise; Dt = 1 for t = TB, 0 otherwise;
DTt = (t   TB) for t > TB, 0 otherwise. y^t is the residual from the OLS estimation. By
using this approach, we are able to eliminate trends and to take into account underlying
structural breaks which may otherwise lead to biased results. We therefore use the de-
trended residual data (i.e., y^t,) in the subsequent causality analysis.
3.3.5 Hsiao-Granger Causality Test
Bivariate Causality Test
Tests for Granger causality are important tools in time-series analyses as employed, e.g.,
in Kollias et al. (2004). A potential shortcoming of standard Granger causality analyses is
that they may su¤er from arbitrary lag length selection because the considered time-series
variables are constrained to all enter at the same lag length. This may yield inconsistent
results due to model misspecications (Braun and Mittnik, 1993). We hence rely on the
sequential approach of Hsiao (1979, 1982) to test for Granger causality, which in particular
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circumvents problems associated with lag length selection. Applications of this causality
testing procedure are, e.g., given in Cheng (1999) and Bajo-Rubio and Montávez-Garcés
(2002), besides the ones in Hsiao (1979, 1982).
Grangers (1969) denition of non-causality states that if it is easier to predict a series
xt when including information from a series yt instead of only employing lagged values
of xt, then yt Granger-causes xt, denoted yt ) xt. Bidirectional causality (feedback) is
present when xt also Granger-causes yt. By combining this denition of Granger causality
with Akaikes (1969) Final Prediction Error (FPE ), we can apply Hsiaos approach toward
testing for causality between time series.
In its basic form, the causality testing procedure requires us to rst consider an autore-
gressive process:
yt = +
mX
i=1
i(L)y

t + ut: (3.2)
In Equation (3.2),
P
(L) indicates the lag order of the series running from 1 to m. ut is
a white noise term with the usual statistical properties and  is a constant term. yt is
operationalized depending on the previous ZA tests. If the series is I(0) with a trend, we
employ the residuals obtained from Equation (3.1), y^t. If the series is I(1), we use the
usual di¤erence lter where yt is equal to (yt   yt 1) in order to obtain stationarity. Note
that we here use estimated rather than observed values of y, potentially making additional
interpretative caution necessary. We choose the lag order that yields the smallest FPE,
denoted FPEy(m; 0). The individual FPE are calculated from the following equation
with lags varying from 1 to m:
FPEy(m; 0) =
(T +m+ 1)
(T  m  1) 
RSS
T
: (3.3)
Here, T is the number of observations and RSS is the residual sum of squares. Then,
we allow another variable xt to enter our model, so we receive the subsequent vector
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autoregression model (VAR):
yt = +
mX
i=1
i(L)y

t +
nX
j=1
j(L)x

t + ut; (3.4)
xt = +
nX
j=1
j(L)x

t +
mX
i=1
i(L)y

t + vt: (3.5)
ut and vt are white noise terms with the usual statistical properties, and  is a constant.P
(L) is the lag operator indicating the lag order of the series, where yt and xt again take
values based on the previous ZA tests. Either they represent the residuals obtained from
Equation (3.1), or they are di¤erence-stationary series where the usual di¤erence-lter has
been employed. Note that in both cases the series are now I(0), so the causality testing
procedure can be conducted properly. While yt steadily enters Equation (3.4) with the lag
order from Equation (3.2) that yields the smallest FPE, m, xt enters with a sequence of
lags varying from 1 to n. The FPE of Equation (3.4) are computed, with the specic lag
order being chosen that generates the smallest FPE, denoted as FPEy(m; n), from:
FPEy(m
; n) =
(T +m+ n+ 1)
(T  m  n  1) 
RSS
T
: (3.6)
By comparing the two minimal FPE, we can draw conclusions regarding causality. If
FPEy(m
; 0) > FPEy(m; n), then xt ) yt , thus Granger causality is established.
If FPEy(m; 0) < FPEy(m; n), then xt 6) yt and no Granger causality is detected.
Testing for Granger causality running from yt to xt requires us to repeat the previously
described steps this time with xt being the dependent variable, so we ultimately arrive at
Equation (3.5).
Trivariate Causality Test
It is a well-known fact that causality tests in bivariate settings may produce inconsistent
results. Lütkepohl (1982) shows that whether or not Granger causality is detected in a
bivariate specication may be due to omitted variables. In order to reduce the possibility
84
of omitted variables, we transform our bivariate model into a trivariate one by including a
control variable.
Methodologically, we build on the previously discussed procedure. Again we are inter-
ested in the causal relationship between the series yt and xt. Therefore, we rst consider
an autoregressive process as in Equation (3.2) and determine the corresponding minimal
FPE as in Equation (3.3). Then, we consider a bivariate VAR similar to Equation (3.4),
where we add a new variable zt as a control variable (in our case trade openness dynamics).
We calculate the minimal FPE as in Equation (3.6). Next, we consider a trivariate VAR,
where xt enters with lags varying from 1 to p, while yt and zt enter the model with the
lag order that yields the smallest FPE, mand n. It has the following form:
yt = +
mX
i=1
i(L)y

t +
nX
k=1
j(L)z

t +
pX
j=1
j(L)x

t + ut; (3.7)
zt = +
nX
k=1
j(L)z

t +
mX
i=1
i(L)y

t +
pX
j=1
j(L)x

t + vt: (3.8)
xt = +
pX
j=1
j(L)x

t +
mX
i=1
i(L)y

t +
nX
k=1
j(L)z

t + vt: (3.9)
The corresponding FPE is computed, with the specic lag order being chosen that generates
the smallest FPE, denoted as FPEy(m; n; p), from the following equation with the
known notation:
FPEy(m
; n; p) =
(T +m+ n+ p+ 1)
(T  m  n  p  1) 
RSS
T
: (3.10)
By comparing the two minimal FPE from the bivariate and trivariate VAR, we can
draw conclusions on causality. If FPEy(m; n; 0) > FPEy(m; n; p), then xt ) yt ;
Granger causality is established, conditional upon the presence of zt. If FPEy(m; n; 0)
< FPEy(m
; n; p), then xt 6) yt and no Granger causality is detected. In order to test
for causality from yt to xt , we would have to repeat the procedure the other way around.
85
Bivariate Causality Test Results
Table 3.2 gives the results of the bivariate tests for causality running from terrorism to
real GDP per capita growth. Our results indicate that terrorism causally sways economic
growth only in the case of Portugal. For all other countries we do not detect a causal link.
That is, it seems as if strong and developed economies are able to endure terrorist violence
without su¤ering major negative growth e¤ects. Rather, they seem to be able to absorb
risk associated with domestic terrorism. This is in line with Enders and Sandler (2008)
who also argue that economies that are diversied and exhibit well-developed institutions
are generally able to withstand the adverse macroeconomic e¤ects of terrorism.
Also in Table 3.2, we report our ndings on causality running from growth to terrorism.
Here, economic growth always exerts a causal inuence on terrorist violence. That is, we
can assume that economic growth a¤ects the terroristscalculus by having an impact on
the opportunity costs of violence. Economic success allows for more economic participation
and opportunities, thus making violence more costly. The contrary is expected to hold for
times of economic decline.
In general, for our sample we do not nd strong support that economic growth is a¤ected
by violence. Rather, targeted economies appear to be stable enough to withstand the threat
of domestic terrorism without su¤ering major economic setbacks.10 We nd that growth
causes domestic terrorist violence for all seven countries. For Portugal there is in addition
evidence for causality running from terrorism to growth, establishing bidirectional Granger
causality (feedback). In the bivariate model specication, a strong link runs from economic
growth to terrorist violence, presumably as the opportunity costs of political violence are
impacted. This is in line with previous empirical ndings which attribute a strong role to
economic factors in shaping the patterns of conict and terrorist violence (e.g., Collier and
10We are well aware that terrorism may substantially damage certain sectors of the economy. We hinted
at corresponding evidence in the literature review of this chapter and also in the introduction to this thesis.
Similarly, terrorist violence may constrain economic growth in regions most a¤ected by conict. For our
sample this may apply to the Basque country and Northern Ireland, as corresponding evidence by Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003) and Fielding (2003) suggests. Our analysis simply provides little evidence that
such economic damages feed through to overall growth at national levels.
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Hoe­ er, 1998; Blomberg et al., 2004a; Blomberg and Hess, 2008b; Freytag et al., 2011).
Country FPE FPE F-Stat T ) G FPE FPE F-Stat G ) T
(m,0) (m,n) (m,0) (m,n)
France 2.1184 2.3718 0.236 NO 1.8558 1.7156 1.453 YES
(1,0) (1,1) (1,0) (1,1)
Germany 2.0725 2.4928 2.651 NO 0.8187 0.6665 3.268 YES
(4,0) (4,2) (1,0) (1,2)
Greece 6.8433 7.0927 1.254 NO 0.5640 0.5287 0.349 YES
(1,0) (1,5) (1,0) (1,1)
Italy 4.0109 4.0169 0.128 NO 1.4802 1.3581 0.630 YES
(1,0) (1,1) (1,0) (1,1)
Portugal 9.2646 8.5833 0.917 YES 0.2965 0.2655 3.102 YES
(1,0) (1,1) (5,0) (5,3)
Spain 6.5819 8.5833 0.917 NO 0.5009 0.2798 2.753 YES
(1,0) (1,1) (6,0) (6,3)
UK 3.2292 3.4394 1.404 NO 1.1821 1.1774 1.112 YES
(2,0) (2,1) (1,0) (1,1)
Notes: FPE (m,0) indicates the minimal FPE of an autoregressive process with the
optimal lag length m. FPE (m,n) indicates the minimal FPE of the two variable VAR
process with the optimal lag lengths m and n. We allow for a maximum of six lags. (**)
and (***) denote signicance of the joint F-statistics at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3.2: Terrorism-Growth Bivariate Causality Test
Trivariate Causality Test Results
We have already argued that care should be taken interpreting bivariate causality test re-
sults due to the possibility of misleading results. Table 3.2 has given an initial hint that
such caution could be appropriate for our analysis. The reported joint F -statistics are
not always signicant, indicating that our causality inferences may be spurious. To reduce
potential bias due to omitted variables and to raise the explanatory power of our analy-
sis, we also test for Granger causality between domestic terrorism and economic growth,
conditional upon the presence of changes in trade openness. Earlier, we already outlined
the underlying mechanisms. On the one hand, trade may inuence growth, e.g., via in-
creased specialization, technological di¤usion or e¢ ciency gains. On the other hand, trade
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may also inuence terrorist activity, mainly by a¤ecting the opportunity costs of violence.
That is, from a theoretical point of view there is the possibility that trade openness may
drive growth as well as terrorism. By accounting for the dynamics of trade openness in a
trivariate system, we are able to reduce inconsistent causality inferences which may have
resulted from the omission of trade openness in a bivariate model.
Table 3.3 gives the results of the trivariate Granger causality tests running from ter-
rorism to real GDP per capita growth. The link from terrorism to growth found in the
bivariate system for Portugal is not detected in the trivariate case. Concerning Germany
and Spain, we interpret our results as in Triacca (1998), also concluding that there is no
causal relationship from terrorism to growth for these countries. In the bivariate system
for these two countries we have already documented that there is no Granger causality
running from terrorist violence to economic growth; in the trivariate system, the compari-
son between the two FPE now only seems to suggest a causal e¤ect from terror to growth.
Following Triacca (1998), we argue that it is actually trade openness i.e., the omitted
variable in the bivariate system that causes growth, and not terrorism.11 For Germany
and Spain Granger causality does not run from terrorist violence to growth. To sum up,
when including information on trade openness dynamics in a higher dimensional process,
we are unable to discover any statistical causality e¤ect of terrorism on economic growth.
This conrms our earlier interpretation that attacked economies have been successful in
coping with the threats of domestic terrorism. We attribute this resilience to the strength
of the markets and institutions of attacked economies (Enders and Sandler, 2008).
With respect to the link from economic growth to terrorism, the results displayed
in Table 3.3 show that economic growth Granger-causes terrorism now only in the cases
of Germany, Portugal and Spain. Note that for these cases the joint F -statistics now
always indicate signicance, adding to the reliability of the causality inferences. For France,
11Formally, Triacca (1998) provides proof for the following argument: If a variable Y3 does not cause Y1
in a bivariate system, but in a trivariate one where the variable Y2 is also included, then Y2 must cause
Y1 in the bivariate and trivariate system. We apply his proof to our causality evidence for Germany and
Spain, where Y1 is economic growth, Y2 is trade openness and Y3 is terrorist violence.
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Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom we cannot conrm our causality ndings from the
bivariate specication. That is, we still nd some evidence for the idea that terrorism
is inuenced by growth through the latters e¤ect on the opportunity costs of violence.
Conditional upon the presence of information on trade openness, the inuence of economic
performance on terrorism generally becomes less pronounced.
In general, the Granger causality test results of the trivariate setting only partially
conrm those of the bivariate analysis. On the one hand, the additional evidence supports
our idea that attacked economies have been successful in adjusting to terrorist violence,
thereby not incurring costs in the form of reduced growth. We do not detect any Granger
causality running from terrorism to growth in trivariate systems. On the other hand,
we should probably not overestimate the determining e¤ect of economic performance on
terrorism, as we see related causal relationships only for Germany, Portugal and Spain.
This supports the evidence provided by, inter alia, Freytag et al. (2011) on the e¤ect of
income growth on terrorism. Still, the missing links for the other four countries of our
sample also support views that are more skeptical of the impact of economic variables on
terrorism (e.g., Abadie, 2006; Kurrild-Klitgaard et al., 2006).
3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Policy Implications
The results of our Hsiao-Granger causality analysis indicate that at least in some countries
in Western Europe economic factors played an important role in shaping terrorist violence
after the Second World War. In general, we provide support for policies that aim at
increasing the opportunity costs of terror, as, e.g., advocated by Frey and Luechinger
(2003). Apparently, economic success (especially in Germany, Portugal and Spain) helped
to reduce political violence by raising the opportunity costs of terrorism. Policies that focus
on growth and economic development are thus also potentially helpful in scaling down terror
risks. Related policies could yield additional dividends beyond raising economic status, as
89
Country FPE FPE F-Stat T ) G FPE FPE F-Stat G ) T
(m,n,0) (m,n,p) (m,n,0) (m,n,p)
France 2.3739 2.4408 0.661 NO 1.7136 1.7778 1.338 NO
(1,1,0) (1,1,1) (1,1,0) (1,1,1)
Germany 2.5289 2.4753 2.61 NO+ 0.6335 0.5894 4.23a YES
(4,1,0) (4,1,2) (1,1,0) (1,1,2)
Greece 7.1225 7.1755 1.262 NO 0.5345 0.5556 0.378 NO
(1,1,0) (1,1,5) (1,1,0) (1,1,1)
Italy 4.0602 4.1992 0.106 NO 1.4085 1.4303 0.516 NO
(1,1,0) (1,1,1) (1,1,0) (1,1,1)
Portugal 8.6179 8.7752 0.868 NO 0.2966 0.2692 2.892 YES
(1,1,0) (1,1,1) (5,1,0) (5,1,3)
Spain 6.2268 5.9240 3.093 NO+ 0.5113 0.4809 2.193 YES
(1,3,0) (1,3,1) (6,1,0) (6,1,6)
UK 3.1570 3.2664 2.095 NO 1.1727 1.2052 0.872 NO
(2,2,0) (2,2,1) (1,1,0) (1,1,1)
Notes: FPE (m,n,0) indicates the minimal FPE of the bivariate VAR with the optimal lag lengths
m and n. FPE (m,n,p) indicates the minimal FPE of the trivariate VAR with the optimal lag
lengths m, n and p. We allow for a maximum of six lags. (*), (**) and (***) denote signicance
of the joint F-statistics at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (+) indicates that causality is
driven by the control variable. See the text for a further discussion.
Table 3.3: Terrorism-Growth Trivariate Causality Test
social stability and peace may also be a¤ected. For Western Europe developed welfare
states may provide important institutional channels for disseminating economic success,
likewise explaining a link from economic performance to domestic terrorism.12 Our results
also indicate that domestic terrorist violence did not a¤ect GDP per capita growth on
national levels. A¤ected economies seem to have been generally successful in dealing with
terror risks. Markets and institutions appear to have adjusted e¤ectively to terror risks.
In general, (1) policies that aim at improving economic status should also be pursued
because they may robustly reduce the propensity towards domestic terrorism at least in
some countries. The opportunity costs of violence and the general inuence of economic
factors on terror should not be disregarded. (2) Policies that aim to increase the e¢ ciency of
markets and institutions should also be undertaken because they help to protect economies
12See Burgoon (2006) for an in-depth discussion of the potential links between terrorism and welfare
policies. The study by Krieger and Meierrieks (2010) which is virtually identical to the second chapter of
this doctoral thesis is an explicit empirical analysis of the e¤ect of welfare policies on domestic terrorism
in Western Europe, which nds that such policies may work as tools for scaling down terrorism.
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from the negative e¤ects of terrorism by sustaining or further increasing markets and
institutionsresiliency to terrorist attacks.
3.4.2 Caveats
Several caveats can be brought forward with respect to our analysis. (1) Our evidence is
region-specic, so the results may not hold for other world regions. These regions may
exhibit less developed markets and institutions, so they are more prone to terror-induced
shocks. Additionally, the relationship between economic factors and terrorism may be less
pronounced. For instance, the study of Piazza (2007) for the Middle East suggest that
other factors (political instability, state failure etc.) matter more strongly to terrorism in
this part of the world. (2) We only look at domestic terrorism. On the one hand, domestic
terrorism is a more common phenomenon than transnational terrorism, so we should be
able to thoroughly assess the interaction between terrorism and economic performance
with our data. On the other hand, transnational terrorism may also contribute to this
interaction, potentially amplifying the e¤ects indicated by our analysis.13 (3) With respect
to our policy advice, we acknowledge that terrorism is caused not only by economic factors.
Economic success is not a panacea for terror. For instance, political participation may also
be helpful as it inuences the opportunity costs of violence as well (Frey and Luechinger,
2003). This is in particular true for conict that is also obviously codetermined by political
factors, e.g., as in the case of ETA (Barros, 2003).
3.5 Conclusion
In this contribution we tested for Granger causality between domestic terrorism and real
GDP per capita growth. Using the Hsiao-Granger method to detect causality in time series,
13However, clearly di¤erentiating between domestic and transnational terrorism (as in our analysis) may
be helpful to keep apart potentially di¤erent terroristscalculi. As discussed before, transnational terrorists
may be driven by other cost-benet considerations than domestic terrorists. For instance, while transna-
tional terrorists may nd it attractive to attack rich countries because of the increased benets of such
attacks, domestic terrorists may reduce attacks at the same time due to the increased opportunity costs of
violence.
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we were able to circumvent several common problems associated with causality analyses
in time-series frameworks. We tested for causality in a bivariate and trivariate setting in
order to provide robust results.
We found that (1) all investigated growth and terror series exhibit structural breaks
matching major turning points in the countries economic and political history. (2) In
bivariate systems, economic growth leads terrorist violence in all cases, whereas terrorism
causally inuences growth only for one country (Portugal). These results indicated that
economic performance inuences the terroristscalculus, while attacked economies are gen-
erally resistant to domestic terrorism. (3) We noted that bivariate causality tests may be
prone to inconsistencies, so we also performed causality tests in trivariate systems, includ-
ing trade openness dynamics as an additional control variable. The ndings conrmed that
economies under attack are successful in adjusting to the threats of terror, so economic
growth is not impaired. With respect to causality running from growth to terrorism, the
results weakened those of the bivariate analysis. Economic performance robustly sways the
terroristscalculus only for Germany, Portugal and Spain, but not for France, Greece, Italy
and the United Kingdom. Solid growth in some countries may raise the opportunity costs
of terror, thus discouraging violent behavior, e.g., as individuals nd more (non-violent)
opportunities of economic participation. In the light of our results, policymakers should
therefore not underestimate the role of economic factors (and the role of the opportunity
costs of violence) in impacting domestic terrorism. For some countries economic success
apparently has contributed to a crowding out of domestic terrorist violence. However, fac-
tors other than economic performance should also be considered when explaining terrorism
dynamics, in particular when the links between economic growth and domestic terrorist
violence are not found to be strong.
Given our empirical results, research should continue with analyzing the terrorism-
growth relationship. With regard to methodology, additional instruments of time-series
analysis may be used to further rene econometric analyses of the terrorism-growth nexus.
With regard to content, future research may investigate this nexus for other parts of the
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world (e.g., the Middle East), for certain periods of time (e.g., the Cold War era) or for
specic kinds of terrorism (e.g., left-wing or Islamic terrorism) aimed at certain targets
(e.g., U.S. citizens) to see whether terrorism-growth dynamics change substantially in such
analytical settings.14
14For instance, Barros and Proença (2005) analyze which characteristics are associated with Islamic
terrorist attacks in North America and Europe. Barros et al. (2007) scrutinize which factors inuence the
likelihood of US citizens to fall victim to a terrorist attack in Europe. That is, these studies investigate
terrorist behavior with respect to the ideological a¢ liation and choice of target. Such analytical approaches
may, amongst others, be useful to expand the empirical literature, also with respect to the terrorism-growth
nexus.
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Chapter 4
Economic Performance and Terrorist Activity in
Latin America
This chapter is a joint work with Thomas Gries. A virtually identical version of this paper
is due to be published in 2012 in Defence and Peace Economics.
4.1 Introduction
Terrorism is often regarded as a danger to economic growth and prosperity. Amongst
others, it is the destabilizing e¤ect of terrorism on economic activity that necessitates its
suppression. Many scholars suggest that terrorism can be fought best by increasing the
opportunity costs of terrorism (Frey and Luechinger, 2003), especially given that military
means which primarily aim at increasing the material costs of terrorism have not proven
overly successful (e.g., Azam and Thelen, 2010; Feridun and Shahbaz, 2010). Here, one
prominent suggestion to increase these very opportunity costs is to stimulate economic ac-
tivity, so as to provide (potential) terrorists and their supporters with additional economic
alternatives to violence (e.g., employment) and opportunities for economic participation.
These lines of argumentation point at a potentially complex causal relationship be-
tween terrorism and economic growth. On the one hand, terrorism may negatively de-
termine economic activity. On the other hand, strong economic activity may lead to
less terrorism. However, most studies on the causes and macroeconomic consequences of
terrorism reviewed in the introduction to this doctoral thesis and also below ignore this
potentially complex interaction (e.g., Piazza 2009: 406-407) and instead a priori assume
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a relationship between terrorism and economic growth that clearly di¤erentiates between
"cause and e¤ect".1
In this contribution we empirically assess the causal interaction between economic per-
formance and terrorism for 18 Latin American countries, where we explicitly consider the
potentially complex nature of this interaction.2 We focus on a sample of Latin American
and Caribbean countries for several reasons. First, very few studies referred to below
have discussed the determinants and consequences of terrorism for this part of the world,
particularly with respect to the terrorism-economy nexus. Thus, our study aims to add to
the sparse evidence on these issues.
Second, Latin America experienced notable economic uctuations and periods of terror-
ist activity during our observation period. Figure 4.1 illustrates the patterns of economic
performance and terrorism between 1970 and 2007.
Third, given the ideological prole of many terrorist groups that operated in Latin
America during this period, a close association between economic factors and terrorism is
highly intuitive. In fact, most of terrorist activity was carried out by groups who explicitly
opposed the socio-economic status quo. Examples of such groups with social-revolutionary
or leftist agendas are the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) in Argentina, the
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) in Chile, the Ejército Zapatista de Lib-
eración Nacional (EZLN ) in Mexico, the Alfaro Vive, Carajo (AVN) in Ecuador and the
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) in Colombia.3 Many of these groups, which con-
sistently emphasized their goal of redistributing wealth in favor of the poor, emerged in
the late 1960s and 1970s when poor economic conditions abounded (Lopez, 1988). Given
their ideological alignment, many of these groups are expected to have been highly re-
1Recent examples that, unlike the empirical mainstream, take into account potential complexities in the
terrorism-economy nexus are Araz-Takay et al. (2009) who focus their empirical study on Turkey. The
study by Gries et al. (2011) which is a nearly identical to the third chapter of this doctoral thesis is
another example.
2The countries in our sample are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Domini-
can Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay, and Venezuela.
3For another overview of the history of terrorism in Latin America, see, e.g., Lopez (1988), Wickham-
Crowley (1990), Gorriti (1991), Feldmann and Perälä (2004), and Feldmann (2005).
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Figure 41: Terrorism and Economic Growth in Latin America,
1970-2007
sponsive to socio-economic change, suggesting a causal e¤ect from economic performance
to terrorism. By contrast, groups with di¤erent ideological proles that have operated
in other parts of the world are expected to be less responsive to such changes, given
that they are more geared to territorial claims (nationalist-separatist terrorism) or socio-
cultural changes motivated by religious doctrine (religious terrorism).4 At the same time,
it seems intuitive to assume that terrorist groups in Latin America have used terrorism
to produce economic damage, thereby weakening opposing governments and facilitating
politico-economic change. Even though insurgent activity in Latin America has rarely
led to the defeat of the incumbent government (cf. Gorriti, 1991), imposing costs on the
government in terms of reduced economic activity may have nevertheless helped to settle
conict through negotiation, which suggests a causal link from terrorism to growth.
4Note that terrorist activity in Latin America can to a lesser extent also be traced back to counter-
revolutionary right-wing groups (e.g., the Alianza Anticomunista Argentina, AAA, in Argentina and the
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC, in Colombia) and drug-tra¢ cking (narco-terrorism). The rationale
of the terrorism-economy nexus (outlined below) is expected to apply to these forms of terrorism, too, given
that they also ought to be markedly responsive to economic uctuations (e.g., Dishman, 2001).
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Fourth, some evidence reviewed below indicates that the roots of terrorism are het-
erogeneous across di¤erent parts of the world, so that economic variables may matter to
terrorism for some countries or types of terrorism but not necessarily for all. Then, a
focus on Latin America ought to make it less likely for heterogeneity in the roots of terror-
ism and in the capability of terrorism of inicting economic damage to become an issue,
since the countries in this part of the world share a similar history and culture and have
similar socio-economic and politico-institutional traditions and structures.
The remainder of this contribution is organized as follows. The next section discusses
the existing literature on the relationship between economic growth and terrorism, so as to
illustrate the potential complexities in this relationship. While some parts of the literature
review re-iterate earlier discussions in the introduction to this thesis and in Chapter 3,
it also relates this discussion to the Latin American experience to demonstrate that an
analysis of the terrorism-economy nexus is particularly promising for this part of the world.
Then, we describe our data before we investigate the causal interaction between growth
and terrorism for 18 Latin American countries from 1970 to 2007 in order to explore which
hypothesis regarding the terrorism-economy nexus suits the Latin American experience
best. Afterwards, we introduce and discuss the ndings from a series of negative binomial
regressions that aim at strengthening condence in our panel causality analysis results.
The nal section concludes.
4.2 Causality Between Economic Growth and Terrorism: Theory, Evi-
dence and the Latin American Experience
4.2.1 Causality from Economic Growth to Terrorism
The main hypothesis when considering a causal link from the economy to terrorism is that
poor economic conditions lead to more terrorist activity. This hypothesis follows from a
rational-choice perspective on terrorist behavior. Terrorists can be regarded as rational
actors who seek to maximize their utility from terrorism, subject to budget constraints
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(money, manpower etc.) and a certain set of costs, benets and opportunity costs associ-
ated with terrorism (e.g., Sandler and Enders, 2004). Accepting that terrorists are rational
actors, we can identify the channels (e.g., recruitment, popular support) through which
poor economic conditions may lead to more terrorism. Here, country-specic factors such
as national economic conditions a¤ect the terroristscost-benet matrix. On the one hand,
reduced economic activity means lower terrorism costs, e.g., because economic disparity
makes it easier (less costly) for terrorist organizations to nd support and recruits, espe-
cially given that the opportunity costs of violence (non-violent opportunities of economic
participation) are limited in poor economic times. On the other hand, poor economic
conditions also mean that the potential pay-o¤ from terrorism is more rewarding. For
example, Blomberg et al. (2004a, b) introduce an economic model of terrorism in which
limited access to economic resources (as indicated by, e.g., low economic growth) increases
the propensity of groups to resort to terrorism in order to change the economic status quo,
given that the pay-o¤ in the event of terrorist success (i.e., a redistribution of economic
resources) is comparatively attractive. There is also some empirical support mostly from
large-N studies for the notion that economic variables (income levels, economic growth
etc.) matter to terrorism (e.g., Blomberg et al., 2004b; Lai, 2007; Blomberg and Hess,
2008b; Krieger and Meierrieks 2010). For instance, Blomberg et al. (2004b) nd that
economic downturns correlate with increased transnational terrorist activity.
As shown above in Figure 4.1, between 1970 and 2007 Latin America experienced
repeated economic downturns that indicated a deteriorating socio-economic environment.
These recurrent economic declines may have contributed to the emergence of left-wing
social-revolutionary groups that "resorted to violence to repudiate what they perceived to
be decadent and inegalitarian bourgeois societies that produced a steady deterioration of
economic conditions for the middle and lower classes" (Feldmann and Perälä 2004: 106-
107). That is, it seems intuitive that the aforementioned theoretical mechanisms have
also been at work in Latin America. First, slow growth is likely to have fuelled popular
support for terrorism and lowered its costs (e.g., by facilitating recruitment). Second, the
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limited access to economic resources as indicated by poor growth may have made it more
likely for terrorism to emerge that was geared to changing these unfavorable conditions.
Here, the ideological prole of many terrorist organizations also makes a link from poor
economic conditions to terrorism for Latin America plausible. The eventual economic
success of many Latin American countries can be expected to have contributed to a decline
in terrorist activity, given that many terrorist groups in Latin America are likely to have
been highly responsive to economic improvements.
However, it can also be argued that there are no strong causal links between the econ-
omy and terrorism in Latin America. The empirical evidence o¤ered by Feldmann and
Perälä (2004) indicates that transnational terrorist activity in Latin America has been
more strongly linked to internal political and institutional (e.g., human rights violations, a
decient rule of law etc.) than to economic factors.5 For instance, some countries (e.g., Ar-
gentina and Chile) experienced military coups that were associated with widespread human
rights abuses, so that terrorism may have also resulted from these politico-historic (and not
economic) circumstances. Also, during the Cold War many Latin American terrorist orga-
nizations were supported by one of the two superpowers (Gorriti, 1991). As Feldmann and
Perälä (2004) note, several left-wing groups (e.g., the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia, FARC, in Colombia and the Fuerzas Armades Rebeldes, FAR, in Guatemala)
received assistance (weapons, funds, training etc.) from the Soviet Union and Cuba. By
contrast, counter-revolutionary groups (e.g., the Contras in Nicaragua) were supported by
the United States. Terrorism may hence have been driven more strongly by the dynamics
of the international political system than by socio-economic variables.
The view that the economy did not matter to the patterns of terrorism in Latin Amer-
ica between 1970 and 2007 is also in line with the majority of large-N studies on the
determinants of terrorism, as reviewed by Gassebner and Luechinger (2011) and Krieger
5As dened above, transnational terrorism involves more than one country (e.g., because terrorist groups
attack foreigners). As already discussed in the introduction, an analysis that focuses on the causes of
transnational terrorism may yield di¤erent results than one that focuses on the causes of domestic terrorism
(which only involves one country) or terrorism in general (i.e., domestic and transnational terrorism). This
argumentation is also re-iterated below.
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and Meierrieks (2011). Rather, most studies nd that terrorism is rooted in, e.g., poor
political and institutional conditions (e.g., Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Li, 2005; Piazza,
2008, 2009), a low degree of international economic integration (e.g., Kurrild-Klitgaard
et al., 2006), poor demographic conditions such as ethnic tensions (Basuchoudhary and
Shughart, 2010), and foreign policy activities that create grievances and lead to an in-
ternationalization of domestic conict (e.g., Savun and Phillips, 2009; Azam and Thelen,
2010).
However, it is also possible that causality from the economy to terrorism follows a
heterogeneous pattern. Such a perspective implies that both the a¢ rmative (postulating
a universal e¤ect of the economy on terrorism) and the strongly skeptical view (postu-
lating no e¤ect of the economy on terrorism) regarding the terrorism-economy nexus are
lopsided. Heterogeneous causation from economic conditions to terrorism would mean
that economic growth reduced terrorism in some but not all Latin American countries.
Importantly, the e¤ect of economic conditions on terrorism may have depended on a coun-
trys level of development. First, populations in less developed economies ought to have
a comparatively stronger need for socio-economic progress, so that they can be expected
to attach higher importance to economic circumstances when, e.g., considering support-
ing or joining a terrorist organization. Second, less developed countries can be expected
to be more vulnerable to economic shocks. This is because a countrys level of economic
development usually correlates strongly with its level of institutional and state capacity
(e.g., Chong and Calderon, 2000; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). For instance, countries with
a lower level of institutional and state capacity are less likely to o¤er e¢ cient means of
economic participation (e.g., social welfare systems) to ameliorate economic grievances, or
to introduce sound economic policies (e.g., scal stimulus) to counter economic downturns.
Thus, economic factors are anticipated to play a stronger role in the calculi of (potential)
terrorists and their supporters in less developed economies.
Following the view that causality from the economy to terrorism is heterogeneous for
Latin America, we may expect economic conditions to have mattered particularly for the
100
less developed economies, whereas non-economic factors may have played a stronger role
in more developed economies where economic grievances ought to have been less pro-
nounced. For example, the aptly named Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (Guerrilla
Army of the Poor, EGP) of less developed Guatemala can be argued to have been more
strongly motivated by socio-economic grievances than Chiles Frente Patriótico Manuel
Rodríguez (FPMR), which emerged as an armed resistance group against the Pinochet
regime.
4.2.2 Causality from Terrorism to Economic Growth
As concerns a causal link from terrorism to the economy, the main hypothesis is that terror-
ist activity leads to reduced economic activity (i.e., poor economic performance). Here, the
rationale of terrorists to destabilize the economy can again be deduced from rational-choice
theory. A government that is attacked by terrorists may take on a rational perspective,
where it weighs the cost of giving in to (at least some) terrorist demands against the cost
of a prolonged terrorist campaign that results from continued resistance by the government
(e.g., Sandler and Enders, 2008). Consequently, economic destabilization is a central goal
of terrorists. Economic damage due to terrorism means that accommodating terrorists
demands becomes comparatively less costly (i.e., more likely) from the governments per-
spective. Here, terrorism is expected to destabilize the economy by inicting direct damage
and by inducing behavior that results in unfavorable economic outcomes (e.g., by a¤ecting
the allocation and accumulation of resources).6 The direct costs, which are not necessarily
substantial, relate to the loss of human life and the damage to property and infrastructure.
The indirect costs result from the response of economic agents to terrorism. For instance,
security measures may be tightened in response to terrorism, which raises transportation
costs and constrains trade. Terrorism may also create anxiety and inuence risk percep-
6The channels of transmission from terrorism to reduced economic activity are also discussed in, e.g.,
Sandler and Enders (2008). See also Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) for an example of a theoretical model
of related linkages. Finally, the various transmission channels are also discussed in the introduction to this
thesis and in Chapter 3.
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tions. Changes in the perception of security may impact, inter alia, public investment
(which may be redirected to security measures), savings and investment decisions (e.g.,
leading to the ight of capital to other countries), and the patterns of economic activity in
susceptible sectors (e.g., tourism).
While there are no empirical studies that relate terrorism to reduced economic activ-
ity in Latin America, anecdotal evidence indicates that terrorist organizations indeed use
violence to cause economic destabilization. For instance, in 2007 the Mexican Ejército
Popular Revolucionario (EPR) attacked pipelines in Mexico which led to the closure of
factories, fuel shortages and economic losses amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars
(Los Angeles Times, 2007). Similarly, it is plausible that terrorist activity in Latin America
between 1970 and 2007 was harmful to, e.g., trade and the regions attractiveness to foreign
capital, thereby damaging economic growth and development. This expectation is in line
with a number of empirical studies which nd that terrorism indeed generates economic
damage through its negative e¤ect on trade (e.g., Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004), tourism
(e.g., Llorca-Vivero, 2008), foreign direct investment (e.g., Enders and Sandler, 1996), and
on further important economic variables such as technological innovation and migration
(e.g., Larocque et al., 2010; Dreher et al., 2011). Expecting a substantial negative e¤ect
of terrorism on growth for Latin America is also in line with previous studies that show
the adverse e¤ect of terrorism on economic growth (e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003;
Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004; Crain and Crain, 2006; Araz-Takay et al., 2009).
However, we may also hypothesize that terrorism did not automatically feed through to
reduced economic performance in Latin America during our period of observation. Rather,
causality from terrorism to the economy may have followed as with the opposite direction
of causation a heterogeneous pattern. This view results from the ndings of several studies
that are rather more skeptical about the impact of terrorism on the economy. For instance,
some studies nd that the e¤ects of terrorism on foreign direct investment (Enders et al.,
2006) and economic performance (e.g., Tavares, 2004; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2009, 2011;
Gries et al., 2011) are rather small. As noted by Sandler and Enders (2008), the causal
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e¤ect of terrorism on economic performance may depend on certain country-specic traits.
First, terrorist attacks are anticipated to have only localized e¤ects. For instance, attacks
may only hurt the tourism industry in a certain part of a country. Second, in particular
when countries are diversied, a shift in economic activity away from vulnerable to more
robust sectors within an economy is likely to occur (coupled with quick adjustments in
the allocation of resources), e.g., as businesses adapt to terrorism by decentralizing (Frey,
2009). Such e¢ cient behavior by markets and agents is anticipated to further mitigate
negative e¤ects of terrorism on economic growth. Third, the costs of terrorism also need to
be weighed against the size of a countrys economy, where terrorism is less likely to lead to
noticeable damage with increasing size. For instance, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) nd
that terrorism is not detrimental to growth in advanced Asian economies, implying that
higher levels of economic development and size lower the vulnerability to economic damage
from terrorism. In fact, even the high costs of the 9/11 attacks (in absolute terms) can
be considered small when seen in relation to the economic size of the U.S. (Sandler and
Enders, 2008).
Given the Latin American history of terrorism, heterogeneous causation from terrorism
to growth seems intuitive. First, some countries in Latin America were hardly hit by ter-
rorism between 1970 and 2007, so that noticeable economic damage on an aggregate level
from such low-scale terrorist activity seems implausible. Second, terrorist activity was at
times limited to inaccessible parts of a country that did not matter strongly to a countrys
economic performance. Third, some countries in Latin America (e.g., Chile, Argentina)
were as already discussed above rather advanced in terms of institutional and state ca-
pacity and thereby potentially able to cushion the negative repercussions from terrorism
by means of, e.g., interventionist government policies. Similarly, higher levels of develop-
ment also ought to coincide with more e¢ cient behavior on the part of private economic
agents in the face of terrorism, further mitigating the negative e¤ects from terrorism (e.g.,
decentralization, reallocation of economic resources, substitution, diversication). Fourth,
a number of countries in Latin America had a large economy during our period of obser-
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vation, making it less likely even for strong terrorist activity to feed through to reduced
(national) economic performance. Following Sandler and Enders (2008) and in line with
Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009), a heterogeneous causal pattern from terrorism to economic
growth thus seems plausible for Latin America. Here, the small and less advanced coun-
tries (e.g., Ecuador, Guatemala, Bolivia) can be anticipated to have been especially likely
to experience macroeconomic consequences due to terrorism, particularly when terrorist
activity was persistent and intense.
4.2.3 Summary of Potential Causal Linkages
Our literature review has shown that causality between terrorism and economic growth in
Latin America between 1970 and 2007 may have run (i) unidirectionally from economic
growth to terrorism, (ii) unidirectionally from terrorism to growth, or (iii) in both directions
simultaneously (bidirectional causality). Independent of the exact direction of causality,
it may have been present (iv) for all Latin American countries (homogeneous causality)
or (v) only for some countries (heterogeneous causality), where the latter view also takes
into account more skeptical contributions on the terrorism-economy nexus. Finally, (vi)
following a very skeptical view the linkages between terrorism and growth may have not
mattered to any country, so that other factors determined the patterns of terrorism and
economic activity instead. In the following empirical part of this contribution we examine
which hypotheses regarding the causal relationship between terrorism and economic growth
suit the Latin American experience best. Here, we focus on Latin America due to its inter-
esting history of economic growth and terrorist activity, the ideological alignment of many
terrorist groups in this part of the world that ought to make them particularly responsive
to economic changes, and the lack of statistical studies on the causes and consequences of
Latin American terrorism.
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4.3 Data and Variables
4.3.1 Economic Growth Data
When analyzing the terrorism-economy nexus for Latin America, we use the growth rate of
real gross domestic product per capita (GDP) to indicate a countrys economic situation.
As shown by, e.g., Blomberg et al. (2004b), times of economic contraction (slow or negative
economic growth) indicate unfavorable economic conditions that are assumed to coincide
with more terrorism. Times of economic expansion (strong economic growth) ought to
be associated with reduced terrorism as economic conditions are more favorable, so that,
e.g., non-violent (economic) opportunities open up and the opportunity costs of violence
increase. The data is drawn from the PENN World Table (Heston et al., 2009).
4.3.2 Terrorism Data
We employ three indicators of terrorist activity and adjust all of them for population size.
We correct for country size because we expect the average e¤ect of terrorism on the economy
to decline with it, while larger countries are also anticipated to experience more terrorist
activity in absolute numbers (cf. Sandler and Enders, 2008; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011).
Using three terrorism indicators also adds to the robustness of our ndings, in particular as
no existing indicator is able to measure terrorism as a whole (e.g., with respect to its level
or its repercussions). First, we use the number of terrorist attacks per 100,000 inhabitants
(TA). Second, we employ the number of terrorism victims per 100,000 inhabitants (TV ),
i.e., the number of individuals wounded or killed in terrorist strikes. Previous studies on the
causes and consequences of terrorism also use similar indicators (e.g., Tavares, 2004; Crain
and Crain, 2006; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2011). While the former indicates the frequency
of terrorism, the latter indicates its intensity. Third, we construct a terrorism index (TI )
similar to that employed by Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004), which includes information on
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the number of terrorist attacks and terrorism victims in a given year and country.7 The data
for population size is drawn from the PENN World Table. The raw data for the terrorism
variables is drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (LaFree and Dugan 2007).
The GTD, unlike other databases, includes data on domestic and transnational terror-
ism. Even though domestic terrorism is far more common than transnational terrorism,
previous empirical studies have resorted to an analysis of the causes and consequences of
the latter due to data constraints (e.g., Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011). However, transna-
tional terrorism is expected to be associated with international political factors (i.e., foreign
policy). For instance, Addison and Murshed (2005) argue that transnational terrorism may
be used by a terrorist group against the external sponsor of a domestic government the
group opposes, so as to reduce the political support of this sponsor for the domestic gov-
ernment. Similarly, the evidence provided by, e.g., Savun and Phillips (2009) and Azam
and Thelen (2010) indicates that international political variables (e.g., military interven-
tions, involvement in international crises) matter to the patterns of transnational terrorism.
However, such variables are less likely to matter to domestic terrorism, which is usually
more strongly related to domestic goals and circumstances. Therefore, one may argue that
domestic terrorism can be expected to share a closer association with a countrys economic
situation than transnational terrorism.
For our analysis we consider all terrorist activity (i.e., domestic and transnational ter-
rorism) in a given country and year in order to examine the terrorism-economy nexus in
Latin America. That is, we take into account terrorism by domestic groups against domes-
tic and foreign targets, terrorism by foreign groups (i.e., imported transnational terrorism)
and unclaimed terrorist activity.8 Therefore, we are able to consider the aggregate e¤ect of
7Formally, the terrorism index TI is equal to: TI = ln(e + TA + TV ), where e is the mathematical
constant and TA and TV are the number of terrorist attacks per 100,000 inhabitants and the number of
terrorism victims per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively. The index thus captures the frequency as well as
the intensity of terrorism.
8While most of the recorded activity in Latin America was carried out by domestic groups against domes-
tic and international targets (ca. 65% of all activity) and little of the activity can be considered imported
transnational terrorism (ca. 4%), a considerable measure of activity (ca. 30%) cannot be attributed to a
specic terrorist group.
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terrorism on the economy (and vice versa). Terrorist activity is expected to produce eco-
nomic damage, regardless of the origin of the attacking terrorists, so that we see no point
in di¤erentiating between domestic and transnational terrorism.9 Also, national economic
conditions ought to matter to domestic and foreign groups alike. As an example, while
slow growth may make it easier for domestic terrorist groups to recruit new members (so
that domestic terrorism increases), foreign groups may also nd it attractive to attack so
as to further destabilize the domestic economy (so that imported transnational terrorism
also increases).
4.4 Panel Causality Analysis: Methodology and Findings
In this section we introduce the methodology to test for causality in a panel framework
and discuss our ndings. We rst examine the stationarity properties of the terrorism and
growth data series by means of a series of panel unit root tests. We then test for Granger
causality (Granger, 1969) with panel data, treating the data correctly as it follows from
the results of the panel unit root tests. Finally, we follow Hurlin and Venet (2001) and
Hurlin (2005) and use a sequential approach to test for causality that allows us to treat all
variables as endogenous. Here, we rst assess whether the independent variable (say, x )
Granger-causes the dependent variable (say, y) in any cross-section. Rejection of the null
hypothesis of non-causality takes us to the second step, where we test for homogeneous
causality. That is, we examine whether x uniformly Granger-causes y in all cross-sections.
If we reject the null hypothesis of homogeneous causality, we in a third step may assess for
which group of cross-sections x Granger-causes y (group-specic causality).
This sequential approach with panel data has several advantages. First, through the use
of time-series cross-sectional data we are able to use more observations and reduce iden-
9The relationship between terrorism and economic growth may depend on the type of terrorism, as sug-
gested by Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011). While we argue in favor of using data on total terrorist activity
to examine this relationship, future research may evaluate the isolated e¤ects of domestic and transna-
tional terrorism on growth (and vice versa). The potentially di¤erent e¤ects of domestic and transnational
terrorism on economic activity are also discussed in the introduction to this doctoral thesis.
107
tication problems, thus arriving at more e¢ cient results than conventional time-series
causality analyses. Second, we are able to take into account country-specic (xed) ef-
fects which are likely to matter in our analysis. For instance, (virtually) time-invariant
factors such as geography and national mentality that are captured in the xed e¤ects
may inuence economic performance and terrorist activity, so that accounting for them
ought to help to identify the terrorism-economy nexus more closely. Third, we allow for
causal variation among the countries. By pursuing this approach described below in more
detail we relax the strong assumption that the causal e¤ect of the respective independent
on the respective dependent variable is identical across all cross-sections.10
4.4.1 Unit Root Tests
In order to correctly test for Granger causality, all considered series need to be stationary
(cf. Granger, 1969). Thus, we begin our analysis by investigating the stationarity properties
of the data series. Here, we employ several panel unit root tests which generally test
the null hypothesis of a (non-stationary) I(d) unit root process against the alternative
hypothesis that no unit root is present, so the series are stationary, i.e., I(0). The results
have implications for the transformation of the data. First-di¤erencing may be necessary
to generate I(0) series. Also, when series are integrated of the same order they may share a
long-run relationship (cointegration) which needs to be accounted for by means of an error
correction model.
The results of the panel unit toot tests are reported in Table 4.1. Regardless of which
panel unit root test we use, we nd that all series are stationary. Thus there is no need to
transform the series. Also, there is no need to investigate potential cointegrating relation-
ships between the data series, given that they are all I(0).
10As discussed above, causality in the terrorism-economy nexus may be heterogeneous. For example,
terrorism may strongly a¤ect the economy in less diversied countries, yet may not matter to more developed
countries. Through our approach we are able to detect such causal heterogeneity. By contrast, a priori
assuming causal homogeneity may lead to incorrect causality inferences.
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Variable LLC test Breitung t-stat IPS test Fisher 2 (ADF) Fisher 2 (PP)
Economic Growth (G) -11.59*** -9.21*** -10.59*** 172.44*** 169.67***
Terrorist Attacks (TA) -10.81*** -5.83*** -9.21*** 348.63*** 309.82***
Terrorism Victims (TV ) -9.46*** -8.37*** -8.61*** 147.69*** 191.60***
Terrorism Index (TI ) -4.34*** -5.02*** -5.25*** 101.21*** 195.92***
Notes: LLC = Levin-Liu-Chu test. IPS = Im-Pesaran-Shin test. Individual e¤ects and linear trends
included as exogenous variables. Automatic lag length selection through Schwarz Information
Criterion (SIC/BIC ). Probailities for Fisher tests computed using an asymptotic 2 distribution,
while all other tests assume asymptotic normality. p < 0:01 (indicating rejection of null
hypothesis, i.e., a unit root process).
Table 4.1: Panel Unit Root Test Results
4.4.2 Test for Panel Non-Causality
Methodology
After having identied the stationarity properties of the data series, we can begin to test
for panel causality, following Hurlin and Venet (2001) and Hurlin (2005). Here, we consider
the following model:
yie;t =
pX
k=1

(k)
i yie;t k +
pX
k=1

(k)
j xi;t k + i + vi;t; (4.1)
where y is our e-th measure of terrorism (TA, TV, TI) of cross-section i in period t. It
is explained by past values of y, with lags running from 1 to p, where we work with a
maximal lag length of p=3. It is also explained by past (i.e., lagged) values of economic
growth (x ) and the country-xed e¤ects . v is the error term. In order to allow for a
maximum of causal heterogeneity, the autoregressive coe¢ cients ((k)i ) and the regression
coe¢ cients ((k)i ) are allowed to vary across cross-sections i. However, they are assumed
constant for all lags running from 1 to p, so as to retain su¢ cient degrees of freedom.11
11The constant is always excluded. Estimating the causal e¤ect of terrorism on growth requires us
to consider a model where economic growth (x ) is the dependent variable. We estimate all subsequent
models using the least square dummy variable (LSDV ) estimator. Estimating models that include a lagged
dependent variable may bias the estimation results (dynamic panel bias). However, Judson and Owen
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We rst test for panel non-causality. Here, we compute the sum of squared residuals
(RSS2) from a model that only includes information on the lagged dependent variable and
the xed e¤ects to estimate present values of the dependent variable. That is, we do not
include information on x in Equation (4.1). Then we compute the sum of squared residuals
(RSS1) from a model that also includes the lagged independent variable (so that we now
estimate the model specied in Equation (4.1)). We use the following test statistic (F1) to
assess whether the inclusion of the lagged independent variable increases the explanatory
power of our model:
F1 =
(RSS2  RSS1)=(Np)
RSS1=[NT  N(1 + p)  p] ; (4.2)
where N is the number of cross-sections, T is the number of time periods and p is the
number of lags. Here, the null hypothesis is that the independent variable does not Granger-
cause the dependent variable for any cross-section. Using an F -distribution with Np, NT-
N(1+p)-p, df (Hurlin and Venet, 2001), we can assess whether the null hypothesis of
non-causality is rejected (signicant F1-statistic) or not (insignicant F1-statistic). In the
latter case, we nd that the independent variable does not cause the dependent variable
for any cross-section, so the test ends here.
4.4.3 Findings
Following the causality testing sequence described above, we test for non-causality from
growth to terrorism and vice versa. The results are reported in Table 4.2.
The ndings indicate that terrorism does not Granger-cause economic growth, regardless
of which indicator of terrorism we use and which lag length we employ. This nding is
consistent with skeptical views regarding the e¤ect of terrorism on the economy (e.g.,
(1999) show that this bias becomes smaller with a larger T (time dimension). Given that T=38 for our
sample, we follow Judson and Owen (1999) and argue that the LSDV estimator is suited to our dynamic
panel estimations.
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Lags F1 Test Statistics
Economic growth Granger-causes terrorist attacks
t-1 6.3442***
t-2 1.9925***
t-3 1.2604*
Terrorist attacks Granger-cause economic growth
t-1 0.7192
t-2 0.6450
t-3 0.4226
Economic growth Granger-causes terrorism victims
t-1 2.6418***
t-2 1.0170
t-3 2.3056***
Terrorism victims Granger-cause economic growth
t-1 1.2481
t-2 0.3743
t-3 0.8237
Economic growth Granger-causes terrorism index
t-1 4.3560***
t-2 2.3001***
t-3 1.9003***
Terrorism index Granger-causes economic growth
t-1 1.2304
t-2 0.5909
t-3 0.4059
Notes: Critical values for F1 based on F -distribution with
Np, NT-N(1+p)-p, df (Hurlin and Venet, 2001). p < 0:10;
p < 0:01 (indicating rejection of null hypothesis, i.e.,
non-causality).
Table 4.2: Test for Panel Non-Causality
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Sandler and Enders, 2008; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2009). While our evidence does not
imply that terrorist activity did not impede economic growth on sub-national levels (e.g.,
in Chiapas in Mexico) or damaged certain sectors that are vulnerable to terrorism (e.g., the
tourism industry), neither does it indicate that such e¤ects fed through to overall economic
performance. It is possible that the attacked economies in Latin America were large enough
in terms of economic size and diversied enough to absorb terror-induced shocks on, e.g.,
investment, tourism and trade, so that overall growth was not impaired. For instance,
the relatively high level of development of Chile meaning e¢ cient behavior by public and
private economic agents (e.g., sound policies to counter terrorism, e¤ective reallocation of
economic resources) seems to have rendered even powerful armed campaigns by, e.g., the
MIR, the FPMR and the Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (MAPU ) ine¤ective in
terms of destabilizing the economy.12 Alternatively, we can argue that terrorism in Latin
America was more of a peripheral phenomenon (i.e., often restricted to the hinterland) or
simply not severe (i.e., organized and/or persistent) enough to induce observable economic
damage. Since we do not nd an e¤ect of terrorism on growth, there is no need to further
analyze this direction of causality.
With respect to the causal e¤ect of economic growth on terrorism, we reject the null
hypothesis of non-causality in almost all cases, regardless of which indicator of terrorist
activity and lag length we employ.13 That is, at least for some Latin American countries
economic growth causally inuenced terrorism. Previous economic success may have made
it less attractive to engage in terrorism, meaning that would-be terrorists and their sup-
porters would lose more than they would gain from using violence. Also, terrorists and
their supporters may have had more non-violent opportunities to participate economically
during economic upturns. By the same token, times of economic downswings may have
meant that terrorist organizations were more able to capitalize on economic grievances
12For the period of 1970 to 2007 the GTD reports over 300 terrorist attacks by the MIR, over 800 attacks
by the FPMR and over 100 attacks by the MAPU.
13Our analysis indicates that the second lag of economic growth does not Granger-cause TV. We therefore
do not consider this specic lag in the subsequent analysis.
112
when striving for popular support and recruits. However, the ndings presented in Table
4.2 do not automatically mean that causality from growth to terrorism is homogeneous.
In fact, more skeptical views regarding this direction of causality may yet be vindicated in
the remainder of our analysis.
4.4.4 Test for Homogeneous Panel Causality
Methodology
Having rejected the null hypothesis of non-causality for the e¤ect of growth on terrorism, we
proceed to test for homogeneous causality. Previously, we allowed for causal heterogeneity
among cross-sections. However, a stronger assumption is to presuppose a common causal
link from the independent to the dependent variable that is present for all cross-sections.
To assess whether homogeneous causality is indeed present, we use RSS1 (as calculated
above) and the residual sum of squares (RSS3) from a model where the slope terms of the
independent variable are constrained to be equal across all cross-sections, thus not allowing
for causal variation. That is,(k)i from Equation (4.1) is now specied to be not only equal
across di¤erent lag lengths but also across cross-sections. We then calculate the new test
statistics (F2) from:
F2 =
(RSS3  RSS1)=[p(N   1)]
RSS1=[NT  N(1 + p)  p] ; (4.3)
Here, the null hypothesis is that the independent variable Granger-causes the dependent
variable for all cross-sections. Using the same F -distribution as before, a rejection of
the null hypothesis (signicant statistic) suggests that the independent variable does not
Granger-cause the dependent variable at least for one cross-section, so that our original
assumption of causal heterogeneity was valid. An insignicant test statistic tells us that
homogeneous causality is indeed present.
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Lags F2 Test Statistics
Economic growth Granger-causes terrorist attacks
t-1 6.3241***
t-2 2.1076***
t-3 1.2754*
Economic growth Granger-causes terrorism victims
t-1 2.6216***
t-2 
t-3 2.2099***
Economic growth Granger-causes terrorism index
t-1 4.0592***
t-2 2.3207***
t-3 1.9155***
Notes: Critical values for F2 based on F -distribution with
Np, NT-N(1+p)-p, df (Hurlin and Venet, 2001). p < 0:10;
p < 0:01 (indicating rejection of null hypothesis, i.e.,
homogeneous causality).
Table 4.3: Test for Homogeneous Panel Causality
Findings
The empirical ndings are reported in Table 4.3. In short, the test results indicate that
there is no common causal process from growth to terrorism for all countries in our sample
(regardless of which terrorism indicator and lag length we use). Given that some countries
in Latin America were hardly hit by terrorism between 1970 and 2007 (e.g., Costa Rica),
this nding is not too surprising.
4.4.5 Testing for Group-Specic Panel Causality
Methodology
So far, our analysis has shown that economic growth Granger-causes terrorist activity, but
not for all Latin American countries. Now we want to analyze for which countries growth
matters to terrorism. We divide our country sample into two groups, where one group
accounts for the lower middle income (LMI ) countries and the other for the upper middle
income (UMI ) countries. As noted above, we expect the causal heterogeneity to depend
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on a countrys level of development, where less developed economies are anticipated to be
more prone to economic change than more developed countries.14 We argued that in less
developed economies a comparatively stronger need for socio-economic progress is likely, so
that higher importance ought to be attached to economic variables when, e.g., support for
a terrorist organization is considered. Also, given that the level of economic development
usually correlates with a countrys level of institutional and state capacity, economic factors
ought to matter more strongly to less developed countries. For instance, countries with
a low level of institutional capacity can be expected to be more vulnerable to economic
shocks as they are less likely to provide e¢ cient means of socio-economic participation
(e.g., social welfare systems, education) to reduce related grievances or to introduce sound
economic policies to counter recessions.
We test for group-specic causality by calculating the residual sum of squares (RSS2;j)
from a model which uses information on the lagged dependent variable, the xed e¤ects
and the lagged independent variable with the exception of the slope coe¢ cient of the cross-
sections of interest (i.e., a subset of panel members) j to estimate present values of the
dependent variable. With respect to Equation (4.1), this means to calculate this model
but to constrain the slope coe¢ cients of sub-sample j to 0 (i.e., (k)i = 0). Using RSS1 (as
calculated above), we compute our third F -statistic (F3) from:
F3 =
(RSS2;;j  RSS1)=(nncp)
RSS1=[NT  N(1 + p)  ncp] ; (4.4)
where nnc is the number of panel members for which the slope coe¢ cient is constrained to
0 and nc is the number of panel members for which this is not the case. For this part of the
analysis the null hypothesis is that the independent variable does not cause the dependent
14We follow the most recent income classication provided by the World Bank. The LMI countries in
our sample are Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. The UMI
countries in our sample are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico,
Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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variable for subset j. Using the same F -distribution as above, we can assess whether the
exclusion of the slope terms of the subset j (indicating either the LMI or UMI countries)
inuences the explanatory power of the model. If the F3-statistic is signicant, the null
hypothesis of non-causality for the respective subset j is rejected. That is, the model loses
explanatory power with the exclusion of j, indicating that for this subset the independent
variable Granger-causes the dependent variable. If the F3-statistic is insignicant, it means
that the exclusion of the respective slope terms does not a¤ect the models explanatory
power, so that for the respective subset the independent variable does not Granger-cause
the dependent variable.
Findings
The ndings of the group-specic tests for non-causality are reported in Table 4.4. In short,
the results indicate that economic expansions and contractions swayed terrorist activity
only in the LMI but not in the UMI countries. This is consistent with our expectation
that economic variables only mattered to terrorism in the less developed countries in our
sample.
For the less developed countries in our sample there is evidence that growth inu-
enced the genesis of terrorism. By comparison, the LMI experienced less economic success
and stronger economic uctuations.15 At the same time, they dedicated fewer resources
to policy means that would have ameliorated grievances associated with poor economic
conditions and performance.16 The comparatively poorer economic performance and in-
stitutional framework of the LMI countries makes it plausible that (potential) terrorists
and their supporters in these countries were more strongly motivated by socio-economic
causes, which also relates to the ostensible goals (redistribution) and ideological motiva-
15While the average growth rate in the LMI countries is 0.91%, it is 1.91% in the UMI countries. The
standard deviation of economic growth in the LMI countries is 5.46, but only 4.77 in the UMI countries.
16For instance, between 1980 and 1999 the LMI countries spent only 1.18% of GDP on social security,
whereas the UMI countries spent 4.64% of GDP during the same period. See the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean website (http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones) for
the corresponding data.
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Lags F3 Test Statistics
Economic growth Granger-causes terrorist attacks for LMI countries
t-1 15.399***
t-2 4.5154***
t-3 2.6988***
Economic growth Granger-causes terrorist attacks for UMI countries
t-1 0.3866
t-2 0.2808
t-3 0.1134
Economic growth Granger-causes terrorism victims for LMI countries
t-1 6.300***
t-2 
t-3 5.5938***
Economic growth Granger-causes terrorism victims for UMI countries
t-1 0.3855
t-2 
t-3 0.0144
Economic growth Granger-causes terrorism index for LMI countries
t-1 10.465***
t-2 5.3142***
t-3 4.5124***
Economic growth Granger-causes terrorism index for UMI countries
t-1 0.3637
t-2 0.2584
t-3 0.1373
Notes: LMI = lower middle income; UMI = upper middle income. Classication
according to the World Bank. Critical values for F3 based on F -distribution with
Np, NT-N(1+p)-p, df (Hurlin and Venet, 2001). p < 0:01 (indicating rejection
of null hypothesis, i.e., non-causality).
Table 4.4: Test for Group-Specic Non-Causality
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tions of many terrorist groups operating in these countries. As in Blomberg et al. (2004a,
b), economic marginalization may have provided incentives to resort to violence. The
eventual economic success of the LMI countries (even though it was slow to arrive) might
have ultimately coincided with higher opportunity costs of violence that impeded terrorism
recruitment and caused popular support for terrorism to dwindle. For the LMI countries,
we thus concur with other empirical studies that attribute a noticeable role to economic
factors in determining terrorism.
However, the group-specic causality analysis also o¤ers support for skeptical views
towards the terrorism-economy nexus. For the UMI countries we detect no evidence of
an e¤ect of growth on terrorism. Compared to the LMI countries, a higher initial level of
development, stronger economic performance between 1970 and 2007 and a sounder insti-
tutional framework that may have been able to better cushion economic marginalization
and crisis may explain why economic performance did not matter strongly to terrorism for
this group of countries. Evidently, other (non-economic) factors which we will discuss
below were more important for the calculus of terrorists in the UMI countries, so that
economic growth (or policies that augmented it) did not help to reduce terrorism. For the
UMI countries, our results are in line with those empirical studies that consider economic
variables to play only a minor role in terrorism.
4.5 Negative Binomial Analysis
Our panel causality analysis ndings suggest that causality running from economic per-
formance to terrorism in Latin America follows a heterogeneous pattern, where growth
inuenced the patterns of terrorism in the less developed (LMI) but not in the higher de-
veloped (UMI) Latin American countries. Reverse causation was not detected. Given that
we analyzed the question of terrorism-economy causality in bivariate systems, the omis-
sion of relevant variables mattering to the emergence of terrorism may be an issue. Such
an omission may bias Granger causality inferences. However, a multivariate approach to
testing for panel causality within our methodological framework has yet to be developed.
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We therefore use an alternative empirical approach to further examine our ndings. We
investigate the e¤ect of economic performance on terrorism using count data models, so
that we are able to assess whether our ndings regarding an e¤ect of growth on terrorism are
robust to the inclusion of further controls. At the same time, we are able to examine which
other factors determined terrorism in Latin America, particularly with respect to the UMI
countries. Finally, treating the terrorism data as event-count data instead of adjusting it
for population and treating it as continuous, as we did in the causality analysis ought to
add to the robustness of our empirical ndings.
4.5.1 Methodology
We estimate a series of negative binomial (maximum-likelihood) regression models because
our dependent variable (the number of terrorist attacks) is discrete, assumes only non-
negative values and has a variance that is larger than its mean (overdispersion).17 This is
the standard empirical model when assessing the determinants of terrorism using event-
count data. All independent variables enter the estimation model in the lagged (t-1) form,
so as to avoid reverse causation. In some specications we also include year dummies to
take into account the omission of relevant variables as well as unit e¤ects and trending
e¤ects commonly associated with terrorism.
4.5.2 Data and Variables
We use the total number of terrorist attacks as our dependent variable, where the data
is extracted from the GTD. As before, we use the growth rate of real GDP per capita as
our main independent variable of interest, with the data coming from the PENN World
Table. Here, we construct two variables by interacting the growth series with dummy
variables reecting whether a country is a LMI or UMI country, so that we are able to
account for the group-specic causal e¤ects of growth on terrorism that were detected in
17Note that this estimation procedure has already been described in more detail in Chapter 2 of this
doctoral thesis. The related discussion is not reiterated here.
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Variable N*T Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
No. of Terrorist Attacks 684 40.16 108.60 0 711
Economic Growth 684 1.52 5.07 -41.10 35.91
Population Size 684 4.00 0.51 3.18 5.29
Real GDP Per Capita 684 8.68 0.47 7.48 9.82
Democracy 684 6.83 3.14 0.50 10
Regime Stability 684 0.96 0.49 0 1.95
Trade Opennness 684 57.52 39.42 10.32 222.89
Cold War Era 684 0.61 0.49 0 1
Guerilla Warfare 684 0.33 0.78 0 8
Military Spending Per Capita 682 3.21 0.89 0.64 5.76
Table 4.5: Summary Statistics for Negative Binomial Regressions
the panel causality analysis. We also introduce a number of controls, where we build on the
rich literature on the determinants of terrorism. The summary statistics of the dependent
variable and the controls are reported in Table 4.5.
First, we control for (logged) population size since it is often found to be positively
correlated with terrorism (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011). For instance, a larger population
may reect higher policing costs or a higher degree of demographic stress. Also, larger
countries are more likely to su¤er larger absolute numbers of terrorist attacks, so controlling
for population size should take into account any scale bias. Data on population size is
extracted from the PENN World Table.
We control for the level of economic development in a country by including data on
(logged) real GDP per capita from the PENN World Table. In line with our previous
argumentation a higher level of development ought to reect fewer economic grievances
that may otherwise lead to terrorism (e.g., Lai, 2007).
The level of democracy may also matter, given that many terrorist groups in Latin
America styled themselves as ghting against repressive (non-democratic) regimes (e.g.,
Feldmann and Perälä, 2004). Being able to participate politically with relative ease then
ought to make it less attractive to make ones voice heard through violence, implying a
negative relationship between terrorism and democracy (e.g., Li, 2005). However, political
repression and military actions against terrorist groups are less likely when governments
120
have to respect civil liberties and account for a broad range of political interests, potentially
suggesting a positive link between terrorism and democracy (e.g., Li, 2005).18 For instance,
Perus President Fujimori argued that democratic constraints had given rise to terrorist
movements (e.g., the Sendero Luminiso, SL, and the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac
Amaru, MRTA) when staging an anti-democratic coup, so as to impose a (non-democratic)
means of repression to ght these movements. Controlling for the level of democracy also
helps to account for a reporting bias in terrorism (e.g., Li, 2005; Drakos and Gofas, 2006).
In countries that have a low level of political development the press is likely to be controlled,
so that the coverage of terrorism is expected to be restricted. Then, the actual number of
terrorist incidents in such countries is likely to di¤er from the number of incidents reported
and subsequently recorded in terrorism databases (e.g., the GTD data).19 The presence
of this reporting bias may also explain any positive relationship between terrorism and
democracy. We use the unied polity score (polity2) from the PolityIV Project (Marshall
and Jaggers, 2008), where we rescale this index so that it only takes positive values, with
higher values meaning a higher level of political openness.
Following Piazza (2008), we also control for the e¤ect of political instability on terror-
ism. We expect regime stability to be negatively related to terrorism, as unstable regimes
may produce political vacuums that terrorist groups can use to forward their agenda. Some
countries (e.g., Argentina and Chile) experienced regime changes, which may have led to
terrorist activity associated with them. For instance, the activity by left-wing (e.g., the
ERP) and right-wing (e.g., the AAA) groups in Argentina can be seen in the context of
the military coup in Argentina in 1976. Regime stability is measured as the (logged plus
unity) number of years since the most recent regime change, with the data coming from
the PolityIV Project.
18This may imply that semi-open polities are most vulnerable to terrorism, as suggested by, e.g., Kurrild-
Klitgaard et al. (2006). We run a non-linear specication of our estimation model to account for this.
19As in Drakos and Gofas (2006), we run a zero-inated negative binomial regression (ZINB ) model to
take the under-reporting bias of non-democracies into account. Here, we use the level of democracy (that
closely correlates with the freedom of the press) as a determinant for zero ination, i.e., for the case that
terrorism is never reported.
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We also control for trade openness. As Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) note, a countrys
degree of economic integration may, e.g., induce resentment towards globalization, making
it easier for terrorist groups to recruit. Alternatively, e.g., when economic integration leads
to economic gains it may be associated with less terrorism since it removes some of the
socio-economic causes of terrorism. Trade openness is measured by the trade ratio (exports
and imports to real GDP) extracted from the PENN World Table.
We also run regressions where we include a variable indicating the Cold War era. As
noted above, during the Cold War time many Latin American terrorist groups gained the
support of one of the two superpowers (Gorriti, 1991). After the end of the Cold War such
support is likely to have been withdrawn, meaning that terrorist groups may have found it
di¢ cult to sustain their Cold War level of activity. We thus expect a positive relationship
between the Cold War era and terrorist activity. The Cold War era is operationalized by
a dummy variable (1 if T  1992).
Finally, we take into account the results of Gassebner and Luechinger (2011) who nd
that guerrilla warfare and military spending are among the robust correlates of terrorism.
Guerrilla warfare as another form of political violence ought to be positively related to
terrorism, given that insurgents often resort to terrorism as part of a violent campaign
to overthrow a government. As in Gassebner and Luechinger (2011), it is measured by
the level of guerrilla activity, with the data coming from the Cross-National Time-Series
Data Archive (Databanks International, 2009). Military spending ought to be positively
related to terrorism due to the asymmetries between terrorist organizations and opposing
governments. Here, the weaker belligerent is anticipated to resort to terrorism as the most
cost-e¢ cient mode of violence (Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011). Military spending is
measured in (logged plus unity) per capita terms with data from the National Material
Capabilities Dataset (e.g., Singer, 1987).
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4.5.3 Empirical Results
Main Findings
The empirical results from the series of negative binomial regressions are reported in Table
4.6. In short, they o¤er further support for our panel causality analysis ndings, as they
suggest that favorable economic conditions reduced terrorist activity in the less developed
countries in our sample, but did not matter to the higher developed ones.
For all specications we nd that economic growth exerts a negative and statistically
signicant inuence on terrorist activity in the LMI countries in our sample. However,
while the e¤ect of growth on terrorism is also negative and statistically signicant for
the UMI countries in a simple specication (Model 2), this e¤ect vanishes once we also
consider additional controls. Using count data, we thus nd support for the view that
poor economic conditions have been conducive to terrorism in the LMI countries in our
sample, e.g., by driving up economic marginalization and lowering the opportunity costs
of terrorism. However, factors other than economic performance seem to have driven
terrorism in the UMI countries of Latin America. This nding adds to the evidence from
the panel causality analysis, which similarly implied a substantial causal link from growth
to terrorism only for the LMI countries. These ndings are robust to the inclusion of a set
of socio-economic, political, military and demographic controls.
With respect to the controls, our ndings suggest that a variety of socio-economic,
political, military and demographic factors also inuenced the calculus of terrorists in
Latin America. The ndings are generally in line with previous contributions concerned
with the causes of terrorism in Latin America (e.g., Lopez, 1988; Feldmann and Perälä,
2004) and also broadly echo the empirical mainstream with respect to the determinants
of terrorism (e.g., Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Kis-Katos et al., 2011; Krieger and
Meierrieks, 2011).
First, we nd that terrorist activity is positively correlated with population size. While
this nding may reect the fact that larger countries are more likely to experience a larger
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(absolute) number of terrorist incidents, it may also suggest that demographic stress trig-
gered terrorism in Latin America.
Second, we nd that the ColdWar era is also positively associated with terrorist activity.
This result suggests that international political developments during the Cold War era
mattered to terrorism in Latin America, e.g., by governing the level of foreign nancial
and military assistance channeled to terrorist organizations by one of the superpowers or
their respective allies.
Third, we nd that the number of terrorist attacks is negatively associated with per
capita income and trade openness. This nding implies that in addition to short-run eco-
nomic performance, long-run socio-economic conditions mattered to terrorism. Consistent
with the ndings of, e.g., Blomberg and Hess (2008b), socio-economic progress reduced
terrorist activity by raising the (opportunity) costs of terrorism. Also, this progress can be
expected to correlate with institutional development, o¤ering an additional pathway e.g.,
by increasing state and institutional capacity through which socio-economic success may
have been negatively related to terrorism in Latin America.
Fourth, there is some evidence that regime stability reduces terrorism during our pe-
riod of observation, while guerrilla warfare is a strong positive predictor of terrorism, as
in Gassebner and Luechinger (2011). Also, military spending positively correlates with
terrorist activity in Latin America. These ndings indicate that terrorism is closely asso-
ciated with political instability and other forms of political violence and that it is used as
a means of violence in asymmetric conicts (e.g., Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011).
Finally, as concerns the level of political development, non-linear specications (Model
8) and the use of a ZINB model (Model 9) suggest that semi-open countries are most prone
to terrorism in Latin America and that the underreporting of terrorism in non-democracy
may have an impact.20 This is in line with Feldmann and Perälä (2004) who argue that
20Note that the use of the ZINB model does not inuence our ndings regarding the e¤ect of economic
performance on terrorism. However, the highly signicant e¤ect of democracy in the zero-ination equation
implies that non-democracies indeed tend to underreport terrorist activity, as previously found by Drakos
and Gofas (2006).
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intermediate levels of political development e.g., as during some periods in Peru, Colombia
and Chile where comparatively good opportunities for political participation coupled with
a comparatively poor rule of law, democratic accountability, and human rights abuses were
breeding grounds for terrorism.
Robustness
As shown in Table 4.7, our main ndings from the series of negative binomial regressions are
also robust to the inclusion of additional controls for international conict, government size
and ethnic fractionalization. Table 4.7 also provides information on the operationalization
and data sources of these additional controls. Net of the inuence of these additional con-
trols, we again nd that favorable economic conditions most importantly, strong economic
growth is negatively associated with terrorist activity in the less developed countries in
our sample, while this association is not detected for the higher developed Latin American
countries.
4.6 Conclusion
In this contribution we studied the causal relationship between terrorism and economic
performance for 18 Latin American countries for the period 1970 to 2007, taking into
account the potential complex links between these two variables. We focused on Latin
America due to its history of economic growth and terrorism, the ideological prole of
many terrorist groups in this part of the world that ought to make them particularly
responsive to socio-economic changes, and the lack of empirical studies on the causes and
economic costs of Latin American terrorism.
A panel causality analysis yielded no evidence that terrorism had a causal e¤ect on
economic growth during the period of observation. This nding may imply that terrorist
activity in Latin America was simply not intense enough to inict economic damage. Al-
ternatively, the attacked economies may have been su¢ ciently diversied and resilient to
absorb any negative economic shock from terrorism.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth*LMI -0.049 -0.032 -0.049 -0.031 -0.051 -0.033
(2.71)*** (1.89)* (2.70)*** (1.69)* (2.80)*** (1.94)*
Growth*UMI -0.012 0.004 -0.012 0.004 -0.012 0.004
(0.59) (0.23) (0.59) (0.21) (0.60) (0.22)
Population Size 1.965 1.800 1.974 1.874 1.881 1.748
(6.64)*** (6.71)*** (6.38)*** (6.81)*** (5.81)*** (6.02)***
Real GDP p.c. -1.517 -0.731 -1.511 -0.735 -1.460 -0.698
(6.53)*** (3.75)*** (6.56)*** (3.71)*** (5.77)*** (3.43)***
Democracy 0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.005 0.002 -0.003
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.16) (0.05) (0.09)
Regime Stability -0.456 -0.077 -0.456 -0.072 -0.478 -0.089
(2.77)*** (0.53) (2.78)*** (0.50) (2.87)*** (0.63)
Trade Openness -0.010 -0.014 -0.010 -0.014 -0.011 -0.014
(0.003)*** (6.17)*** (3.33)*** (6.04)*** (3.57)*** (6.42)***
Cold War Era 1.504 1.507 1.494
(6.86)*** (6.87)*** (6.79)***
International War 0.024 0.136
(0.416) (0.18)
Government Size 0.002 0.025
(0.18) (2.53)**
Ethnic 0.280 0.164
Fractionalization (0.52) (0.42)
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -2344.50 -2227.50 -2344.48 -2225.27 -2344.36 -2227.45
Wald Chi2 337.34*** 808.03*** 335.54*** 825.11*** 352.25*** 815.36***
Mean VIF 1.35 1.23 1.37 1.24 1.45 1.34
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of terrorist attacks. Constant not reported. Absolute,
robust z-scores in parentheses (using Huber/White sandwich standard errors). LMI = dummy
variable for lower middle income country. UMI = dummy variable for upper middle income
country. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Results for time dummies not reported. All explantory
variables are lagged by one year (i.e., by t  1). Number of observations is 666 in all model
specications. International War = dummy variable, equals 1 when countries are involved in an
international conict; data drawn from an update of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict
Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Government Size = ratio of government consumption to real
GDP; data drawn from the PENN World Tables (Heston et al., 2009). Ethnic Fractionalization
= (constant) index of ethnic heterogeneity; data drawn from Alesina et al. (2003).
Table 4.7: Negative Binomial Regression Results with Additional
Control Variables
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By contrast, we found that economic growth mattered to the lower middle income
countries in our sample (e.g., Guatemala, Ecuador), but not to the upper middle income
economies (e.g., Chile, Brazil). We argued that one the one hand, slower socio-economic
progress (compared to the UMI countries) coupled with a lower initial level of economic
development made it more likely for socio-economic causes to matter to the calculus of
(potential) terrorists and their supporters, thereby, e.g., increasing terrorist mobilization
and popular support. On the other hand, we hypothesized that low levels of institutional
and state capacity (that correlate with a countrys level of economic development) meant
that the LMI countries dedicated fewer resources to policy means (e.g., social security
spending) that would have otherwise ameliorated economic grievances, making it more
plausible that socio-economic factors mattered to terrorist activity in these countries. That
is, for the LMI countries there may have been a causal e¤ect of growth on terrorism by
virtue of its impact on the costs, benets and opportunity costs of violence. This does not
seem to be true for the UMI countries.
The panel causality analysis results were further supported by a series of negative bino-
mial regressions. The results indicated that economic performance exerted a heterogeneous
causal inuence on terrorism, with growth only mattering to terrorism in the LMI coun-
tries. While the inclusion of additional controls did not compromise the main ndings
of this contribution, it showed that a variety of further factors also swayed the patterns
of terrorism in Latin America. Our contribution indicated that terrorism in Latin Amer-
ica between 1970 and 2007 was fostered by population size, political instability, military
spending, the dynamics of the Cold War era, low levels of socio-economic development and
economic integration, and intermediate levels of political openness. That is, in addition to
having shown that short-run economic performance mattered to terrorism in Latin Amer-
ica, our study also highlighted the importance of structural economic, politico-historic,
military and institutional factors in Latin American terrorism.
Our analysis has several implications. First, future research should more thoroughly
consider the potentially complex nexus between terrorism and economic performance, e.g.,
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by acknowledging the existence of feedback or heterogeneous causality. Underestimating
this potential complexity may lead to biased results. Second, for Latin America we nd
no evidence that terrorism produced economic damage. From an aggregate point of view,
excessive spending on counter-terrorism may even be harmful to growth as it redirects re-
sources from more productive investments.21 The countries of Latin America would be well
advised to sustain their macroeconomic resiliency, and future research may try to identify
those factors that matter to it (e.g., diversication, institutional quality). Third, for the
LMI countries there is evidence that strong economic growth reduced terrorism, even net of
the inuence of further variables. This nding is in line with Frey and Luechinger (2003),
as it indicates that an appropriate tool in the ght against terrorism is to raise its opportu-
nity costs in addition to raising terrorisms material costs by promoting socio-economic
progress and participation. Policies that foster growth and strengthen institutional quality
(so as to mitigate grievances associated with macroeconomic uctuations and the lack of
economic participation) may hence also pay o¤ in the shape of reduced violence.
21However, it is challenging for a government to identify the right amount of counter-terrorism expen-
ditures, so as to avoid ine¢ ciencies, given that the level of terrorism ought to depend on the level of
counter-terrorism spending. What is more, the loss of life from terrorism and the potentially substantial
e¤ect of terrorism on political and sub-national and industry-specic economic development may call for
strong counter-terrorism measures, regardless of potential ine¢ ciencies on national levels.
129
Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
This doctoral thesis focused on the relationship between socio-economic factors and ter-
rorists activity. For one, it was motivated by the popular discourse which suggests that
socio-economic conditions determine terrorism "poverty causes terrorism" and that ter-
rorist activity inicts substantial economic costs on attacked economies. For another, it was
inspired by the inconclusive academic evidence regarding the dynamics of the terrorism-
economy nexus, with empirical studies on the economic causes and consequences of terror-
ism being plagued by a number of potential methodological and conceptual shortcomings.
This thesis tried to shed further light on a number of research questions. First, does terror-
ism have economic roots? Second, does terrorism produce (noticeable) economic damage?
Third, what is the causal relationship between terrorism and the economy; particularly,
does feedback exists, indicating the presence of a vicious circle of increased terrorist and re-
duced economic activity? Fourth, is there evidence of heterogeneity in the economic causes
and consequences of terrorism; particularly, which factors specic to certain countries or
parts of the world may explain this heterogeneity? Finally, do methodological issues (data
sources, measurement issues, econometric methods etc.) add to a better understanding of
the terrorism-economy nexus?
The core of this doctoral thesis consists of three research papers that contribute to an-
swering these research questions, while also addressing the methodological and conceptual
shortcomings associated with the study of the terrorism-economy nexus. The results of
these contributions Terrorism in the World of Welfare Capitalism (Chapter 2), Causal
Linkages between Domestic Terrorism and Economic Growth (Chapter 3) and Economic
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Performance and Terrorist Activity in Latin America (Chapter 4) can be summarized as
follows (R1-R4):
(R1) There is a unidirectional (negative) causal e¤ect of economic variables on terrorist
activity for Western Europe and Latin America. The ndings of this thesis conict with
the empirical mainstream on the roots of terrorism which does not attribute an important
role to economic factors in terrorism. Yet, the empirical mainstream usually does not
account for heterogeneity in the causes of terrorism, instead assuming a uniform terrorist
calculus which economic factors enter the same way across the board and estimating
an "average" e¤ect of economic variables on terrorist activity. As a matter of fact, the
evidence provided by this thesis suggests that terrorism- and country-specic factors matter
and that heterogeneity needs to be accounted for. For one, terrorists ideology arguably
governs its responsiveness to economic incentives, with terrorist groups geared towards
economic change (e.g., left-wing terrorism) being more responsive to it than groups geared
towards broad social change (e.g., Islamist terrorism). For another, country-specic factors
(e.g., the level of socio-economic development and the quality of institutions associated
with the provision of social policies) also play a role, e.g., by safeguarding a su¢ cient
spread of economic success. Terrorism in Western Europe and Latin America the focus
of this thesis seems to be particularly responsive to socio-economic incentives due to
terrorism-specic and country-specic reasons (e.g., through the provision of functioning
institutions that facilitate economic redistribution). Future research may try to identify
which terrorism-specic (e.g., ideology) and country-specic (e.g., institutions) factors may
explain why there is obvious heterogeneity in the economic causes of terrorism.
(R2) For Western Europe and Latin America there is evidence of (homogeneous) non-
causality from terrorism to economic performance, meaning that terrorism has no negative
e¤ect on economic growth. Again, this conicts with the empirical mainstream on the
macroeconomic consequences of terrorism which usually nds that terrorism is detrimental
to economic activity. As with the roots of terrorism, terrorism- and country-specic fac-
tors help to reconcile the ndings of this thesis with the empirical mainstream. For one,
131
terrorist activity in Western Europe and Latin America seems to have been a rather rare,
peripheral phenomenon primarily directed against non-business targets, making economic
repercussions from terrorism rather unlikely.1 For another, country-specic factors, which
shape the robustness of attacked economies to terrorism, seem to play a role. Through-
out this thesis it was argued that economic size and institutional quality are among those
country-specic factors that are positively associated with a countrys macroeconomic re-
siliency to terrorism. Future research, however, may try to identify more accurately which
terrorism-specic (e.g., targets of terrorism) and country-specic (economic size, demo-
cratic institutions etc.) matter to the heterogeneity regarding the economic e¤ects of
terrorism, where future large-N studies are also advised to take this heterogeneity into
account.
(R3) There seem to be substantial di¤erences between the economic roots and e¤ects
of domestic and transnational terrorism. This thesis focused on the underanalyzed issue of
domestic terrorism, nding that this kind of terrorism at least for Western Europe and
Latin America has socio-economic roots, but produces little economic damage. The fact
that the empirical mainstream has primarily analyzed the determinants and repercussions
of transnational terrorism may (party) explain why the ndings of this thesis conict with
this mainstream. On the one hand, it seems that domestic terrorism is more strongly related
to (domestic) socio-economic conditions, while international factors (e.g., globalization, for-
eign policy) seem to more strongly inuence the emergence of transnational terrorism. On
the other hand, domestic terrorism seems to be less dangerous to economic development
than transnational terrorism, even though the former is usually far more common than
the latter. Presumably, this is because, e.g., transnational terrorism carries further eco-
nomic risks (e.g., by deliberately targeting outward-oriented sectors of an economy), while
its control is associated with collective action problems due to its international nature
1For instance, Sanchez-Cuenca and De La Calle (2011) show that almost half of the lethal terrorist
activity in Western Europe between 1965 and 2005 was directed against military targets (the police, military,
paramilitaries etc.), while there were almost no deadly attacks against entrepreneuers.
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(e.g., Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2011).2 Future research may provide additional compara-
tive studies on the (economic) origins and e¤ects of domestic and transnational terrorism,
given that there is little evidence that both kinds of terrorism interact symmetrically with
the economy.
(R4) The use of alternative datasets (e.g., the GTD), socio-economic variables (e.g.,
social spending instead of GDP p.c.) and econometric techniques (panel VAR, causality
tests etc.) may contribute to a better understanding of the terrorism-economy nexus. For
instance, in this doctoral thesis (cf. Chapter 3) tools of time-series analysis (unit root
tests, VAR, Granger causality tests) were used to simultaneously consider the causal e¤ect
of terrorism on the economy and vice versa, while previous empirical research has assumed
a "xed" causal relationship between the two. Given the inconclusive evidence on the
economic causes and consequences of terrorism as it follows from "standard" empirical
analyses on these issues, it seems appropriate that future research continues to employ
alternative empirical approaches. One recent examples of such an alternative approach is
Blomberg et al. (2011) who study the role of ideology and country-specic variables on
the duration of terrorist groups (while the dependent variable in related "conventional"
analyses is the number of attacks these groups produce).
Previously, the implications of the results of this doctoral thesis for future research were
already highlighted when discussing its main ndings. However, some policy implications
(P1-P4) can also be deduced:
(P1) Attacked economies in Western Europe and Latin America appear to be su¢ ciently
resilient to the economic threat of domestic terrorism. While counter-terrorism spending
may benet certain sectors of the economy such as, e.g., the defence industry (e.g., Koh,
2007; Berrebi and Klor, 2010), it seems to be ine¢ cient to allocate economic resources
to the ght against domestic terrorism when its economic costs are negligible and when
this resource allocation hurts the commitment to other forms of (growth-inducing) pub-
2See Lee (1988) and Sandler (2005) for an in-depth discussion of collective action problems (e.g., free
and paid riding) associated with the ght against transnational terrorism.
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lic investment on, e.g., health, infrastructure or education (Gupta et al., 2004). Rather,
it seems su¢ cient that attacked economies in Western Europe and Latin America up-
hold their robustness to domestic terrorism through policies that foster, e.g., institutional
quality, decentralization and economic diversication. Alternatively, they may focus their
counter-terrorism e¤orts on the prevention of transnational terrorism which seems to more
dangerous to economic activity.
(P2) Given that the results of this thesis indicate that terrorism in Western Europe
and Latin America is (partly) rooted in unfavorable socio-economic conditions, countries
in these parts of the world may benet from policies that promote economic growth (i.e.,
policies that increase the economic pie) or that facilitate economic participation and re-
distribution (i.e., policies that distribute the economic pie more fairly). Such policies are
expected to inuence the terroristscalculus in ways that make violence less likely, par-
ticularly given that ideological alignment and goals of terrorist groups in Western Europe
and Latin America seem to be prominently shaped by economic motives. Consistent with
rational-choice theory, such policies ought to deter terrorism by raising the opportunity
costs of terrorism (e.g., by improving socio-economic redistribution)
(P3) As a rst caveat, the prevalence of heterogeneity in the causes and consequences of
terrorism highlighted throughout this thesis does not suggest that the previous policy
implications can be easily transferred to other parts of the world. For one, it seems to be
the case that countries outside Western Europe and Latin America (e.g., in Sub-Saharan
Africa and the Middle East) are more vulnerable to terrorism and may thereby more
strongly benet from counter-terrorism e¤orts (e.g., Sandler and Enders, 2008; Gaibulloev
and Sandler, 2011). For another, terrorism in Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia
seems to be less responsive to socio-economic incentives, where terrorism in these parts of
the world is geared more towards religious motives (e.g., Islamist terrorism), while weak
institutions do not provide su¢ cient means of socio-economic participation (e.g., Kitschelt,
2004; Kutan, 2004; Piazza, 2007; Freeman, 2008). In fact, some evidence indicates that
demographic (e.g., youth burdens), politico-institutional (e.g., kleptocratic regimes) and
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international (e.g., foreign policy) factors and trends matter more decisively to terrorism
outside Western Europe and Latin America (e.g., Kitschelt, 2004; Piazza, 2007; Freeman,
2008). Consequently, these countries may more strongly benet from policies that ame-
liorate unfavorable demographic, political and international rather than socio-economic
conditions. These ndings suggests that socio-economic underdevelopment is neither a
necessary nor su¢ cient conditions for the emergence of terrorism.
(P4) As a second caveat, it seems necessary to hint at the possibility that socio-economic
success may not automatically "buy" internal peace. This is because economic progress is
likely to matter di¤erently to active terrorists and to those parts of the population that
support terrorism by, e.g., providing nancial and other material resources or sanctuary.
The economic (rational) calculus of the former can be expected to be less responsive to
economic incentives, particularly when a supreme value ideology (e.g., Islamism) is involved
(e.g., Bernholz, 2004, 2006) or when surrendering means to face long prison sentences
due to committed crimes. Therefore, a number of studies on the economics of counter-
terrorism suggest that active ("hard-core") members of a terrorist groups can be better
fought by means that destroy the social cohesion of these groups, e.g., through principal
witness programs, amnesties or the inltration of such groups by double agents (Frey and
Luechinger, 2003; Abrahms, 2008). Following this line of reasoning, economic progress then
seems to be more likely to reduce terrorism by shrinking popular support for terrorism on
which many terrorist groups crucially depend (Paul, 2010). Economic growth and access
to economic resources through participatory and redistributionary policies ought to raise
the opportunity costs of terrorist supporters and future recruits, while these groups in
comparison to active members at the same time do not face the (potentially prohibitively)
high costs of leaving terrorism behind. Indeed, Cronin (2006) nds that many terrorist
groups have ceased to exists due to the failure of generational transition and a loss of
popular support, where both of these developments are likely to be aided by socio-economic
improvements for those parts of the population that would have otherwise been sympathetic
or supportive of terrorism.
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The Chinese revolutionary Mao Zedong famously argued that the "[...] guerrilla must
move amongst the people as a sh swims in the sea" (cited in Paul, 2010: 488). For
one, the ndings of this thesis suggest that economic systems in Western Europe and
Latin America are su¢ ciently resilient to withstand the terrorist threat of the "shes".
For another, its ndings also suggest that through socio-economic incentives provided by,
e.g., sound economic growth and welfare policies terrorism in these parts of the world
can be e¤ectively marginalized, draining its popular appeal and support (i.e., "the sea")
through the provision of non-violent economic alternatives which raise the opportunity
costs of terrorism.
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